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For Jacqueline Rae, without whom this project, this fulfilling career, and this amazing life would not be possible.

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ABSTRACT

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What is the nature of White racial attitudes in the age of Obama? This dissertation project seeks to answer this question in three distinct ways. The first empirical chapter examines the role of economic insecurity and education on White racial attitudes. The second empirical chapter evaluates the relative importance of individual vs. contextual factors in shaping Whites' attitudes about race. The third empirical chapter seeks to evaluate the extent to which racial color-blindness (as opposed to other racial attitudes) motivates White opposition to race-targeted programs. Findings in empirical chapters one and two are conditional, while clear evidence is demonstrated that color-blindness does not predict white opposition to race-targeted programs in empirical chapter three. Implications for the future study of white racial attitudes are discussed.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Though much is known today about the nature of racial prejudice among those in the US who identify as White, a number of things remain unclear. Since the middle of the twentieth century in particular, Sociological research has made great strides in describing, explaining and even sometimes predicting the expression of White racial attitudes. In spite of this progress, however, a number of important debates among race scholars remain and are worthy of closer scrutiny.

Research has long documented, for instance, that education seems to be an antidote to racial prejudice, but the reasons *why* increased education is associated with increased tolerance remains a source of debate in the racial attitudes literature. Another source of contention in the research is concerned with the role of social context- as opposed to individual experiences and characteristics- in shaping racial attitudes. How might one's own educational profile, for example, influence one's racial attitudes as compared with the influence the socio-economic context in which she finds herself? Yet another important debate among scholars is the degree to which racial- as opposed to explicitly non-racial attitudes shape the public policy preferences of non-white citizens in the United States. Is the substantial White opposition to race targeted programs driven, for example, by a color-blind rejection of group-based claims, or a result of color-conscious group-based evaluations? These

are the important debates in the racial attitudes scholarship to which the work of this dissertation project are addressed.

This dissertation will attempt to attend to these questions, among others, in order to advance our understanding of White racial attitudes at a unique socio-historical moment. The project will make use of three advantages in order to make original contributions to the racial attitudes literature. First, most of the data used in this dissertation were drawn in a period of unique racial salience in US society. The rise to power of the first person of color to the presidency, the growth of racial inequalities, and a number of high-profile racial incidents have foregrounded the issue in a way that was not true for most White citizens in the recent past (Chetty et al. 2014, Forman 2014, Warren 2013, Wilson and Brewer 2013). Second, this dissertation uses a several measures not available to earlier survey researchers. For example, chapter four benefits from the use of the first direct measure of racial color-blindness ever included in a nationally representative sample. Finally, as in chapter three, panel data are applied to questions that have previously been analyzed almost exclusively with cross-sectional data. Measurement of phenomena as complex and dynamic as racial attitudes benefit from the repeated within-person analysis-- when possible. These three unique features allow for direct adjudication of important questions that linger in racial attitudes literature.

Chapter two of this dissertation helps to advance our understanding of just how education and economic insecurity influence a variety of racial attitudes. Specifically, the analysis in chapter two addresses a debate in the literature about whether or not education reduces prejudice by enlightening subjects (Hodson and Busseri 2012, Kahn 1951,

Lopez, Gurin and Nagda 1998) or by conferring status advantages that insulate them from competition with lower-status people of color (Glaser 2001, Jackman and Muha 1984, Wodtke 2012). Chapter three of this dissertation offers new evidence associated with a debate about the role played by contextual and individual factors in shaping racial prejudice. Specifically, the analysis helps to clarify a debate in the literature about whether local contextual factors such as racial composition (Avery and Fine 2012, Monnat 2010, Quillian 1996) or socioeconomic environment (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011, Taylor and Reyes 2014) are more important than personal characteristics (Hogan, Chiricos and Gertz 2005, Richmond 1950). The final empirical chapter, chapter four, addresses a debate in the racial policy attitudes literature about whether or not anti-black prejudice at least in part contributes to white opposition to programs like Affirmative Action. Specifically, the analysis in the chapter attends to a debate in the research among those who find that such opposition is the result of "new racism" (Kluegel and Smith 1983, Oh et al. 2010, Wilson and Brewer 2013) and those who argue that opposition is animated by "principled opposition" (Sniderman, Tetlock and Carmines 1993, Sniderman and Carmines 1997).

1.1 Background and Purpose

Renowned scholar WEB DuBois remarked famously more than 110 years ago now that "…the problem of the twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line." If at the dawn of that century, the assertion was more or less uncontroversial, only in retrospect is its gravity so apparent (Du Bois 2003). What some scholars have audaciously called "The American Century," was characterized as much as anything else by racial conflict and injustice. The 20th century opened with an epidemic of racial

terrorism and lynching in the US South, Anti-Chinese hysteria, rioting and exclusion in the West, and a burgeoning Eugenics movement directed at "the lower European races" in the East and Midwest (Lieberson 1980, Olzak 1992, Omi and Winant 1994). The century would see terrible violence and oppression across the color line – especially between the descendants of slaves and those identified as white- but also a gradual, if sometimes volatile, erosion of the system of White Supremacy to which DuBois earlier referred.

That slow erosion is still ongoing, and as the important work of countless scholars has demonstrated, is far from finished (Alexander, Entwisle and Olson 2014, Bobo et al. 2012, Hutchings and Valentino 2004, Neal and Rick 2014). While it is true that much has changed since the dawn of the twentieth century, our society remains deeply racialized in terms of both our attitudes and our life chances. The manifestations of these ongoing- and in many cases, worsening- inequalities are many. There are, for example, ongoing significant racial barriers in access to and advancement in US labor markets (Alexander 2010, Kmec 2003, Pager 2007, Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012), significant racial inequality in access to and cost in housing markets (Massey and Denton 1993, Massey, Rothwell and Domina 2009, Oliver and Shapiro 2006, Rugh and Massey 2010), racial discrimination in rental markets (Alexander 2010, Bavan 2007), significant racialization in the formation and administration of welfare policy (Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010, Gilens 1999, Soss, Fording and Schram 2011), unequal access to education and differential provision of school discipline (Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 1999, Welch and Allison Ann 2010), significant racial differentials in rates of victimization, arrest, length of sentencing, conviction, incarceration, and execution (Alexander,

Entwisle and Olson 2014, Alexander 2010, Neal and Rick 2014), and ongoing significant differences in health outcomes and incidence of excess death (Farmer and Ferraro 2005). In fact, in some measures such as school segregation, differential rates of incarceration, and wealth inequality, things are actually worse across the black/white color line than they were before the Civil Rights Movement (Alexander, Entwisle and Olson 2014, Alexander 2010, Massey, Rothwell and Domina 2009).

Yet, our society is deeply invested in a narrative of transcendence, a belief that race either no longer matters or is much less significant than it once was. Americans in general and White Americans in particular have always been invested in the idea that our institutions were fair and that individual failings were primarily responsible for what inequality exists (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Ignatiev 1995, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Roediger 1999). The perceptive disconnection from the actual circumstances or our current racial opportunity structure is such that US whites are now more likely to see anti-white bias as a significant social problem than anti-black bias (Norton and Sommers 2011).

In 1962, well before the establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or passage of the Civil Rights Act*,* a national poll found that 65 percent of white respondents agreed that workers of color had job opportunities equal to or better than their white peers (Wise 2010, Wise 2012). In other words, at a time when racial discrimination was not limited by statute and was openly practiced, a clear majority of Whites believed that African Americans had an equal chance in the job market. Forty years later, writing the opinion on behalf of the majority, Supreme Court justice O'Connor opined: "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will

no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." In the more than ten years since O'Connor penned those words, Affirmative Action programs have been rolled back and educational inequalities between Whites and African Americans in particular have grown (Bobo et al. 2012). Our perceptions of the state of our society, especially where racial "others" are concerned, are sometimes less than perfectly accurate.

These perceptions, along with other attitudes about race and racial policy are both the result and the cause of deeper structural and institutional systems of racial advantage and disadvantage (Merolla, Hunt and Serpe 2011). It is the very insulation from the daily struggles of people of color conferred by white privilege that allows a majority of white US citizens to believe what is manifestly untrue (Bonilla-Silva, Lewis and Embrick 2004). But those beliefs are not mere misapprehension of a complicated social phenomenon. They represent a set of interests, a set of ideologies, and ultimately a set of priorities. While it is certainly true that racist ideologies flourish in social circumstances of great inequality and deprivation, those ideologies also serve to generate, affirm, and maintain those social systems (Merolla, Hunt and Serpe 2011, Monnat 2010).

It is clear, in other words, that there is a (growing) gap in many ways between the realities of our racialized society and the perceptions that many whites hold about themselves, members of other racial groups, and the society in which we all live. Such is the relevance of the focused effort to understand the complicated nature of racial attitudes in the early twenty-first century. This project seeks to make a new accounting of several of the key issues associated with the racial attitudes literature. The ample record of racial inequalities and the unrealized expectations of many scholars and commentators demands that researchers better understand the way(s) in which we come to experience race and

how our experiences, our feelings, and our thoughts animate specific attitudes and political behavior. Complicated and highly technical as though they may be, these are not issues without import beyond the academy or beyond the few who read this text.

This project seeks, in sum, to contribute to the racial attitudes literature by providing analyses that further clarify and disentangle the complicated nature of the racial attitudes of white people in the contemporary United States. Though white attitudes are among the most studied, new data and unique measures will be employed here to test hypotheses previously untested in some cases, and to attempt to more robustly replicate key findings in others. It is hoped that these analyses will provide a clearer picture of what white attitudes actually are such that efforts at education and public policy promotion can be calibrated to address white people where they are- irrespective of where they claim to be.

1.2 Project Design

In a modern society that is more and more characterized by racial diversity, it is important to justify a focus on racial attitudes across the black/white color line. While it is certainly true that there is great diversity *within* racial groups attitudinally and otherwise, and that African-Americans are a shrinking proportion of the non-white part of US society, the black/white divide is unique in its historical and contemporary character. Differences in political attitudes- especially those about race- are greatest between Whites and African Americans. For example, in much of the US South more than 90% of whites voted for the Republican candidate in the last two presidential elections, while nearly 90% of African Americans voted for the Democratic candidate (Lee, Boeckelman and Day 2013). It is also true that inequalities in life chances are the most different

between black and white persons and their families (Alexander, Entwisle and Olson 2014, Alexander 2010, Chetty et al. 2014). Also, racial animosity toward and racial anxiety about black persons, institutions and interests is greater for white people than for any other group (Berinsky 2002, Bobo et al. 2012, Wilson and Brewer 2013). And finally, perhaps most pragmatically, the best-established and most thoroughly tested theories and measures in the racial attitudes literature have focused on the attitudes of white people *about* African Americans (Bobo et al. 2012, Bobo and Charles 2009, Quillian 2006, Schuman et al. 1997). It is certainly true that there are many important dimensions of racial attitudes between racial minority groups as well as the dynamics of racial perception of whites on the part of people(s) of color, but those objectives are beyond the scope of this project.

The racial attitudes literature is composed primarily of research generated using three different methodologies (in order of volume): survey research, experimental research, and ethnography. Each method, of course, has its own benefits and is best suited to different research questions, but in terms of both volume and impact factor, survey research is the most significant (Bobo et al. 2012). There are, of course many limitations of using surveys to assess white's attitudes about race. Primary among these is the lack of depth and nuance possible with uniform and closed-ended prompts on the one hand, and the ability of respondents to carefully and intentionally mask her attitudes on the other[1].

[1] For example, the implicit attitudes research undertaken by social psychologists in experimental settings has great value for overcoming the limitations of social desirability bias associated with the expression of racial prejudice. See Tynes and Markoe (2010)

If the objective of the researcher, however, is to evaluate the nature of racial attitudes among all the white citizens of the United States – and to test theories developed with qualitative and experimental work- then the advantages of survey research outweigh its limitations. In fact, those very evaluations and tests are the subject of this project. For all three substantive chapters, this project employs the use of what is considered the "gold standard" for survey research instrument in the Social Sciences: the General Social Survey (GSS). In all cases, the samples are constrained to non-Hispanic persons who identify as white; the most privileged ethno-racial group in US society, and the group for whom racial stratification is likely to be the least visible (Kurzman et al. 2014).

The data employed in the forthcoming chapters are also very recent- the data were collected between 2006 and 2010. This is significant not just in order to best evaluate racial attitudes as they presently exist, but also to take advantage of the dynamic economic and political circumstances at play in the United States over the course of the last decade. The significant economic downturn of the so called "great recession" coupled with the emergence of the first person of color in the White House directly implicate several of the theoretical questions involved in this research. It is hypothesized, then, that these relatively unique circumstances provide an ideal environment in which to test some of the questions of concern to this research.

1.3 Literatures Implicated

Many research literatures employed in this project are common across all three chapters, but several are distinct. The research presented here is deeply indebted not just to the great original research done by scholars, but also to the meta-analyses and literature reviews produced in the last several decades as well. In many cases, bodies of

research will be referenced briefly in some chapters and explored more deeply in others. For example, the role of education and political ideology are involved in the analyses of all chapters, but education is more central to the questions raised in chapter two, and political ideology more central to those in chapter four.

Common to all three chapters of this project is an interest in the research associated with several distinct racial attitude constructs. These attitudes, and the underlying social psychological mechanisms associated with each, are distinct from one another. As such, the terms "racism" and "prejudice" are used very little, if at all, in the analyses. Reference to and treatment of these attitudes (or indices constructed from discrete measures) are always treated as operating distinctly unless the research has suggested otherwise. Each chapter makes use of multiple attitudes or indices as outcome variables based precisely on this assertion of independence of these attitudes, well established by prior research. It is an effort to be clear and precise and to make narrow claims that animates this particular approach—with the expectation, for example, that one's level of education or local socioeconomic context have a different effect on traditional prejudice than they might on racial resentment.

Specifically, this project draws upon the research focused on research associated with seven different racial attitude constructs. The first three are implicated in all three chapters, while the final four show up only in chapter three. First, the idea of *Traditional Prejudice*, sometimes also referred to as "old fashioned racism," is a set of beliefs or attributions that cast the racial other in terms of (1) inherent inferiority and (2) immutable difference (Zamudio and Rios 2006). This attitude has seen the greatest decline in expression in the post-Civil Rights period, though many scholars suggest that its

expression is being masked or transmuted to different attitudes that are subject to less social sanction (Bobo et al. 2012, Quillian 2006). Second is the *Racial Resentment*, which is among the most studied and most frequently used constructs in the race and politics literature. Expression of this attitude is associated with a group-based assessment that non-whites (especially African Americans) have gotten more than they deserve, that black claims on equality are inappropriate or overreaching, and that agitation for racial justice will inevitably lead to a loss for white people (Tuch and Hughes 2011, Wilson and Davis 2011, Wilson and Brewer 2013). The final among the three that appear in all chapters is *Opposition To Race Targeting,* also referred to as "race policy attitudes." This is a set of explicitly policy-oriented attitudes in opposition to Affirmative Action or so-called set-asides- or in general programs that seem to target non-whites for resources, opportunity, or access (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo et al. 2012, Schuman et al. 1997). The remaining four attitude constructs: *Racial Apathy, Stratification Beliefs, Racial Affect, and Color- blindness,* are employed only in chapter three and will be discussed briefly in the coming summary of that chapter.

Beyond these specific racial attitudes, there is another area of research prominent to all three chapters: the literature associated with the so-called "group threat" theory of racial prejudice. Briefly, this vast body of research has documented an association between various attitudinal and social effects and the presence of a large number of members of a racial out-group, usually African Americans. Research in this area has linked increased expression of racial prejudice, more conservative racial politics, higher levels of lynching and other anti-black means of social control, increased levels of racial inequality, and even rates of social mobility for whites (Dixon 2006, Herman 2005,

Quillian 1995, Quillian 1996). The theoretical origin of this idea is that the presence of a sufficiently large out-group inspires in whites feelings of anxiety, exclusion and aggression in defense of group interests (Blalock 1957). It is suggested, then that the associations listed above, among many others, are the result of the anxiety induced by the perception of that threat. In spite of the reliability of its observation, this causal mechanism has lately come into question- with some research suggesting that a confounding factor might be the kinds of social contexts in which large numbers of non-whites usually reside (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011). This issue is discussed in all three chapters, but explored at length in chapter two.

The nature of the topic is one in which a great deal of work has been conducted by social scientists outside the Sociological discipline. Political Science and Psychology, in particular, have taken up many of the questions of interest to the present researcher. Some of the foundational work on racial attitudes upon which our best Sociological analyses are based, in fact, was created by Political Scientists. Whenever possible, however, the Sociological research referenced is given primacy, as is research published in Sociological journals. The majority of this research, of course, is conducted by Sociologists, but it is important to recognize the contributions of these other scholars, to highlight the shared concerns and – in particular—to note the consistent findings of researchers outside the discipline.

1.4 Chapter Two

In chapter one, the present author addresses two primary questions related to the expression of racial prejudice. First, the chapter employs several indicators of economic insecurity to evaluate the way(s) in which (perceived) vulnerability to threat from an out-

group might be at least partially responsible for the expression of prejudice. The chapter also takes account of the role of education- and its interaction with economic insecurity- in the expression of that racial prejudice. A primary animating question for this chapter was the question of whether and to what extent different levels of education might mitigate the experience of racial threat engendered by economic insecurity.

Since recent work has called into question the underlying mechanism behind the racial tolerance induced by increased levels of education, this chapter seeks to disentangle the presumed "enlightening" effects of education from the relative economic insulation that is also often conferred to the more well-educated. The chapter makes use of both subjective and objective measures of economic insecurity. With regard to the former, the chapter employs a subjective insecurity scale to capture the effect of multiple dimensions of economic insecurity. This is based on research that has suggested that it is the *perception* of threat rather than crossing a particular objective threshold that is important to shaping racial attitudes (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005, Gallagher 2003, Wong and Cho 2005).

In the analysis, the effect of insecurity at different levels of education are examined in order to better understand how these insecurities are manifested across levels of "enlightenment" and "insularity." This chapter seeks to make contributions both to the prejudice and education literatures, but especially to the less-well developed research in economic insecurity and prejudice.

1.5 Chapter Three

In chapter three, the present author seeks to robustly evaluate the nature of context effects on the racial attitudes of white people. Recent research has suggested that local

contexts are more important in explaining variation in the expression of racial attitudes than are individual demographic differences. This research has, however, relied on cross-sectional data and has yet to demonstrate the primacy of these contexts in a within-person effect. This chapter overcomes this limitation in the literature by using panel data from the inaugural GSS panel data set drawn between 2006 and 2010. Again, this time frame is critical given the amount of economic and political change observed between the two waves of observation.

Of specific interest to this chapter is whether and to what extent measures of local "racial threat" and local socioeconomic context might inform white racial attitudes. Though political and religious contexts have also been demonstrated to significantly influence racial attitudes, racial context (usually operationalized as "racial threat- see earlier references) and socioeconomic context have been the focus of most of the recent research showing large effects. In order to capture these context effects, these GSS panel data are appended to local racial demographic data from the US census and local unemployment rate from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Along with other key measures from the racial attitudes literature, these context effects are evaluated to get a multi-level picture of the sources of individual racial attitudes.

As in chapter one, three different kinds of outcome indicators- composed by five different dependent variables are modeled in chapter two. This approach allows the evaluation of the way that both context and individual effects impact *Racial Resentment, Traditional Prejudice,* and *Opposition to Race Targeting* differently. Given that, again, as the existing literature suggests- these racial attitudes operate distinctly from one another

and are differentially associated with various predictors- the measures have been included in separate models in this chapter.

1.6 Chapter Four

In chapter four, the present author seeks to advance the understanding of racial color-blindness in general, but also to adjudicate a key debate about the relationship between racial color-blindness and opposition to race targeted programs. Briefly, color-blindness is the attitude or orientation to race that suggests that race, racial differences, and racism are not important to the holder of the attitude. Further, it is a normative suggestion that race shouldn't be important to others and that it is (no longer) a useful social value (Bonilla-Silva 2003, Holoien and Shelton 2012, Lewis 2004, Mazzocco, Cooper and Flint 2012).

The chapter enters a debate between Sniderman and colleagues on the one hand; who suggest that opposition to race targeting is primarily driven by color-blindness, and Bobo and colleagues on the other, who suggest that this opposition is primarily driven by "new racism."

The chapter seeks, using a measure only recently available, to evaluate this association, but also to situate this relationship into the context of Bonilla-Silva's *color-blind racism*. This chapter, then, seeks to better understand how an endorsement of personal color-blindness fits into the debates existing in current literatures associated with racial attitudes and racial policy more broadly.

In order to fully test the "new racism" hypothesis informed by the work of Bobo and others, a variety of racial attitudes are modeled against the support for these race policy attitudes. The two mentioned above, *Traditional Prejudice and Racial Resentment*

are included in the analyses, but so *Color-blindness* are three others. *Racial Apathy* is a construct fairly recent identified by Forman (2000, 2004) and others that describes an attitude of unconcern or apathy with racism and racial inequality. Thus far, the construct has been identified as empirically distinct from other racial attitudes, but yet untested against support for race targeted programs- one of the objectives of this chapter (Berinsky 2002, Forman 2010). *Racial Affect, or* racial distance, is also included in models predicting this opposition. Following Bogardus (1947), this construct captures affective orientation toward members of the out-group- usually evaluating how "warmly" a respondent feels about members of the out-group or how willing that respondent is engage in various levels of intimate contact with those persons (Bogardus 1947, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Tolsma, Graaf and Quillian 2009). Finally, *Stratification Beliefs* are the subject of a substantial body of research in the racial attitudes literature. This construct evaluates the degree to which respondents make individual, cultural, or structural attributions for racial inequality. In general, this literature focuses on how and why respondents make sense of the racial hierarchy and distribution of social resources and opportunities across the color line (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Kluegel and Smith 1983).

The objective of this chapter, then, is to evaluate how all of these racial attitude constructs effect opposition to race targeted programs in general, and to test the role of individual color-blindness in particular. Six different measures of support for race targeting are used in order to capture attitudinal effects that are either distinct or relatively universal across different measures of race targeting.

1.7 Summary

The data used here were drawn and are presently analyzed in what many have referred to as "*The Age of Obama;"* a phrase that both refers to a presidential administration, but more significantly also denotes an important moment of contestation about the role of race in US society. Though primarily focused on more parochial concerns, this dissertation might be described as an effort to understand that state of white racial attitudes in this unique moment- the age of Obama.

In the coming pages, the present author seeks to provide unique and valuable insights into the complex nature of racial attitudes in the United States in the early 21st century. By measuring constructs in new ways and by subjecting data to new analyses, a sincere effort is made to advance the racial attitudes literature. The debates in these areas are ongoing and complex, and this project seeks to provide new ways to think about the important questions and to provide new conclusions about the nature of racial prejudice.

In exploring issues of insecurity, education, local context, and the nature of color-blindness, this project is designed to capture a diversity of different factors using a diversity of quantitative methods. It is intended, overall, to provide a solid review of the racial attitudes literature in general and a much more focused review of the specific literatures identified above. In the aggregate, these chapters aim to provide a meaningful understanding of the nature of white racial attitudes in a very contentious time in US history.

Though data and method were carefully chosen in every case, it should be noted that the research presented in the following pages is limited by the availability of the data and the level of the complexity of possible analyses. These limitations, were however, the

impetus for numerous innovations and the discovery of relationships and methods not initially anticipated. In this way, the analyses that follow benefited from these limitations as much as they were constrained by them.

CHAPTER 2. TOLERANCE, INSULATION, OR NEITHER? EDUCATION, ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND PREJUDICE

2.1 Abstract

Though frequently invoked, the relationship between economic insecurity and out-group bias has been under-examined in the racial prejudice literature. The present chapter makes use of a well-established correlate of racial tolerance-- education-- to establish whether and to what extent increased education and the lower level of economic insecurity it often brings might establish a buffer from competition with people of color. The study makes use of unique insecurity measures available for the first time in the 2010 panel sample of the General Social Survey. Findings suggest modest evidence of insecurity effects and that the interaction of education and insecurity produce only a moderate effect on one attitudinal measure on the variety of racial attitudes examined. Implications for further study of prejudice are discussed.

There are few more reliable or robust predictors of racial prejudice in surveys than the respondent's level of education. Put simply, more educated respondents are less likely to express prejudice than their less-well educated peers (Bobo et al. 2012, Glaser 2001, Jackman and Muha 1984, Wodtke 2012). The underlying mechanism for this relationship however, is debated. On one side of this debate are those who have suggested that the effect of increased education is that it alleviates ignorance and misunderstanding- that it confers "enlightenment" (Allport 1954, Gomez and Wilson 2006, Hodson and

Busseri 2012, Kahn 1951, Park 2009). On the other side are those who have suggested that increased education merely gives those who enjoy it better tools to hide their prejudice while insulating them from the competitive dynamics that engender racial animosity (Jackman and Muha 1984, Wodtke 2012).

Those who advance the second argument, which might be referred to as the "insulation thesis," have not, however, empirically tested the underlying latent process at the core of this thesis: the idea that education insulates persons from the threats of economic insecurity. If it is true that education reduces prejudice (or more broadly the expression of racially conservative attitudes) because respondents are less likely to *feel* threatened by an out-group, then it should be possible to demonstrate that relatively well educated persons who experience economic insecurity should express less prejudice than less-well educated economically insecure persons. Such an "insulation" phenomenon may be the result of either economic privilege that confers actual labor market insulation from competition with people of color on the one hand, or a kind of cognitive insulation that is the result of relative educational advantage in the context of insecurity on the other. The present chapter is interested in an empirical test of the latter form of "insulation."

It is also notable that the relationship between economic insecurity and prejudice as been under-examined in the Sociological literature. Though frequently referenced in both the common and academic discourses, there are surprisingly few direct tests of this relationship. It is widely assumed, for example, that as one's economic fortunes wane, s/he will be more receptive to scapegoating of racial and ethnic out-groups and more likely to support policies that derogate members of those groups. The few examples of

efforts to test this relationship in the Social Science literatures include single measures of insecurity, often employed as control variables, and often with a focus on attitudes about immigrants and immigration policy. In order to more clearly establish this relationship, deeper examination is needed.

The present chapter seeks to fill these two gaps in the literature first by identifying the key factors associated with economic insecurity with special attention to the role education might play. The goal is to establish the degree to which education may "insulate" one from the experience of insecurity in the first place. Second, this article will deeply and directly test the relationship between economic insecurity and diverse racial attitudes using rich new data recently available to scholars. Nuanced and discrete measures of economic insecurity will be employed here to shed new light on this frequently assumed relationship. Finally, this study will test the effects of education on the relationship between economic insecurity and prejudice in order to fully flesh out the "insulation thesis" and demonstrate what insulatory benefit, if any, education confers to those who experience economic insecurity. In addressing these gaps in the extant research, the present chapter seeks also to provide a clearer link between macro-level group dynamics and individual-level Social Psychological processes only intimated previously.

2.2 Background

As mentioned previously, the relationship between economic insecurity and prejudice has been used primarily as a secondary or control variable in most Sociological analyses, in spite of its relative theoretical centrality to many research models. In fact, the only Sociological study to explicitly analyze the link between anti-Black prejudice

among Whites and (objective) economic insecurity was conducted more than 50 years ago in England and revealed only a very weak and contextually novel relationship- one heavily intertwined with the immigrant status of the overwhelming number of the African-descended objects of the prejudiced attitudes (Richmond 1950). Although there has been no comprehensive study focusing primarily on the impact of perceived economic insecurity on Whites' attitudes toward African Americans in the US, a number of studies have been undertaken to test variations of this relationship in a variety of other contexts. Recent work for example, has even examined the interaction of local Hispanic population composition and economic insecurity on the attitudes of African Americans, finding weak or no effects (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Gay 2006; Taylor and Schroeder 2010).

In more general terms, several studies have been conducted to describe the relationship between native white economic status (variously operationalized) and attitudes about immigration, both within the United States (Becker, Wagner and Christ 2011, Burns and Gimpel 2000, Citrin et al. 1997, Kessler 2001, McClain et al. , Valentino, Brader and Jardina 2013) and in Europe (Kunovich and Hodson 2002, Kunovich 2004, Quillian 1995, Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002, Semyonov et al. 2004, Sniderman 2000). Results of this work are mixed, but none of the extant research suggests that economic factors act alone as the primary factor in shaping attitudes about immigration and immigrants in either the US or Europe.

Previous literature examining whites' racial attitudes toward racial or ethnic out-groups has examined the influence of various (mostly objective) indicators more directly. For example, correlates of out-group derogation with measures of social or economic

position such as employment status (Quillian 1995, Quillian 1996, Taylor 1998, Taylor 2000), social mobility (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1956, Lauterbach 1952, Seeman, Rohan and Milton 1966, Silberstein and Seeman 1959), status discrepancy (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1956, Lauterbach 1952, Stephan et al. 2002, Stryker 1959, Treiman 1966), group labor market position (Cummings 1980, Noel and Pinkney 1964), and even studies of community or state-level economic indicators (Avery and Fine 2012, Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011) A final category of research focusing on white racial attitudes and social position is the so-called "self-interest" or "realistic group threat" literature-most of which has focused perceived economic interests and opposition to government aid to perceived out-groups (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Kinder and Sears 1981, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Stephan et al. 2002, Turner, Brown and Tajfel 1979). The consensus of this research is twofold. First, any effect of economic or social position on racial attitudes is highly contingent on a number of other factors and is almost never a significant factor in explaining variation in the incidence of prejudice. Second, so-called self-interest evaluations are weak to non-existent as predictors of racial attitudes- especially when compared with the effect of perceptions of threat to whites as a group (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo 1998, Huddy and Feldman 2009, Jacobson 1985).

None of this previous research has properly and fully taken account of robust measures of economic insecurity in order to once and for all address the assumption that economic insecurity "causes" prejudice. The gap in the research left empty by those who assume that insecurity is an underlying mechanism for "group threat" or other theories of prejudice is the focus of the present chapter. Namely, the primary aim of this chapter is to

more fully characterize economic insecurity and explore its causes and consequences. In particular, previous research has demonstrated a strong association between increased formal education and racial attitudes. Theoretically, scholars have suggested that higher education "enlightens" and reduces white racial animus. And some have even speculated that part of the education effect is because the more educated typically have more stable and higher paying jobs and therefore less likely to feel economic insecurity than their less educated counterparts (Glaser 2001, Wodtke 2012) or simply become more sophisticated in the masking of their prejudice (Jackman and Muha 1984).

Although some potential indicators of insecurity have been included in previous research, they are primarily used as control variables. In this article, I focus on economic insecurity as a potentially key mediating factor between demographic characteristics – especially education- and racial attitudes. For example, individuals with higher levels of education tend to report less anti-black sentiment compared to those with less education (Glaser 2001, Gomez and Wilson 2006, Hodson and Busseri 2012, Jackman and Muha 1984, Kahn 1951, Radloff 2007, Wodtke 2012). The reasons for this relationship are debated, but it is hypothesized here that an interaction between education and insecurity might extend the present understanding of the dynamics of prejudice.

Three core questions are addressed in this article. First, what factors are associated with economic insecurity? Second, to what extent does economic insecurity mediate the association between key demographic characteristics and racial attitudes? And finally, does the effect of insecurity on racial attitudes differ for the more educated compared to the less educated? By answering these questions, the present research will

make a critical contribution to understanding the underlying mechanisms associated with prejudice and social position.

Economic insecurity will be operationalized in this study in terms of both subjective (3 items) and objective (1 item) indicators. As detailed above, objective measures like work status, previous unemployment, and income have been employed by other researchers interested in the causes and effects of insecurity, will be thus included in the present analysis. Numerous novel subjective measures available for the first time in the third wave of the recent panel survey conducted by the GSS will also be analyzed to take account of the respondent's perception of her/his own economic insecurity. These indicator variables are more numerous and more complex, and as a result offer a more direct link to the individual experience with insecurity. As was famously argued by W.I. Thomas, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas 1969). Along this line, there is a body of research that demonstrates that it is the *perception* of economic threat that is most relevant to formulation of prejudice, so it follows that the *perception* of insecurity and vulnerability is most salient in the formulation and expression of prejudice (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Gallagher 2003, McLaren 2003, Semyonov et al. 2004)

The present research is informed most substantially by four literatures, all of which will be briefly discussed here. Included here are brief reviews of the relevant research on (1) the effects of inter-group contact, (2) the effects of education on prejudice, (3) the research on the social causes and effects of economic insecurity, and (4) a brief general survey of the broader literature on racial attitudes research. Each area of research, though inter-related with the others, is of unique value to this study. Where

possible, efforts have been made to highlight the areas in which there are substantive disagreements, as well as ways in which researchers substantially agree.

2.3 The Threat vs. Contact Debate

There is perhaps no topic in the prejudice literature on which there has been more focus than the effect of inter-group contact on the attitudes, behaviors, and policy prerogatives of white people. This debate is relevant to the current study for several reasons. First, I seek to add to the existing body of literature in this area by the inclusion of two subjective measures of inter-racial contact in each the models. Second, a clearer understanding of the role of insecurity might offer valuable insight into the underlying mechanisms for the so-called group threat theory. Finally, given the centrality of the role of *perception* of threat, the present chapter aims to foreground the importance of one's own evaluation of her circumstances, whether that be the presence of a threat or one's vulnerability to that threat.

In what is often referred to as the "mere contact hypothesis" of racial prejudice, Allport (1954) suggested that much of the observed racial prejudice among whites was as a result of stereotypes developed in the absence of substantive contact with members of the racial-out-group. The assumption in this model was that more contact with those outside of one's own racial group drives down prejudice by providing a more complex and nuanced understanding of the group of which the subjects of prejudice are a part. This perspective came under substantial criticism by scholars who noted at first that, especially in terms of black/white contact, the areas of the country with relatively high rates of inter-racial contact were places in which prejudice and discrimination were most prominent. In response to this criticism, scholars have argued that contact can indeed

reduce prejudice, provided that the contact is "congenial, non-competitive, and sustained." More recent scholars have pointed out that they key to contact is not just the type of contact (personal relationships are best for attenuating prejudice), but the environment in which the contact takes place. When whites encounter non-whites in equal-status, low-stakes, mutually beneficial contexts, (such as friendship for example) that contact has been repeatedly demonstrated to reduce the expression of prejudice (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004, Dixon 2006).

Beginning with Blumer's (1958) suggestion that racial prejudice was a product of group position and Blalock's (1956) examination of the effect of the black population on discrimination, scholars have followed the thread of a so-called "group threat" theory of prejudice. The key contention of this perspective- one in direct contrast to the contact theory- is that as the size of the racially-othered (usually Black) population increases, white anxiety, prejudice, and hostility also increase. Scholars in diverse disciplines have linked the "percent black" population parameter with various measures of prejudice, discrimination, racial inequality, within-race gender inequality, support for punitive criminal justice policies, opposition to race targeted policies, and incidence of lynching among many, many others (Avery and Fine 2012, Becker, Wagner and Christ 2011, Berg 2009, Campbell, Wong and Citrin 2006, Corzine, Creech and Corzine 1983, Dixon 2006, Giles and Evans 1985, King and Melissa 2007, Quillian 1995, Quillian 1996, Semyonov et al. 2004, Taylor 1998, Wagner et al. 2006). Over and over, with various levels of specificity using increasingly complex models, racial population composition- especially "percent black"- seems to have a significant effect on white racial attitudes and behaviors. There is, however, considerable debate about whether this effect is primarily

the result of the presence of large numbers of persons of color and the threat to resources, jobs, political power, and public safety they are believed by local whites to represent, or if the effect is instead the result of the fact that people of color are more likely to live in environments with so-called "downscale" whites with less education and fewer job prospects (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011).

2.4 Education and Prejudice

Because of the reliability of finding across time and contexts, the debate in the prejudice literature around education is much more a function of "why than how or if." In other words, the fact that increased formal education is associated with racial tolerance is taken as a given for most researchers. Early work on prejudice was dominated by psychologists, most of whom saw prejudice as (1) cognitive and not affective and (2) primarily a "false belief," suggesting in sum that prejudice simply amounted to a cognitive error that might be corrected with further education. This set of assumptions drove the prejudice research in general and the understanding of the role of education in particular until the early 1980s, when more diverse understandings of the nature and causes of prejudice began to emerge. Whatever the debates about why the correlation, scholars continue to replicate the findings that education reduces prejudice. Of course, this is not true for all racial attitudes for all groups. As Wodke (2012) points out, the effect of education is different on support for race-targeted programs than it is for traditional prejudice, and different for Asian Americans than it is for whites. In general terms, especially among whites, increased formal education is associated with lower expression of traditional prejudice and racial resentment, but notably NOT higher support for race-targeted programs.

The present debate about this effect might be best organized into three categories. First, those who maintain that the primary reason for the relationship is that education causes persons to better understand themselves, the other, and the world in which they find themselves and are therefore less likely to express prejudice- what we might call the classical view of the relationship (Gomez and Wilson 2006, Hodson and Busseri 2012). A second view, first articulated by Jackman and Muha (1984) suggests that increased education does not actually have an effect on the holding of prejudiced attitudes, but instead acts to suppress the expression of those attitudes through a more sophisticated screening process. In other words, this view contends that education does not reduce prejudice, but rather makes it easier for the prejudiced person to hide. A final view is more structural in nature: the suggestion that it is not the education effect *per se* that reduces prejudice, but instead it is the relative insulation from competition with non-whites that education confers. In other words, because educated people are less likely to be faced with the threat from relatively low-status non-whites, they are less likely to feel threatened and express hostility as a result (Glaser 2001).

This final view is the one with which the present chapter is most concerned. Because of the underlying assumption of threat and vulnerability to threat, this research seeks to offer a further test of this hypothesis by characterizing the role of insecurity and then examining the interaction of insecurity with education.

2.5 Research on Insecurity

As a subset of the emerging literature of the Sociology of Emotion, there is a well-established body of research whose focus is the role of fear and insecurity in shaping individual attitude and behavior. The primary shared conclusion of this research is that

when individuals are afraid or feel under threat, they are much more likely to feel social distance from those marked as "other." (Szasz 1987, Turner, Brown and Tajfel 1979, Turner 1975) Additionally, when experiencing fear or threat, persons are more likely to support leaders and policies that punish outsiders and deviants; they are more likely to strongly identify with in-group members; and they are less likely to seek out interactions with members of the out-group (LeCount and Wasburn 2009, Pyszczynski 2004). For example, the so-called *terror management theory* – a framework used widely across the social sciences- asserts that when forced to confront their own mortality, persons are much more likely to be conservative in general and express increased hostility to out-groups in particular (Pyszczynski 2004, Willer 2004).

This body of research suggests that in general, when under threat and/or feeling afraid, persons will feel antipathy toward those who are believed to be of other religions, races or ethnic groups, whether or not the "other" in question is the source of that threat. The work on Susan Olzak, though it does not take up the question specifically of fear or prejudice, demonstrated that even when African Americans are not the source of a labor-market "threat" (Chinese workers were, in this case), they were the targets of inter-ethnic violence anyway (Olzak and Nagel 1986, Olzak 2003). These findings certainly contribute to the notion that prejudiced reaction to threat is not necessarily a rational attempt to address the threat as understood, but rather an irrational formulation disconnected from objective understanding. However demonstrated and articulated, the thrust of the insecurity literature suggests that when threatened, persons feel less close to those marked as others.

Though the research on the effect of fear on social and political attitudes has been robust, fairly little of this literature has sought to directly examine the effect of fear or insecurity on stereotypic or prejudiced attitudes. This is an under-studied area which bridges the affective experience with threat and measures the quantifiable ways in which that feeling is expressed in terms of stated attitudes. A brief review of the relatively few studies which have sought to analyze the relationship between various kinds of insecurity and prejudice follows.

In the early years of research on prejudiced attitudes, a few scholars took up the question of social status mobility and prejudice[2]. Successive studies suggested first that only downward, and later both upward and downward social mobility were associated increased the expression of prejudice (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1956, Seeman, Rohan and Milton 1966, Silberstein and Seeman 1959, Treiman 1966). Later work would clearly identify a link between orientation toward status and prejudice as the intervening variable in this relationship- those who are more concerned about status are more likely to express prejudice regardless of their status position or its change over time (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1956, Hodge and Treiman 1966, Maykovich 1975, Treiman 1966). Taking a different focus toward social-level contextual variables, a few more recent studies have sought to parse out the influence of living in an "insecure environment" on White racial attitudes.

Two studies linking macroeconomic factors to racial attitudes found that when whites have (Avery and Fine 2012, Burns and Gimpel 2000). Notably, this study linked a

[2] These studies focused variously on prejudice against so-called "White Ethnics" and African Americans in the US context and against other Ethnic Minorities in non-US Americans in the US context.

perception of *national,* not *personal* insecurity to the expression of prejudice. Another recent influential study argued that much of the observed effect of racial composition on prejudice was actually the result of the fact that Whites who lived in areas of high minority populations were more likely to be living in low SES "stress-inducing" environments (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). These studies have included insecurity as an important factor in predicting prejudice, but unlike the present chapter, focus on the social/contextual level rather than the individual's experience with insecurity. Some recent research suggests that insecurity DOES influence racial attitudes not between whites and non-whites, but *among minority groups.* This research has demonstrated that African Americans who lived in areas in which they were disadvantaged relative to their Hispanic neighbors, they were more likely to express feelings of hostility toward those neighbors (Gay 2006, Taylor and Schroeder 2010).

Often, related literatures have used structural changes or population changes (see *group threat* above) as a proxy for this relationship, but have not directly tested the relationship between self-reported feelings of insecurity and the expression of prejudice. That is the effort of this research: to test directly the hypothesis that those who are more economically insecure will be more likely to express anti-black prejudice.

2.6 General Trends in Racial Attitudes

Since the 1960s, a variety of surveys have consistently and reliably demonstrated a decline in the expression of traditional prejudice among white respondents. For example, white respondents report significantly less opposition to interracial marriage, integration, and are much less likely to express views of inherent/biological inferiority of people of color- or even to express anti-black *feelings.* While the rate of this decline does

vary by region, level of education, and birth cohort, the decline is consistent and unidirectional. Over this same period, however, there has been a concurrent decline among whites (and some people of color as well) in support for policies aimed at reducing racial inequality. This is especially striking in that, in some measures such as wealth, rates of marriage, and rates of incarceration, that racial inequality has significantly *increased* over this same period.

A number of scholars have noted this trend, but Lawrence Bobo and his colleagues were the first to Sociologists to articulate a clear framework for describing it. Bobo refers to his paradox as the *principles-implementation gap*- suggesting that it can be understood as the distance between whites' stated principles toward racial equality and their willingness to do what is necessary to implement policy directed at ameliorating it. Since the 1990s, in particular, this gap has widened for whites, with growing opposition to race targeted programs and very low levels of endorsement of traditional prejudice (Bobo et al. 2012).

Proceeding from the work done by Jackman and Muha (1984) mentioned above as well as by a host of Political Scientists working in this area, Bobo suggests that whites have become savvier in their ability to mask prejudice by avoiding explicitly prejudicial expressions, but moving heavily away from policies and practices which are seen to benefit people of color. There are a diversity of approaches and theoretical explanations to explaining this phenomenon: Bonilla-Silva's "colorblind racism," Bobo and Kleugle's "laissez-faire racism," Forman's "racial apathy," Kinder and Sears' " symbolic racism," and Tuch's "racial resentment." All of these constructs share the assertion that prejudice still shapes white racial attitudes to a great extent, but has become more difficult to

measure directly. What these constructs share is an assumption that (1) opposition to programs aimed at racial inequality is at least partly the result of latent racism and (2) that the responses on more explicit measures of prejudice offered by whites are not truthful and/or representative of their true thoughts and feelings. As Bonilla-Silva put it so famously, we no longer need racists, in the classical sense, for the continuation of racism and racial inequality.

The most robust and frequently used of these measures within Sociology is that of *racial resentment* (Jacobs and Tope 2007, Tuch and Hughes 2011, Wilson and Davis 2011). This particular construct focuses on distributions of opportunity and explanations for inequality. Simply put, racial resentment represents a belief that, though not inferior per se, African Americans are not deserving of the opportunities for mobility provided them, primarily because they are collectively responsible for their own relatively low social group status. This construct is highly correlated with measures of individualism in general, and of individual attribution of inequality in particular. In light of the prominence of this issue to the modern prejudice literature, all of the models in the present chapter will include a measure of this construct. Previous research has established that these constructs do operate separately from, though often concordant with, other measures of traditional prejudice. It is, however, clear, that many of the factors that predict traditional prejudice or opposition to race targeting do not seem to have a significant effect on racial resentment. The present research aims to separate out the effects of insecurity on a variety of racial attitudes- and this distinction will be a point of emphasis here.

2.7 Hypotheses

The first aim of this research is to establish whether and to what extent there exists a relationship between economic insecurity and a variety of racial attitudes. The confirmation (or rejection) of this relationship would serve to clarify the prejudice picture and disentangle many current debates in the racial attitudes literature. The second major aim of this study is to more fully evaluate the claims of Glaser (2001) and Wodke (2012), whose work suggests that the effect of education on racial attitudes is not cognitive, but structural. By disaggregating insecurity from education and testing of this key assumption, we will be able to better understand not just the mechanism for the education-prejudice relationship, but we will further clarify the dynamics of prejudice more generally. With those aims, the following core hypotheses will be tested:

H_1: Net of all other factors, persons who experience high levels of economic insecurity will be *more* likely to express high levels of prejudice, racial resentment and opposition to race-targeted programs.

H_2: Net of all other factors, persons who are highly educated will be *less* likely to express high levels of prejudice, racial resentment and support for race-targeted programs

H_3: Net of all other factors, persons who experience high levels of insecurity, but are relatively well educated will express *more racially liberal attitudes* by comparison with similarly situated persons.

2.8 Data and Method

The data employed in this study come from the third wave (2010) of the General Social Survey's (hereafter' GSS') inaugural Panel Survey study. The GSS is a carefully

weighted, nationally representative survey on which a very large portion of the racial attitudes literature is based. These particular data were chosen for the present chapter for three reasons: first, they include a number of key subjective economic insecurity indicators not present in the cross-sectional version or the earlier waves of the GSS. Second, the data were collected from respondents during a particularly dynamic economic, social and political period in the United States (Avery and Fine 2012, Becker, Wagner and Christ 2011, Blee and Creasap 2010, Tesler 2012). Finally, this was also a period during which issues of race were thrust anew to the fore in the context of the nation's first President of color along with the attending "spill-over of racialization" to many other attitudes evidenced in recent research (Sears and Henry 2003, Tesler 2012). Taken in sum, the data gathered at this particular socio-historical moment represent an ideal environment in which to test the hypotheses outlined above.

Of the 2000 respondents that began the panel study in 2006, there were 1260 participants who completed the survey in the third wave of the study. As the focus of this research is on the racial attitudes of white persons, all respondents of color were eliminated from the sample. Also, given the emerging body of research suggesting a growing difference in the attitudes of white Latinos from others who identify as White, the sample is constrained to Non-Hispanic Whites only, with a final sample size of 923 respondents (Brown, Steven and H. 2006, Hitlin, Brown and Elder 2007, Roth 2010).

Because the GSS utilizes a modular system in which one-third to two-thirds of respondents are not asked all questions, and because many of the variables of interest in this study were not asked to all respondents, there are substantial numbers of missing data across the sample. As the study is designed, respondents do not answer all questions, thus

there is no systematic bias including or discluding respondents, an approach referred to in the literature as *Observed at Random* or (OAR)[3]. Based on this survey design, the data were missing completely at random (MCAR). Though still common practice until recently in the Social Sciences, list-wise deletion of cases with missing values often leads to biased estimates and distorted standard errors in the data (Allison 2011, Johnson and Young 2011, Raykov 2011, Raykov, Lichtenberg and Paulson 2012). Instead of utilizing the list-wise technique, the present chapter makes use of the robust Multiple Imputation (MI) techniques in order to analyze a complete data set- thereby retaining statistical power for analysis. Numerous studies have established that Multiple Imputation is the most robust and reliable technique for analyzing data- even when substantial data are missing (Allison 2011, Johnson and Young 2011, Raykov, Lichtenberg and Paulson 2012, Von Hippel 2007)

Missing data were multiply imputed using the *ice* command in the STATA software package to provide parameter estimates for 923 complete cases across all models. In order to maintain variability in the presences of numerous missing values, a very high number of iterations (100) were generated to produce the completed estimates presented in the present chapter[4]. The number of imputed values for each variable ranged from 0 to 634, with the majority of the variables including most or all responses, as the GSS Panel program features a very low percentage of biased non-answers. All tables and

[3] Data that were Observed At Random (OAR) by nature considered Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) and are therefore eligible for imputation at very high thresholds of missingness. For more, see Raykov et al (2012) and Raykov (2011)

[4] Variables with a high degree of missingness benefit greatly from a higher number of imputation iterations. For more discussion, see Raykov (2011)

information presented here reflects this particular analytic strategy as well as this final sample *n* of 923.

Previous research has, given the complexity and multi-dimensionality of racial attitudes, privileged the construction and use of multiple item scales in order to properly measure underlying categories of racial attitudes. The reliability of these scales is primarily measured by Cronbach's Alpha- a primary measure of inter-item correlation. Using Confirmatory Factory Analysis (*CFT*), a number of theoretically derived attitudinal scales were revealed. One scale representing economic insecurity was revealed, and three distinct scales measuring racial attitudes emerged from the data, and these scales are substantially similar or identical to measures used by several other researchers (Cokley 2007, Ditonto, Lau and Sears 2013, Huddy and Feldman 2009, McDermott 2011, Tarman and Sears 2005, Taylor 1998, Taylor 2000, Tuch and Hughes 2011).

Allison (2001) raised concerns about the inclusion of dependent variables in imputation models, but more recent work has demonstrated, especially when a large number of imputation iterations are generated, that it is appropriate to include those measures in imputation models (Von Hippel 2007, Young and Johnson 2011). Further, as the dependent variable indices in most models are made up of many constituent variables providing valuable information for estimation of values of fellow index items, dependent variable indices were included in the imputation model. The secondary benefit of this approach is to retain statistical power for items otherwise more difficult to analyze.

2.8.1 Measures

Allport (1954) famously said, "…there is no master key to unlocking our understanding of racial prejudice, " and the preponderance of evidence made available by decades of research since has borne that statement out. It's clear that different kinds of racial attitudes have different causes, and indeed, different effects. Many of the most vigorous debates in the prejudice literature have focused on disaggregating and re-evaluating how racial attitudes are measured. As such, the present chapter includes three distinct theoretically derived indices of racial attitude constructs- a brief description of which follows. Early modeling indicated that analysis of the observed variables individually yielded results no different from those of the indices reported here, and as such are not reported or discussed here. Each observed variable was standardized before being added to the other items in the index in order that no constituent item exert too much influence on the overall construct.

2.8.1.1 Racial Resentment

A three-item index of variables is utilized here to measure the underlying construct of 'racial resentment'. Indices such as this one have been used elsewhere to capture dimensions of a construct developed to measure racial antipathy not captured my traditional prejudice measures. The construct, which has been used very widely in the literature, represents a combination of individual attribution of racial inequality and anti-black affect. (Blanton and Jaccard 2008, Bobo 1999, Ditonto, Lau and Sears 2013, Feldman and Huddy 2005, Kinder and Sears 1981, Semyonov et al. 2004, Taylor 1998, Tuch 1987a, Tuch and Hughes 2011, Vron 2008, Wilson and Davis 2011). Careful work

has been done to isolate the effects this latent construct from many attitudinal variables with which it co-varies, and the research is clear that it is a unique underlying construct independent of other measures. As such, it is critical to the present analysis. This index had an inter-item correlation coefficient of .684.

2.8.1.2 Traditional Prejudice

A two-item index is constructed to evaluate traditional prejudice. This index captures various dimensions of a respondent's explicit belief in out-group inferiority or undesirability. In spite of the decline in the incidence of openly stated antipathy toward a racial out-group, measures of traditional prejudice or "old fashioned racism" remain powerful indicators of a persistent social phenomenon- especially for certain segments of the population. Of particular interest to this measure is a belief that such characteristics are inherent and/or natural, attitudes that are not necessarily captured by other measures. These negative attributions also have the distinction of having been well-entrenched into the cultural consciousness as well as having been relatively durable across time and space (Peffley and Hurwitz 1998, Watt and Larkin 2010). Similar indices have been widely used by scholars whose interest was in parsing out the differences among racial attitudes and their causes, and the available evidence continues to suggest that traditional prejudice is a unique underlying construct (Bobo 1999, Dixon 2006, Huddy and Feldman 2009, Krysan 2000, Kunovich 2004, Quillian 2006, Sears and Henry 2003, Taylor 1998, Wagner et al. 2006, Wilson and Nielsen 2011). This index had an inter-item correlation coefficient of .711.

2.8.1.3 Racial Policy Attitudes

Three items were used to construct an index measuring non-Hispanic Whites' orientation toward formal norms and laws involving race-targeted public policy issues. These attitudes have been demonstrated to operate with some similarity, though in a distinct manner, relative to other attitudes about race. Research has documented a discrete underlying mechanism that informs attitudes about racial policy among non-Hispanic Whites, and much of this work has relied on similar measures and indices to the one employed here (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo and Charles 2009, Gilens 1999, Krysan 2000, Olzak 2003, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Wilson and Nielsen 2011). This index had an inter-item correlation coefficient of .594.

2.8.1.4 Economic Insecurity

Three variables were selected from among a large number of related variables in the GSS to form an index of economic insecurity[5]. These variables are comprised of subjective evaluations of the respondent's level of economic insecurity or vulnerability to economic instability. Notably, these variables are necessarily separate from objective levels of economic standing, so they are capturing the distance between one's aspirations and one's circumstances-- independent of actual level of income, wealth, or social class. Though those who reported lower levels of education and income (wealth data were not available) did report higher levels of insecurity, respondents who reported higher levels

[5] Each variable was tested separately in each model and the results did not vary significantly from the use of the index.

of education and income in many cases reported relatively high levels of economic insecurity. This index had an inter-item correlation coefficient of .671.

2.8.1.5 Unemployment

As a few other researchers have included unemployment controls on previous research in racial attitudes, such a measure is included here. This measure is of particular interest in comparison with the subjective scale mentioned above- the comparison of which should allow for evaluation of which factor, if either, produces a more robust effect in the models. This variable is coded 1 for having been unemployed and looking for work at any time in the twelve months and 0 for having been continuously employed.

2.8.1.6 Education

As the relationship between racial attitudes and education has been the source of a great deal of research, there remains a debate about the best way to measure education. Though the literature features examples of the variable measured continuously in terms of years of education, recent research has suggested that the ordinal measure approach (of measurement by degrees attained, for instance) may be of greater value given that it captures broader situational differences reflected in key points at which attitudes often diverge (Aaron 2006, Hardie and Tyson 2013, Hodson and Busseri 2012). Following this framework, the present chapter utilizes a degree-based measurement of education ranging from those with less than a High School Degree to those with a Graduate Degree. This source variable has been divided into four Dummy variables that are compared with the reference category- in this case, the variable “Less Than a High School Degree.”

2.8.1.7 Key Controls

Previous research has demonstrated the relatively reliable influence of a number of key variables in predicting change in racial attitudes. These factors have been demonstrated across contexts and across time and as such, warranted inclusion in each of the racial attitude models under examination in the present chapter. A very brief discussion of the relevant research associated with each of these controls follows.

One very reliable indicator of a variety of racial attitudes, especially traditional prejudice, is age or **birth cohort**[6]. Older or earlier born respondents are more likely to express racial prejudice and resentment, though this effect is non-linear (Forman 2010, Nteta and Greenlee 2013, Wilson 1996). Though this relationship is frequently attributed to the effect of being socialized under more conservative racial norms, recent experimental evidence has suggested that-- fear induced by confrontation with mortality on the one hand, and a less-well regulated "social filter" on the other- may explain much of this effect (Gonsalkorale, Sherman and Klauer 2009, Radvansky, Copeland and Hippel 2010) .This variable (cohort) is measured by year of birth, and thus higher values represent younger respondents.

As a very general measure of social position, **income** is often included in research modeling racial attitudes. There remains a relatively high degree of occupational, and especially residential racial segregation in the United States, and both one's job and one's residence are closely correlated with income (Massey and Denton 1993, Massey,

[6] Birth cohorts were arranged by decades, generations and presidential administrations, as is the custom in the literature. None of the variations to the strategy employed here were found to be significantly different.

Rothwell and Domina 2009, Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). Given the relatively durable relationship between race and class in the US, a high income, then, means that high-income whites are less likely than low-income whites to come into contact with people of color at work or in one's neighborhood, and the existing research on measures of social distance bear this relationship out, and this is the only kind of racial attitude on which income seems to have a relatively reliable effect (Bobo 1999, Bobo et al. 2012). The income variable is coded categorically with the highest income respondents coding 12 and the lowest income group coding 1.

Ideological identification as **conservative** has been strongly and repeatedly associated with nearly every kind of racial construct used in the literature. There remains considerable debate about how independently political ideology operates from several other constructs with which it is closely associated such as traditionalism, authoritarian personality, social dominance orientation, and so-called right wing authoritarianism (Duckitt and Bizumic 2013, Levin et al. 1998, Levin and Sidanius 1999, Pena and Sidanius 2002, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Thomsen et al. 2010). A corresponding debate focused primarily on racial policy attitudes is ongoing between Sniderman and his colleagues, who suggest that the relationship between political ideology and racial attitudes is simply the result of "principled conservatism," while a large number of other scholars have consistently and successfully critiqued this position (Kinder and Sears 1981, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Sears and Henry 2003, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Sniderman, Tetlock and Carmines 1993, Sniderman and Carmines 1997). The political ideology variable is coded 1 for "extremely liberal," and 7 for "extremely conservative".

As discussed at some length above, there is a very large literature analyzing the effect **of inter-group contact** (differently conceptualized) on racial attitudes. While there is evidence for both contact and threat effects in the literature, most research has focused on using objective measures of intergroup contact such as population distribution data from the US census. As previously mentioned, there is growing evidence that the correlate of prejudice with real explanatory value is actually *perception* of intergroup presence (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005, Gallagher 2003). For this reason, the present chapter will rely on single discrete measures of both neighborhood and workplace racial composition available in the GSS data to evaluate the effect of inter-group contact on our racial attitude scales. The variable for neighborhood contact is coded 1 for those living in an integrated neighborhood and 0 for those who do not, while the variable for workplace contact is coded 1 for an all-white workplace and 5 for a workplace made up of almost all African Americans.

Region of residence is customarily included in racial attitude measures, and is usually coded such that residents of the US South (most often defined by census region) are compared with all other respondents in the study. The unique racial conservatism of this region is the subject of considerable research focus which has found that, as operationalized, 'the more southern, the more prejudiced' are both individual respondents and respondents clustered into larger groups such as counties (Burr, Galle and Fossett 1991, Carter et al. 2005, Hardie and Tyson 2013, Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997, Middleton 1976). Debates about whether or not this racial conservatism is a result of a so-called "southern subculture of honor and violence," or –instead—the result of other structural and demographic factors unique to the region is also ongoing (Carter et al.

2005, Ellison 1991, Key 1949, McVeigh 2012, Valentino and Sears 2005). What is clear, however, is that region of residence is frequently found to be a significant predictor of a variety of racial attitudes in that respondents in the South report more prejudice, racial resentment and opposition to race-targeted policy. This variable is coded 1 for residents in the US South and 0 for those outside that region.

Though not usually the primary focus of researchers, the effect of **gender** on racial attitudes is frequently included in research models. Though white female respondents are slightly less likely to express traditional prejudice and social distance, they are sometimes more likely to express racial resentment and opposition to race targeted policies (Hughes and Tuch 2003, Johnson and Marini 1998, Stack 1997). The reasons for the differences are debated and the effects are relatively small, but female respondents are consistently more racially liberal than their male counterparts. This variable is coded 1 for men and 0 for women.

Finally, a number of interaction terms mediating between (four levels of) education and measures of insecurity were also included in each model to evaluate the theoretical relationships among variables. There is one interaction term for each level of education (compared with reference group less than high school) and both the insecurity scale and unemployment. These interaction terms will be of distinct interest in evaluation whether and to what extent increased education acts to "insulate" respondents from the prejudicial effects of insecurity.

Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
Education (less than HS degree)	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Education (HS degree)	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Education (2 year degree)	0.08	0.26	0.00	1.00
Education (4 year degree)	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Education (graduate degree)	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
Insecurity index[a]	0.00	1.00	-6.60	13.40
Unemployed in last 12 months	0.17	0.380	0.00	1.00
Traditional prejudice index[a]	0.00	1.00	-3.35	3.12
Race policy index[a]	0.00	1.00	-6.89	3.50
Racial resentment index[a]	0.00	1.00	-5.33	2.47
Political ideology (conservative)	4.26	1.47	1.00	7.00
Income (by level of income)	11.20	1.80	1.00	12.00
Cohort (year of birth)	1957.29	16.40	1917.00	1988.00
Size of place (in thousands of persons)	200.00	89.30	0.00	8008.00
Region of residence (south)	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Respondent sex (male)	0.43	0.050	0.00	1.00

[a] Indices are standardized.

2.9 Findings

2.9.1 Predictors of Economic Insecurity

There were few surprises in this element of the analysis. First, insecurity and unemployment were closely related in that each was a significant predictor of the other. The relationship was the strongest when unemployment was predicting insecurity, as unemployed persons appear more likely to express insecurity than those who were employed. Other significant predictors of insecurity were cohort, and income- in order of predictive power. Besides unemployment, the most powerful predictor of insecurity was education, with each degree level conferring more predictive weight relative to those without a high school degree. Those with a college degree are nearly as much less likely to express insecurity, as are those who are employed relative to their unemployed peers. The story with unemployment is simpler, with education dominating the analysis. The effects of education at each level are still significant with respect to unemployment, but notably they are a bit weaker. Interestingly a very, very small but significant effect of size of place on unemployment was observed. This is likely the result of increasing rural poverty and a more general shift of resources and opportunities from rural to urban and suburban locales. Generally speaking, these findings were consistent with the established literature and with the theoretical framework employed here.

Table 2.2. Ordinary Least Squares and Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Insecurity and Unemployment

	Insecurity index	Unemployed (within last 12 months)
Less than high school	Reference	Reference
High school degree	-0.964**	0.132**
	(0.348)	(0.041)
Jr. college degree	-1.718**	0.139**
	(0.461)	(0.053)
College degree	-2.534**	0.181**
	(0.382)	(0.045)
Graduate degree	-3.277**	0.208**
	(0.406)	(0.048)
Subjective insecurity index		0.062**
		(0.003)
Unemployed	4.682**	
	(0.255)	
Younger cohort	0.039**	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.001)
Income	-0.230**	-0.010
	(0.053)	(0.006)
Conservative	-0.038	-0.009
	(0.063)	(0.007)
Integrated workplace	0.155	0.021
	(0.163)	(0.022)
Size of place	0.000	-0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
South	-0.183	-0.004
	(0.191)	(0.022)
Male	0.273	0.035
	(0.177)	(0.020)
Integrated neighborhood	-0.232	-0.000
	(0.196)	(0.023)
Intercept	-72.996**	-2.072
	(10.923)	(1.287)
R^2	0.56	0.40
N	923	923

2.9.2 Racial Policy Attitudes

Neither the economic insecurity index nor the unemployment measure had any significant relationship to the index of racial policy attitudes in any model. As observed in previous research, the strongest and most consistent predictor of attitudes about racial policy was political ideology with more conservative respondents much more likely than others to oppose policies targeted at reducing racial inequality. This finding represents at least partial support for Sniderman's contention that attitudes about race-targeted programs are largely driven by political ideology.. Also notably absent from the present models are regional and gender effects. Previous research suggests that respondents in the South and Men were more likely to oppose policies targeted at reducing racial inequality, though the present data did not reflect that relationship. Most importantly, neither education nor the interaction of education with insecurity and unemployment yielded a significant relationship to the racial policy measure.

These findings suggest that the formulation of attitudes related to support for or opposition to race-targeted policy is the result of factors not necessarily related to economic insecurity (a potentially fluid and partially affective state), and this finding is consistent with at least some of what is known about these attitudes. Previous research suggests that among the variety of racial or race-related attitudes, racial policy attitudes take the longest to develop and are least subject to influence from temporary or short-term variation (Branton and Jones 2005, Campbell, Wong and Citrin 2006). It is also important to note that the modern conservative movement has been thoroughly identified with opposition to race-targeting and active government intervention in issues of inequality, so it stands to reason that political ideology was the strongest factor

influencing respondent's attitudes about racial policy across all models (Blee and Creasap 2010).

Table 2.3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models: Education Effects on Prejudice (Without Insecurity Measures)

	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Racial policy
Grad degree	-0.077	-1.176**	-0.216
	(0.149)	(0.424)	(0.342)
Coll. degree	-0.080	-0.812*	0.131
	(0.138)	(0.397)	(0.316)
Jr. coll. degree	-0.079	-0.382	0.378
	(0.159)	(0.454)	(0.370)
HS degree	0.087		0.352
		-0.243	
	(0.132)	(0.375)	(0.285)
Younger cohort	-0.006	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.002)**	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income	-0.007	0.025	0.074
	(0.020)	(0.054)	(0.043)
Conservative	0.094**	0.512**	0.343**
	(0.021)	(0.064)	(0.052)
Workplace integrated	-0.023	-0.060	-0.034
	(0.056)	(0.150)	(0.097)
Neighborhood integrated	0.043	-0.304	0.042
	(0.065)	(0.203)	(0.159)
South	0.053	0.346	0.102
	(0.068)	(0.194)	(0.163)
Male	-0.143*	0.155	0.019
	(0.063)	(0.184)	(0.147)
R^2			
	0.12	0.23	0.10
N	923	923	923

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

2.9.3 Racial Resentment

When education variables were absent from the model, the insecurity index did show a small effect on the expression of racial resentment, but that effect disappeared in the fuller model. Unemployment yielded no effect on resentment at any level in the modeling. Like insecurity, region made its only appearance across all models, but the effect also disappeared once education variables were included. Political ideology loomed larger in the resentment modeling than in any other context, providing strong significant power in every model at every level.

Here, the level of education plays its most prominent role. At nearly every level of nesting, level of education plays a significant role in predicting racial resentment. The effects are particularly pronounced for those with a graduate degree relative to those respondents who did not complete their HS degree. Those with advanced degrees are significantly less likely to express racial resentment than those who did not complete High School. Here we find evidence in tension with Glaser, suggesting that the effects of education are not necessarily support for a policy, but rather in the evaluation of group hierarchy and explanations of racial inequality. These findings seem to be more in concert with the work of Gomez and others who suggest that education confers a structuralist (as opposed to individualist) orientation to the explanation of racial inequality- and thereby undermines potential resentments.

Taken in sum, these findings are also consistent with previous research, suggesting that the expression of racial resentment is primarily the product of sociopolitical environment, again, rather than the relatively transitive state of economic insecurity (Feldman and Huddy 2005, Jacobs and Tope 2007, Wilson and Davis 2011).

Though this particular index has been repeatedly demonstrated to be operationally distinct from general racial policy attitudes in its degree of racialization and sensitivity to the influence of other racial attitudes, in the models employed here it was substantially similar to the other indices in its relationship to political ideology. The notable exception, of course, is that education- especially advanced education seems to play a much more prominent role in the formulation of racial resentment.

Table 2.4. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models: Insecurity Effects on Racial Attitudes (without Education Measures)

	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy
Subjective insecurity scale	-0.006	0.063**	0.013			
	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.022)			
Unemployed				-0.006	0.280	0.019
				(0.085)	(0.244)	(0.200)
Younger cohort	-0.006**	-0.006	-0.002	-0.006**	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income	-0.015	0.027	0.075	-0.012	0.001	0.068
	(0.020)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.020)	(0.054)	(0.043)
Conservative	0.098**	0.538**	0.362**	0.098**	0.539**	0.361**
	(0.021)	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.021)	(0.064)	(0.052)
Workplace integrated	-0.024	-0.077	-0.046	-0.026	-0.064	-0.043
	(0.055)	(0.152)	(0.096)	(0.055)	(0.153)	(0.097)
Neighborhood integrated	0.035	-0.319	0.041	0.038	-0.346	0.034
	(0.066)	(0.203)	(0.160)	(0.066)	(0.204)	(0.159)
South	0.053	0.386*	0.089	0.054	0.375	0.086
	(0.068)	(0.191)	(0.164)	(0.068)	(0.192)	(0.163)
Male	-0.140*	0.104	-0.000	-0.143*	0.119	0.005
	(0.063)	(0.184)	(0.148)	(0.063)	(0.186)	(0.148)
Constant	11.616**	8.461	1.692	12.591**	3.766	0.550
	(3.28)	(0.84)	(0.18)	(3.61)	(0.38)	(0.06)
R^2	0.11	0.22	0.09	0.11	0.21	0.09
N	923	923	923	923	923	923

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

2.9.4 Traditional Prejudice

Traditional Prejudice has been the source of more research and analysis than any other kind of racial attitudinal measure, and for good reason. It is the kind of racial attitude most stigmatized and often most deeply held (Quillian 2006). Previous research has identified numerous predictors for expression of these attitudes, and these findings were no different. As with the other attitudinal scales here, political ideology played a role in predicting expression of traditional prejudice across every single level of the nesting. Self-identified conservatives were more likely than others to express traditional prejudice. Cohort was also significant across every single model, demonstrating that respondents born in more recent cohorts were less likely to express prejudice. Gender was significant in every model as well, with women expressing less traditional prejudice than did their male counterparts.

Most importantly, both measures of economic insecurity were found to be predictors of traditional prejudice. In the full model without interaction terms, the insecurity scale was significant, suggesting as hypothesized that more insecure persons were more likely to express prejudice. Once the interaction terms were added, both unemployment and its interaction with the *High School Degree* dummy variable were significant, suggesting that, among the unemployed, those who completed their HS degree were less likely than those who didn't to express prejudice. It is worth repeating here that by itself, education conferred no special impact on the expression of traditional prejudice. This finding seems to support the view of Glaser and others who have suggested that the real value of education is its relationship to opportunity, not it's capacity for enlightenment (Glaser 2001, Jackman and Muha 1984, Wodtke 2012).

Table 2.5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models: Insecurity Effects on Racial Attitudes (with Education Measures)

	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy
HS degree	0.083	-0.236	0.352	0.090	-0.265	0.358
	(0.131)	(0.374)	(0.285)	(0.133)	(0.380)	(0.286)
Jr. coll. degree	-0.101	-0.334	0.375	-0.077	-0.391	0.380
	(0.160)	(0.455)	(0.371)	(0.159)	(0.455)	(0.370)
Coll. degree	-0.114	-0.739	0.126	-0.080	-0.818*	0.132
	(0.138)	(0.399)	(0.320)	(0.138)	(0.398)	(0.317)
Grad degree	-0.126	-1.070*	-0.223	-0.077	-1.175**	-0.216
	(0.151)	(0.435)	(0.349)	(0.149)	(0.425)	(0.342)
Subjective insecurity index	-0.015	0.032	-0.002			
	(0.009)	(0.026)	(0.023)			
Unemployed				-0.035	0.190	-0.051
				(0.086)	(0.249)	(0.201)
Younger cohort	-0.005**	-0.003	-0.002	-0.006**	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income	-0.014	0.040	0.073	-0.008	0.032	0.072
	(0.020)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.020)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Conservative	0.092	0.516	0.343	0.093	0.515	0.342
	(0.021)**	(0.064)**	(0.052)**	(0.021)**	(0.064)**	(0.052)**
Workplace integrated	-0.017	-0.072	-0.033	-0.021	-0.068	-0.032
	(0.056)	(0.151)	(0.097)	(0.056)	(0.151)	(0.098)
Neighborhood integrated	0.038	-0.292	0.041	0.042	-0.300	0.041
	(0.065)	(0.203)	(0.159)	(0.066)	(0.203)	(0.159)
South	0.048	0.356	0.101	0.052	0.348	0.101
	(0.068)	(0.194)	(0.163)	(0.068)	(0.194)	(0.163)
Male	-0.134	0.137	0.020	-0.141*	0.142	0.023
	(0.064)*	(0.184)	(0.148)	(0.064)	(0.185)	(0.148)
_cons	11.465**	1.624	1.098	9.590**	3.605	0.984
	(3.23)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(2.65)	(0.35)	(0.10)
R^2	0.12	0.23	0.10	0.12	0.23	0.10
N	923	923	923	923	923	923

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 2.6. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models: Full Models Including Education and Insecurity Measures PLUS Interaction Effects

	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy
HS. degree	0.130	-0.215	0.430	0.228	-0.244	0.352
	(0.142)	(0.418)	(0.301)	(0.142)	(0.421)	(0.303)
Jr. coll. degree	-0.131	-0.573	0.335	-0.030	-0.603	0.254
	(0.174)	(0.509)	(0.407)	(0.175)	(0.511)	(0.411)
Coll. degree	-0.152	-0.572	0.144	-0.052	-0.603	0.063
	(0.161)	(0.456)	(0.355)	(0.161)	(0.456)	(0.355)
Grad degree	-0.225	-1.249*	0.155	-0.124	-1.280*	0.075
	(0.195)	(0.556)	(0.455)	(0.194)	(0.560)	(0.457)
Insecurity index	-0.005	0.024	0.040			
	(0.028)	(0.087)	(0.066)			
Unemployed				0.701*	0.011	-0.184
				(0.343)	(1.153)	(0.766)
Younger cohort	-0.005**	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005**	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income	-0.010	0.042	0.080	-0.005	0.040	0.076
	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.021)	(0.057)	(0.045)
Conservative	0.092**	0.512**	0.343**	0.095**	0.512**	0.341**
	(0.021)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.021)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Workplace integrated	-0.024	-0.082	-0.041	-0.025	-0.083	-0.041
	(0.059)	(0.154)	(0.100)	(0.059)	(0.154)	(0.099)
Neighborhood integrated	0.042	-0.294	0.050	0.041	-0.294	0.050
	(0.066)	(0.203)	(0.160)	(0.066)	(0.204)	(0.160)
South	0.057	0.367	0.109	0.050	0.369	0.115
	(0.068)	(0.194)	(0.165)	(0.068)	(0.193)	(0.165)
Male	-0.135*	0.147	0.043	-0.134*	0.147	0.042
	(0.064)	(0.184)	(0.148)	(0.064)	(0.184)	(0.148)
Subjective insecurity × coll. degree	-0.018	0.090	-0.027			
	(0.038)	(0.115)	(0.090)			
Subjective Insecurity × grad degree	-0.031	0.010	0.074			
	(0.046)	(0.137)	(0.121)			
Subjective insecurity × HS degree	0.003	0.006	-0.049			
	(0.031)	(0.095)	(0.075)			
Subjective insecurity × jr. coll. degree	-0.026	-0.093	-0.139			
	(0.042)	(0.123)	(0.107)			
Unemployment. × coll. degree			0.295	-0.464	-0.717	0.472
			(0.562)	(0.417)	(1.281)	(0.927)
Unemployment.			-0.405	-0.049	2.202	-0.216

	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy	Traditional prejudice	Racial resentment	Race policy
× grad degree						
			(0.876)	(0.507)	(1.480)	(1.150)
Unemployment.			-0.133	-0.935**	-0.207	0.050
× HS degree						
			(0.329)	(0.361)	(1.235)	(0.849)
Unemployment.			0.451	-0.495	1.136	0.627
× jr. coll. degree						
			(0.794)	(0.456)	(1.388)	(1.082)
Constant	11.170**	-0.723	0.736	9.563**	3.066	0.767
	(3.16)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(2.63)	(0.30)	(0.08)
R^2	0.17	0.25	0.10	0.13	0.24	0.11
N	923	923	923	923	923	923

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

2.10 Discussion and Conclusion

Contrary to the widely held conventional wisdom, the effects of insecurity and unemployment were much less prominent in the models relative to other factors. Despite the inclusion of a wide array of measures used to capture feelings of economic insecurity, the models did not suggest that insecurity played a primary role in the shaping of racial attitudes, though the insecurity scale had more predictive power than did unemployment- showing up in the full models of traditional prejudice. These findings are important in that only modest evidence was found in support for such a widely argued (and even more widely assumed) thesis. Though the literature is replete with evidence of the continued role of race in the formulation of interpersonal dynamics, opportunity structures, and even attitudes about public policy and the allocation of resources, the present chapter only moderate evidence that insecurity among Whites accounts for variation in those racial attitudes.

Education played a more minor role than expected in explaining the variation in racial attitudes. The effect of education was most significant in terms of predicting the racial resentment scale and conspicuously absent from the traditional prejudice scale (absent its interaction term with the High School Degree category) with which it is most closely associated in the literature.

Political ideology remains the strongest factor in predicting all of the racial attitudes in the present chapter, and this is consistent with a large body of research that documents the increasing racialization of politics in the United States (Davis and Silver 2003, Hutchings and Valentino 2004, Kessler 2001, Kinder and Sears 1981, Krysan 2000, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000). There are few issues in which there is

a greater gulf between liberals and conservatives, between Democrats and Republicans, than issues of race. Indeed, in spite of explicit racial claims, racial agendas, and in many cases the absence of any specific reference to race, our parties are more divided by race than ever before (Taylor and Merino 2011, Tuch and Hughes 2011). The project of teasing out the ways in which more racial prejudice and racial anxiety might be bound up in expressions of political ideology, while well documented, are certainly beyond the scope of this study. It bears repeating, though, that no factor was as consistent or as strong in predicting a variety of attitudes- from traditional prejudice to putatively non-prejudicial attitudes about racial policy- than was political ideology.

What might help explain the weakness of the primary hypothesized relationship is a corresponding absence of prominent elite actors who promote narratives of resentment and antipathy toward African Americans as a means of explaining or justifying white insecurity. Previous references to cases involving this hypothesized relationship, especially those that led to violence and/or significant political strife, almost are always characterized by elites who use these narratives as tools of political manipulation. In other words, there exist many frames for understanding the sources and solutions to one's own circumstances of insecurity (well beyond the agency vs. structure 'debate' that characterizes much of our current political culture), and this research suggests that a frame of white resentment and antipathy is not necessarily the only frame available to insecure Whites. From this perspective, Nativist, Nationalist and Fascist movements, for example, can be seen as much as political projects of elites who are applying an available frame for their own

political gain as much as they can be seen as an organic reaction to economic conditions on the ground. Other research might rightly put more emphasis on the political environment in which one experiences insecurity and find, perhaps, that insecurity is sometimes necessary, *but not sufficient* for an increase in the expression of prejudice, resentment or opposition to race-targeting. The data available to the present research do not allow a test of this hypothesis and it is clearly beyond the scope of this project, but a fuller understanding of this dynamic would certainly benefit from a more robust test involving examination of the role of elites and political narratives.

Though these findings may run counter to the broadly held assumptions about the ways in which insecurity might have an influence on intergroup relations, the results of this study may well be regarded with some level of optimism. Factors such as increased education, increase in congenial contact, and more recent birth cohort are all much more clearly demonstrated factors in attenuation of prejudice and hostility, *even for the economically insecure,* and that is certainly cause for optimism among those concerned with racial justice. If it is indeed true that increased economic insecurity among the racially privileged members of a given society does not *necessarily* yield animosity or antipathy toward the people of color, many of whom are also likely to suffer insecurity, there exists a potential for trans-racial political and economic cooperation previously unrealized in US history.

One might conceive of a reconsideration of Dawson's concept of *linked fate*, one in which those who suffer insecurity become less identified with racial distinctions, racial identity, and racial goals, and more invested in a common fate

directed at overcoming insecurity and struggle (Dawson 1994). In a society still characterized by white supremacy in which even poor and relatively economically insecure whites still enjoy race privilege, this is no easy task. The emergence of this alternative conception of *linked fate* is not likely to emerge easily or without resistance, but the findings of the present research suggest that such a reconfiguration is perhaps more possible than previously believed.

It must be added, of course, that the picture is not universally a positive one, and that many of the current issues of racial injustice have very little if anything to do with the racial attitudes of economically insecure White people. The well documented examples of increasing segregation in some quarters, the role of mass incarceration of people of color, an exploding wealth gap, slowing academic progress and a host of other issues are more the product of a complex matrix of putatively non-racial public policy and subtle forms of discrimination which may or may not be captured in measures of racial attitudes. Though the literature is somewhat mixed in terms of the connection between expression of prejudice and likelihood to discriminate, it is clear that prejudice (and attitude) and discrimination (an action) are distinct and operate differently from one another. There is still a great deal of work to do to understand the mechanisms that create and maintain racial inequality, and a still greater measure of effort to be marshaled toward building political will to address the causes that emerge from that research.

A finding that insecurity does not correlate with expression of prejudice is certainly not a finding that more economic security leads to less expression of White prejudice, and that is worth emphasizing. Just as the causes of prejudice are manifold

and contextually dependent, so too are the ways in which the expression of prejudice might be attenuated. More research is needed to identify what- if any- role other economic factors play in the expression of prejudice. It does however seem clear that economic insecurity and the anxiety that is engendered by that insecurity *alone* are not sufficient to produce and increase in the expression of prejudice. Social-level norms encouraging increased inter-racial (congenial) contact and increased formal education are becoming prominent and it is clear that both of these factors are associated with a reduction in the expression of prejudice over time.

2.11 Limitations and Challenges For Future Research

There are few topics whose measurement elicits more debate than does racial prejudice. The debates range broadly from disagreements about the operationalization(s) of the concept to methods used to collect data, to the measures used to measure those data, and especially over the overall trends in the incidence of racial prejudice. Though used most frequently until recently in the study of racial attitudes, survey research has rather recently come under criticism for being subject to interviewer and social desirability effects, among other things. The preponderance of the most recent critiques of survey research – as compared with experimental and qualitative methods- suggests that, if anything, surveys *underestimate* both the durability and centrality of race to identity, political attitudes and inter-group dynamics. While it is clear that statistical analysis of survey responses may not be sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of racial prejudice, there remains a high degree of similarity of findings both across the survey literature and between survey and other research methods.

Future examinations of the effects of education and insecurity on prejudice will benefit from more diverse data and methods to capture the richness and complexity of these relationships. Given the highly subjective nature of two of the key constructs in the present research, findings may be clarified and strengthened by a mixed method approach involving implicit measures of prejudice –especially given the present trajectory of the literature in this area (Tynes and Markoe 2010).

CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS, CONTEXT EFFECTS, AND RACIAL ATTITUDES: A WITHIN-PERSON PANEL STUDY

3.1 Abstract

How important are the local racial and socioeconomic contexts to the expression of racial attitudes? A growing number of studies have suggested that local socioeconomic context, in particular, is a driving factor in the formation of racial attitudes, but this work has relied exclusively on cross-sectional individual-level data. The present chapter extends the literature by including key indicators from the General Social Survey (2006-2010) panel data – appended to data from the US Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics-- which allow evaluation of within-person effect of both individual and contextual factors across time. At the contextual level, primary focus is given to "group threat" and economic contextual factors, as they have been the subjects of the greatest interest in previous research. Findings suggest a complicated picture in which context effects play a more prominent (and variable) role in cross-sectional than in panel analyses. Implications for future multi-level analyses of racial attitudes are discussed.

This chapter takes up a question long considered in the sociological literature in general and the racial attitudes research in particular: how does the local environment- the local context- shape one's worldview? This chapter seeks to identify- using nationally representative panel data for the first time- how individual

and context effects influence one's attitudes about race. Is, for example, living in a county that has experienced significant economic distress a risk factor for the increased expression of prejudice? Does living in a county that has experienced a significant demographic change in a short period of time leave one more likely to express racial resentment? These are the questions that animate the research in this chapter.

Research since the 1960s, and especially more recently, has sought to account for the impact of local context on prejudice rather than evaluating only the ways in which survey respondents might vary – one from another – in a given local place (Hood Iii and Morris 2000, Lee, Boeckelman and Day 2013, McDermott 2011, Olzak 1990, Stein, Post and Allison 2000). Of particular interest to researchers focused on these contextual effects have been the role of region (with special attention to the US South), rurality, local economic and political conditions, and especially the role of so-called "racial threat." (Tam Cho and Baer 2011) Such efforts to analyze the effect of these factors have demonstrated that a significant amount of variation in racial attitudes is attributable to contexts and not captured by individual variation in attitudes or experiences alone (Enos 2014, Johnson, Pais and South 2012, Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011).Scholars have taken up this question only relatively recently by – primarily- linking survey and other attitudinal data with other data such as local economic and demographic parameters.

The findings of this research, while relatively nascent, have pointed on the one hand to the limitation of attitudinal measures for evaluating likely human behavior, and on the other to the importance of contextual factors in the proper understanding

of racial attitudes(Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Quillian 1995, Taylor 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011, Taylor and Reyes 2014). These scholars have carefully constructed models to take account of both individual and contextual effects. While results are somewhat mixed, the most carefully and comprehensively constructed research suggests a significant role of contextual effects in predicting the observed variation in the expression of prejudice (Enos 2014, Quillian 1996, Taylor 2000). This relatively new direction in the racial attitudes literature, then, points to the limits of using survey research to fully evaluate the sources and nature of racial attitudes in the modern United States.

The limits of using survey research alone are well known, but so are the values of this approach. In spite of significant change both in terms of the demographics of US society and the racial attitudes they express, many of these survey research findings have been consistently observed across time. This is especially compelling given that most of this research has been conducted using relatively large ($n < 5000$) samples and almost exclusively cross-sectional data. Perhaps most compelling is the fact that many of the theoretical frameworks developed and tested in the US context have been replicated to very similar effect in European and Asian societies, suggesting that the observed relationships are less culturally-dependent than may have been assumed (Quillian 1995, Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002, Seeman, Rohan and Milton 1966, Semyonov et al. 2004, Watt and Larkin 2010).

In spite of the relatively strong levels of reliability and generalizability found in research-based on surveys however, individual characteristics are usually

demonstrated to account for a relatively small amount of variation in the expression of racial prejudice (Johnson, Pais and South 2012, Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011). This has remained true in spite of the creation of nearly comprehensive survey instruments that account for nearly every known correlate of racial prejudice and include carefully weighted samples. It is clear then, that while cross-sectional survey research alone is consistent, it is certainly not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of the factors associated with racial prejudice.

Exactly how and why local contexts are so influential, though, remains an object of debate in the literature. Even these very well designed studies have produced somewhat variable results, perhaps owing in part to reliance on cross-sectional data for individual attitudes. Even when scholars include longitudinal contextual variables, the dependent variables or indices in these models are associated with single-point observations, which may or may not actually reflect more general racial attitudes of the respondent at any more than one point in time.

The aim of this project is to overcome this limitation by subjecting these models to panel data from the newly available GSS (2006-2010) Panel Study. By leveraging these panel data against the longitudinal contextual information available from other sources, it is possible to more fully adjudicate the claims made by researchers about the relative predictive power of various factors and groups of factors. With two very recent waves of information and the ability to measure change across all variables, both individual and contextual, the present research will be able to evaluate the validity of previous research in a new way. It will be possible, for

instance, to evaluate whether and to what extent the observed role of contextual factors in the recent prejudice literature may be an artifact of the cross-sectional modeling used in the past, and whether this kind of analytic strategy has resulted in an underweighting of individual factors like personal economic insecurity or political ideology.

With this aim in mind, the present chapter has four primary goals. First, this project will evaluate the ways in which individual level factors may predict racial attitudes both in each individual wave and between them. Second, it will attempt to replicate the findings of recent research suggesting the importance of local socio-economic context. Third, by employing a unique measure for "racial threat," the present chapter seeks to overcome the limitations of the "percent black," measures often employed in the literature. Finally, this project will analyze two cross-sectional and one change model including all contextual and individual variables in order to robustly evaluate the role played the factors at each level.

3.2 Background

Early research into the correlates of racial prejudice, most of which took on the conceptualization of psychologists and psychological researchers, focused primarily on two factors: inter-group contact and education. Persons with more formal education and more (positive) contact with members of a racial out-group, for example have been repeatedly demonstrated to express lower levels of racial prejudice and animosity (Allport 1954, Kahn 1951). These researchers proceeded with the understanding that racial prejudice was primarily the result of a "false belief," that "..arose from the ignorance of isolation.." (Allport 1954). Central to this

understanding of prejudice is one that does not take account of the distribution of power or of (group or individual) interests, but rather sees racial prejudice primarily as the result of simple normative failures that might be addressed without any significant structural changes. Put simply, these early theories of prejudice saw it as an individual-level pathology whose cure was to be administered individually.

Though these basic assumptions have come under significant challenge since the earlier waves of prejudice research, the factors that were the focus of this research continue until today to be demonstrated correlates or racial prejudice (Bobo et al. 2012). In the decades since this early work, scholars have set about the task of unpacking the underlying mechanisms of these relationships and found, as is often the case with complex human behaviors and attitudes, that the relationships are more complicated than they first appeared (Bobo et al. 2012, Bobo and Charles 2009). Sociological treatments, of course, have turned the focus to environmental factors, beginning with a (now well-established) assertion that racial attitudes- like all others- are learned (Adorno 1950, Kahn 1951, Penner and Saperstein 2013, Wodtke 2012). This focus on the social learning of prejudice- and the various conditions and environments in which that learning takes place- continues up to today.

3.3 Intergroup Contact

Among the foremost areas of focus on this social learning has been the literature on the role played by inter-group contact. Generally speaking, great empirical support has been provided for the idea that increased contact with members of a stigmatized or low-status out-group will increase the level of tolerance of that group and its members. The underlying mechanism for this relationship is believed to

be a falsification of group stereotypes coupled with a softening of the boundaries between in-group and out-group. While the relationship between contact and tolerance is well established, it has also been noted that very heterogeneous locales are often the sites of significant racial animus and conflict. What came to be critiqued as the "mere contact hypothesis," came under significant criticism as too blunt a theoretical instrument to capture the complexities of the effects of inter-group contact on racial attitudes (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004, McClendon 1974, Sigelman and Welch 1993). Researchers have since developed a more nuanced understanding of the role of contact that captures not just the quality, manner, and scope of contact, but also one that has turned its focus more primarily to the context in which the contact is taking place. To summarize the most recent findings in this area, in order for contact to reliably reduce prejudice and inter-group animosity, that contact must have two kinds of characteristics. First, the *nature* of the contact must be reach into the private sphere, be non-competitive, non-zero sum, and sustained. Secondly, *the context* of the conflict must be in a relatively low-stress local environment marked by the absence of significant social problems and social stresses. A strong recent example of this work is that of Dixon (2006), who found that those who having a personal friend who was a member of the racial out-group determined whether or not the effects of inter-group contact would increase or diminish levels of racial prejudice (Dixon 2006). Again, the manner and circumstances of the inter-group contact are of significant import, as some persons with a high level of contact actually express more prejudice than others if the contact is competitive and/or contentious (Enos 2014, Havekes, Coenders and Dekker 2013, Taylor and Reyes 2014).

3.4 Group Threat

The first significant challenge to the notion that contact and education were the primary sources of racial animosity came from Blumer's (1958) "*Race Prejudice As A Sense of Group Position."* In this extremely influential but parsimonious paper, Blumer articulated fully for the first time the idea that racial prejudice was the result of persons of different racial (and thereby social) status seeing one another primarily as members of their group—not as individuals. In other words, for the first time Blumer suggested that the source of race prejudice was necessarily the result of a *collective* process- not simply the result of individual factors like education or lack of inter-group contact. For Blumer, the causes (and cures) of racial prejudice lay primarily at the social level a suggestion in direct opposition to earlier researchers who conceived of prejudice as misinformed affect or cognition. Blumer's contribution was to turn attention to the process of racial formation and the structures that differentially allocated power and opportunity to different groups, and away from the idea of racism as individual pathology.

Following Blumer, Blalock provided the first powerful framework for testing Blumer's theory: a test of "Group Threat," namely the idea that the relative size of a racial out-group (in his case African Americans) is predictive of "a threat response" both at the individual and collective levels. Blalock focused primarily on anti-black discrimination as a threat response and demonstrated that in localities with a higher percentage of black persons, economic and political discrimination was more likely. In his later and most comprehensive work (1967), Blalock made three important points that have been largely borne out by researchers that followed him. First,

different kinds of threat (political, economic, public safety) elicit different kinds of reactions at different thresholds to the majority white population. Second, the relationship between minority group size and threat response (discrimination, political disenfranchisement, etc.) is non-linear. As the non-white percent of the population increases from near zero, the negative effects of increasing percent non-white diminish and eventually reverse direction.[7] Finally, Blalock demonstrated that it was the perception of threat (or percent black) that was the most important factor influencing threat response, even when the actual local demographics varied significantly from perception. There has been, in fact, in recent years, a growing literature on the effect of over-estimation of an out-group population on hostile attitudes toward that group (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005, Gallagher 2003).

A vast and growing body of research has repeatedly documented the relationship between the presence of a "racial threat" and numerous attitudinal and social outcomes among the white population of the United States (Avery and Fine 2012, DeFina and Hannon 2009, Giles and Evans 1985, Quillian 1995, Quillian 1996, Semyonov et al. 2004). Though the research has concentrated primarily on attitudinal measures of prejudice, "racial threat" has demonstrated associations with support for public policy measures, incidence of discrimination and even racial and gender inequality (Cohen 1998, Durso and Jacobs 2013, Unnever and Cullen 2012). The research in question has concentrated primarily on the black/white dimension of

[7] Though the curvilinear relationship is robustly demonstrated in the literature, the threshold at which the effect begins to reverse is the matter of some contention. Most studies place this point between 20-40% non-white. For further discussion, see Dixon (2006).

racial interaction and has operationalized that "threat" almost exclusively in terms of local racial population composition. This variable has almost always been operationalized in terms of "percent black." Largely referred to as the "group threat" theory of racial prejudice, studies have consistently demonstrated both that respondents who live in areas with higher concentrations of persons of color AND persons who live in an area in which the percentage of persons of color has increased—will be more likely to express anti-black prejudice.

It would be a substantial understatement to say that though the "threat effect" is relatively reliably observed, its latent causal process is not well understood. In fact, the reason *why* group threat seems to be so frequently related to racial prejudice is the object of considerable debate (Dixon 2006, Johnson, Pais and South 2012, Lee, Boeckelman and Day 2013, Posta 2013, Taylor and Reyes 2014). It is not clear, for example, if it is the mere presence of members of the out-group that lead to anxiety among whites, but instead the kinds of social conditions (crime, poor institutions, general social deprivation) that characterize the places in which members of the out-group- people of color in this case- predominate (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor and Reyes 2014, Wagner et al. 2006).

3.5 Racial Context: Threat or Contact?

The "group threat" and "contact" literatures, then, seem to provide opposing theories about the effect of inter-group contact on racial attitudes. While carefully qualified, the "contact" literature points to fact that in many cases, increased contact with members of the out-group promotes racial tolerance. On the other hand, the "group threat" literature – especially insofar as it relies on local measures of "percent

black," predicts that the presence of a significant number of members of the out-group (at least up to a certain threshold) makes white persons more likely to express racial antipathy, among other things. A number of researchers have addressed this apparent paradox head-on and in so doing, made an effort to reconcile the two well-established areas of research. In general, the literature here suggests that there are three main factors that influence whether and how the presence of members of an out-group might impact the attitudes (and behaviors) of local white persons.

First, several studies have found that the size of the unit of analysis matters a great deal. In general terms, the smaller the unit of analysis, the more likely (controlling for other factors) that the inter-group interaction will have a contact (tolerance-promoting) effect on local whites. For example, at the state level, in which there is frequently significant racial segregation, a relatively high percentage of out-group members is likely to result in a threat (animus-promoting) effect. On the other hand, at the level of census tract or neighborhood, the effect is likely to be the opposite; whites expressing more racial tolerance. This is thought to be as a result of the fact that different levels of geographical granularity describe different circumstances of interaction, and that living in the same neighborhood and sharing an investment in local institutions and identity is very different from being isolated by several counties and interacting with members of the out-group only in terms of political and economic competition.

Secondly, the *nature* of contact is important. If, as referenced above, contact is experienced primarily in terms of competition and if there is not common investment in shared institutions, the presence of (a large number) of members of an out-group is

likely to be associated with racial antipathy instead of tolerance. This is especially true, as scholars have pointed out, if the interaction takes place in of the realm of group-based zero-sum exchanges. If the nature of this contact is instead collaborative and self-selected across group lines (voluntary and municipal associations), the contact is much more likely to promote tolerance. While the nature of contact is frequently associated with the unit of analysis (more cross-group collaboration happens at the neighborhood than state level), the effect of the nature of contact has been observed across several levels of analysis. The effect, for example, of having just one close friend that is a member of the out-group actually *inverts* the "threat effects" posed by a large and/or increasing local presence of other members of the out-group.

Finally, the context within which the contact takes place is of great importance. Research has found that inter-group contact in low-status contexts is more likely to yield a "threat effect." Put simply, if one encounters members of the out-group primarily in an environment in which most of the residents and social institutions are degraded, that interaction is less likely to promote tolerance of that group. Critically, this phenomenon is consistent whether or not the local context being measured is confined to members of the in-group (usually white), members of the out-group, or all residents of the context in question. This finding has been replicated using local religious profile, educational levels, economic factors, and even subjective measures of local disadvantage. This factor will be explored in more detail in the coming pages.

3.6 Studies of Context Effects on Racial Attitudes

Quite apart from questions of inter-group interaction is the environment in which those interactions do (or do not) take place. Among other things, researchers have found that the size of place (Carter et al. 2005, Tuch 1987b), region of the country (Ellison and Musick 1993, Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997, Lee et al. 2007), local political environment (Lee, Boeckelman and Day 2013, Monnat 2010), local educational profile (Moore and Ovadia 2006, Taylor and Mateyka 2011, Taylor and Reyes 2014), local labor market conditions (Quillian 1995, Quillian 1996), and local religious characteristics (Moore and Ovadia 2006) all strongly influence the racial attitudes of persons living in those contexts. Critically, much of this research has found that these contexts are more predictive of one's level of racial tolerance than many individual factors such as one's own race, gender and level of education (Barlow et al. 2012, Branton and Jones 2005, Taylor and Reyes 2014).

3.6.1 The Socioeconomic Context

It has long been argued that economic distress makes persons more unstable and susceptible to manipulation and responsive to anti-minority demagoguery and scapegoating (Horwitz 1984). Some limited evidence has been provided for the so-called "scapegoating theory" of prejudice, in which individual economic insecurity (usually unemployment) was associated with increased prejudice; so-called because it is asserted that the prejudice is a function of the person experiencing insecurity "scapegoating" the racial other for her own struggles (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Taylor and Mateyka 2011, Valentino, Brader and Jardina 2013). This research is, however, limited and almost exclusively focuses on attitudes related to immigration.

On the other hand, while the effects of individual economic insecurity are relatively under-examined, a number of recent studies have included key measures of context-level effects including local economic conditions, unemployment rates, and rates of college completion as possible correlates of various racial attitudes (Johnson, Pais and South 2012, Kuziemko et al. 2011, Lee, Boeckelman and Day 2013, Lee et al. 2007, Tuch 1987b). This research recasts the main assumption of the "group threat" theory, asserting not that people of color *per se* were inducing prejudice, but that the kinds of environments in which large numbers of people of color live, instead serve to induce prejudice (Moore and Ovadia 2006, Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). Very recent evidence from economists seems to confirm this finding as well, suggesting that whites living in areas with a higher percentage of black residents have lower rates of social mobility- a correlate of racial prejudice used in earlier research (Chetty et al. 2014, Seeman, Rohan and Milton 1966, Silberstein and Seeman 1959).

An influential study found that the effects of "racial threat" could be accounted for entirely by controlling for the socio-economic conditions of the local white population (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). In other words, Oliver and Mendelberg found, whites living in higher stress (low SES) environments – environments more likely to be places where a higher percentage of people of color lived- were more likely to express anti-black prejudice. Variously operationalized, researchers have found that intergroup interaction in high status contexts provides evidence for the racial tolerance of the "contact effect," while interaction in low-status contexts provides evidence for the racial antipathy of the "threat effect." (Binder et al. 2009, Blake 2003, Branton and Jones 2005, Oliver and Mendelberg

2000, Taylor 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011, Taylor and Reyes 2014, Wagner et al. 2006) . While the results are somewhat mixed, these socioeconomic factors have been linked to increased expression for racial prejudice and/or opposition to race-targeted programs (Gay 2006, Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Quillian 1996, Taylor 1998, Taylor 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011), poor electoral representation of African Americans (Avery and Fine 2012), opposition to immigration (Becker, Wagner and Christ 2011, Citrin et al. 1997, Pettigrew, Wagner and Christ 2007, Quillian 1995), and support for more punitive criminal justice policy (Hogan, Chiricos and Gertz 2005), beliefs about the sources of poverty (Merolla, Hunt and Serpe 2011), and even the number of lynchings (Corzine, Creech and Corzine 1983, McVeigh 2012). One study even found that when local religious and educational context characteristics were introduced into the model, the well-established effects of rurality and residence in the US South were no longer significant (Moore and Ovadia 2006). On the other hand, local economic conditions were found not to be related to the incidence of hate crime (Green, Glaser and Rich 1998), or support for more punitive criminal justice policy (Johnson 2001).

The most prominent and consistent findings in this area have used local educational characteristics as the primary indicator of socioeconomic context- usually percentage of persons in the unit of analysis who have completed college (Barlow et al. 2012, Lee, Boeckelman and Day 2013, Moore and Ovadia 2006, Posta 2013, Taylor and Mateyka 2011, Taylor and Reyes 2014). The value of using this particular indicator as opposed to others is that it captures pro-tolerance norms that are "…achieved through institutional and macrosocial means, as opposed to the face-to-

face interactions between similar individual." (Taylor and Mateyka 2011) These findings have been robust, demonstrating at multiple levels of analysis (county, metropolitan statistical area, neighborhood) and both in the US and abroad – Canada (Blake 2003), Germany (Wagner et al. 2006), and France (Rathelot and Safi 2014)- that local diversity yields tolerant racial attitudes in high-status areas and antipathy in low-status areas. While most of this work has focused on white's attitude about non-whites (and/or immigrants), the effect has also been observed in multi-ethnic settings along multiple lines of racial and ethnic difference (Havekes, Coenders and Dekker 2013, Oliver and Wong 2003).

3.6.2 Longitudinal Studies of Prejudice

The prejudice literature is surprisingly limited in terms of panel studies, and this body of research suffers from four main limitations. First, most studies which attempt to evaluate change in racial attitudes within the same sample across time have focused almost exclusively on three areas to the exclusion of nearly all others: the role of inter-personal contact, the role of education, and the role of personality development (Bobo et al. 2012, Bobo and Charles 2009). Secondly, most of this research has either included relatively small and non-representative samples or has been focused outside of the United States context (Hodson and Busseri 2012, Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). Thirdly, most of the research has been undertaken by Psychologists and Political Scientists whose assumptions and aims, though they may overlap considerably with Sociologists, bear the mark important disciplinary differences (Ditonto, Lau and Sears 2013, Huddy and Feldman 2009, Neblo 2009). Finally, these generally very micro-level oriented studies have not modeled any

contextual-level effects to compliment these individual-level data, and account for a fairly small amount of variation in expression of prejudice (Binder et al. 2009, Pettigrew and Tropp 2008).

Perhaps the greatest number of studies in this area have focused on the long-term effects of sustained inter-group contact on racial prejudice (Binder et al. 2009, Pettigrew and Tropp 2008, Taylor 2000, Wagner et al. 2006). Most such studies reinforce previous cross-sectional research by demonstrating that it is the *manner* and *context* of contact that is important in predicting prejudice, not the mere quantity of contact. A recent study along this line, for example found that while prejudice does reduce inter-group contact, the effect of positive, sustained inter-group contact has a stronger effect on reducing prejudice, thereby mediating the reduction in contact (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). This chapter will seek to overcome the limitations of this research by employing well-tested measures to evaluate within-person change in a nationally representative sample of respondents. This unique sample will allow a direct evaluation of the importance of individual-level and contextual factors during a time of particular political and economic tumult in the United States.

3.7 Data and Method

The data employed in this study come from three distinct sources. First, all individual-level variables come from General Social Survey's (hereafter GSS) inaugural Panel Survey program. The GSS is widely considered among the very best sources of nationally representative attitudinal data on a variety of social and political indicators and has been frequently used in the measure of racial attitudes. The population from which these samples were drawn is all non-institutionalized adult

English or Spanish speakers in the United States. The respondents included in this GSS Panel were first surveyed in 2006 and were re-interviewed in 2010. Data from the second wave (2008) were not included in the analysis in order to allow a substantial passage of time between observations in the analysis. All of the individual-level variables used in each model come from these two waves of the GSS.

In order to link the GSS data with other geographically organized data, geocodes were applied for and obtained from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), who produces the GSS. These codes made available the census tract, county, and metropolitan statistical area information for each respondent. Given the availability of other sources of data drawn at the county level, the unit of analysis chosen for this chapter was the county of residence for each respondent at each wave of observation[8].

The second source of data for the present chapter is the United States Census Bureau. The data from the Census Bureau come both from the decennial census and from inter-censual population estimates made by the American Community Survey (ACS), an arm of the Bureau. The ACS data were used to gather the county-level racial composition characteristics for each respondent in the non-census year 2006, and the corresponding data for 2010 come from the full census conducted in that year. In order to capture the net effect of population changes that might result in "racial threat," the percentage of the county that is White and Non-Hispanic is included. This

[8] Considerable disagreement remains about the ideal contextual unit of analysis to measure the dynamics under investigated in this chapter. Though more granular (or multiple) levels of clustering might be preferable, data availability guided the choice employed here. For further discussion, see Cho & Baer (2011).

measure is employed here in order to make use of the aggregate effects of changing population parameters to include other low-status groups such as Latinos and Asian Americans. These data were appended to the GSS data, and each of these percentages is modeled as a separate contextual-level variable in the present chapter.

The final source of data used in the present chapter is the local unemployment rate from United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (hereafter BLS). Specifically, data for the average monthly level of unemployment for each county were drawn from the BLS database and appended to the GSS and Census Data. Included in these parameters are all eligible working age citizens who are unemployed and looking for work. This rate is *not* constrained to only white persons as rates of unemployment across the labor market These numbers reflect only a year- interval average for unemployment rate, but the greatest volatility in the economy an the unemployment rate more generally occurred well between the two points of observation included in the present chapter. In general terms, these two points provide a pre-recession baseline level of unemployment in 2006 and an unemployment level in 2010 reflective of the deep economic recession that began in 2008.



Figure 3.1. US Unemployment Rate, 2001–2012.

Longitudinal research offers many challenges to researchers, not least of which is the difficulty of capturing significant contextual and temporal variation while maintaining valid subsequent measures for a sample that becomes more and more difficult to re-survey over time. While the time period between waves was relatively short, the two waves spanned a substantial and precipitous economic downturn that resulted in increased economic insecurity across the population. In other words, there is likely no four-year span in the last 75 years of US history in which there was more economic volatility, uncertainty and insecurity- an ideal environment in which to test the hypotheses presented here. Perhaps most indicative of this significant economic downturn was the rapid rise in unemployment between the two waves of observation (see Figure 1).

This was also a period during which issues of race were thrust to the fore in the context of the election of the country's first President of color. Researchers have traced the rise of a new wave of racial anxiety and resentment that has increasingly characterized social life from public policy outcomes to general public discourse, and these effects are found most profoundly in the population that is the focus of this research: non-Hispanic Whites (Blee and Creasap 2010, Bobo et al. 2012, Bobo and Charles 2009). For this reason, one might expect a greater than average level of variability in attitudes about race and race policy given the relatively proximal dates of observation.

3.7.1 Analytic Strategy

Because both individual-level and contextual variables are included in the study, multi-level modeling is employed here. Multi-level modeling is used in

circumstances in which individual observations are nested in a second level of observation- in this case, counties- which would otherwise bias the standard errors in the analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Specifically, both Linear and Non-Linear (Ordinal Logistic) mixed-models are used to account for the assumed non-independence of these observations, which are clustered into counties on the racial threat and unemployment variables. Interclass correlation coefficients were run on each model and revealed that there was sufficient (>30%) variation attributable to the nesting in order to justify the use of this analytic technique. In order to further enhance analytic efficiency, first-level (individual characteristic) variables are centered on the mean of the all observations in their county cluster.

Each wave of the survey responses will be analyzed separately in order to establish variability over time and evaluate the areas in which the observed relationships are relatively strong. Finally, an additive change model will be constructed in the same way to evaluate the effect of change in both individual and contextual level variables on change in racial attitudes between 2006 and 2010. This last model will be of particular value as the author knows of no such longitudinal analysis of these variables at the national level in the literature.

Of the 2000 respondents that began the panel study in 2006, there were 1,681 participants who completed the survey in the third wave of the study. As the focus of this research is on the racial attitudes of white persons, all respondents who identified as persons of color were eliminated from the sample. Also, given the emerging body of research suggesting a growing difference in the attitudes of white Latinos from others who identify as White, the sample is constrained to Non-Hispanic Whites only,

with a total available sample size of 1,222 respondents (Brown, Steven and H. 2006, Hitlin, Brown and Elder 2007, Roth 2010). Because not all respondents responded to each of the racial attitude questions, the final N for each model ranges from 587-781 respondents.

Because the GSS utilizes a modular system in which one-third to two-thirds of respondents are not asked all questions, and because many of the variables of interest in this study were not asked to all respondents, there are substantial numbers of missing data across the sample. As the study is designed, respondents do not answer all questions, thus there is no systematic bias including or excluding respondents, an approach referred to in the literature as *Observed at Random* or (OAR)[9]. Based on this random ballot-assignment survey design, the data were missing completely at random (MCAR). There are a very small number of cases (.07 %) in which data are missing for non-response or refusal to respond to a question that was actually posed to a respondent- but in all other cases, missingness is completely unbiased.

While multiple imputation methods may be a preferred means of handling data with significant missingness, there are currently no tools available to efficiently conduct imputation involving multi-level models. Given this analytic limitation and the fact missingness that was almost exclusively MCAR, the analyses employed in the present chapter are based on list-wise deletion of cases with missing data. The actual *n* for each model varies based primarily on the dependent variable, given that some racial attitude items were asked to more respondents than were others.

[9] Data that were Observed At Random (OAR) by nature considered Missing Completely At Random (MCAR). For more, see Raykov et al (2012) and Raykov (2011)

The measures of racial attitudes used as outcome variables in the present chapter are based on individual questions posed to respondents rather than latent scale composed of several similar items. While the construction of such scales often yields important information about the underlying psychosocial constructs at the heart of these racial attitudes, the complexity of the models employed and the relatively modest sample sizes used here make the construction of such scales impossible. The carefully chosen individual measures employed here, on the other hand, have been very well tested in the racial attitudes literature and have produced very reliable effects in a number of diverse samples and complex models. The full wording of each prompt, along with coding information, can be found at the end of the chapter in Appendix A.

3.7.2 Individual-Level Independent Variables

Previous research has demonstrated the relatively reliable influence of a number of key individual-level variables in predicting change in racial attitudes. These factors have been demonstrated across contexts and across time and as such, warranted inclusion in each of the racial attitude models under examination in the present chapter. Each of the factors used here is the subject of its own well-established research literature, but very brief discussion of the relevant research and reasons for inclusion associated with each of these variables follows.

One fairly reliable indicator of a variety of racial attitudes, especially traditional prejudice, is age or **birth cohort**[10]. Older or earlier born respondents are more likely to express racial prejudice and resentment, though this effect is non-linear (Forman 2010, Nteta and Greenlee 2013, Wilson 1996). Though this relationship is frequently attributed to the effect of being socialized under more conservative racial norms, recent experimental evidence has suggested that-- fear induced by confrontation with mortality on the one hand, and a less-well regulated "social filter" on the other- may explain much of this effect (Gonsalkorale, Sherman and Klauer 2009, Radvansky, Copeland and Hippel 2010) . This variable is measured by year of birth, and thus higher values represent younger respondents. It is hypothesized that older persons will express higher levels of traditional prejudice, but not necessarily racial resentment or opposition to race targeting.

Though not usually the primary focus of researchers, the effect of **Gender** on racial attitudes is frequently included in research models. Though white female respondents are slightly less likely to express traditional prejudice and social distance, they are sometimes more likely to express racial resentment and opposition to race targeted policies (Hughes and Tuch 2003, Johnson and Marini 1998, Stack 1997). The reasons for the differences are debated[11] and the effects are relatively small, but female respondents are relatively consistently more racially liberal than their male

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[10] Birth cohorts were arranged by decades, generations and presidential administrations, as is the custom in the literature. None of the variations on the strategy employed here were found to be significantly different.

[11] The most consistent explanation is that White women are significant beneficiaries of Affirmative Action programs and may see people of color as potential competitors in the Affirmative Action "market." For further discussion, see Hughes and Tuck (2003).

counterparts in areas not focused on race-targeted policy. This variable is coded 1 for men and 0 for women. It is hypothesized that men will express more racially conservative attitudes than will women, except with respect to race targeting.

Ideological identification as **conservative** has been strongly and repeatedly associated with nearly every kind of racial construct used in the literature (Bobo et al. 2012, Duckitt and Bizumic 2013, Quillian 2006, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996). There remains considerable debate about how independently political ideology operates from several other constructs with which it is closely associated such as traditionalism, authoritarian personality, social dominance orientation, and so-called right wing authoritarianism (Duckitt and Bizumic 2013, Levin et al. 1998, Levin and Sidanius 1999, Pena and Sidanius 2002, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Thomsen et al. 2010). A corresponding debate focused primarily on racial policy attitudes is ongoing between Sniderman and his colleagues, who suggest that the relationship between political ideology and racial attitudes is simply the result of "principled conservatism," while a large number of other scholars have consistently and successfully critiqued this position (Kinder and Sears 1981, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Sears and Henry 2003, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Sniderman, Tetlock and Carmines 1993, Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Whatever the nature of the relationship or the underlying mechanisms for it, conservative-identifying persons – especially white conservatives – express more social distance, more traditional prejudice, more racial resentment, and more opposition to race targeted programs, and as such is included here (Blodorn and O'Brien 2013, Bobo et al. 2012, Wilson and Brewer 2013). This political ideology variable is coded 1 for "extremely liberal," and

7 for "extremely conservative". It is hypothesized that more conservative persons will express more racially conservative attitudes (such as those described above) than their less conservative peers.

Education has been demonstrated to be a very strong and reliable predictor of racial attitudes, in most cases with respondents expressing more liberal attitudes with greater levels of formal education (Kahn 1951, Lopez, Gurin and Nagda 1998, Moore and Ovadia 2006, Radloff 2007, Wodtke 2012). The exception to this rule is the effect of education on attitudes about race-targeting among Whites. In fact in many cases, more educated Whites are more are more opposed to race targeting. While much of the literature explains the effect of education as "enlightening" and "promoting tolerance and understanding," a growing body of research suggests that at least some of the differences attributable to increased education are the result of better filtering of the expression of prejudice on the part of educated Whites (Glaser 2001, Jackman and Muha 1984, Wodtke 2012). This latter view helps explain the apparent paradox of increased opposition to race targeting as the single case in which people of color would be likely to pose an economic or political threat to well-educated Whites, thus the opposition. Though the thresholds are somewhat different in the literature, scholarship has consistently suggested that most of the differences in racial attitudes by level of education- especially among whites- are between those who only finish High School (or less) and those who at least attend college[12] (Kahn 1951, Radloff

[12] The reasons for this particular threshold are debated, and it remains unclear if it is the subsequent education that is most important, or primarily the social differences associated with college matriculation instead. For more discussion, see Lopez et al (1998)

2007, Wodtke 2012). Accordingly, the present chapter includes a dummy variable in which those who have at least completed one year of higher education are coded 1 and those who have not are coded 0. It is hypothesized that, except with respect to opposition to race-targeted programs, those who did not attend college will express more racially conservative views than those who did.

Employment Status has been used by researchers (mostly with respect to attitudes about immigration) to evaluate personal vulnerability to group threat. The variable is included here in order to evaluate the notion that those who are unemployed will be more vulnerable to economic competition from non-whites and will therefore express more anxiety about and animosity toward them. Though inconsistent, previous research has demonstrated that unemployment is associated with increased out-group derogation, increased social-distance and increased perception of economic threat (Jacobs, Jason and Kent 2005, Jacobs and Tope 2007, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Luttmer and Singhal 2008). This variable (unemp) is coded 1 for those who were currently unemployed and 0 for those who were not unemployed. The latter category is much more diverse, but previous research has suggested that the greatest effects of employment status on social attitudes in general is in the difference between those who are currently unemployed (and part of the potential labor market) and those who are in any other status (Avery and Fine 2012, Durso and Jacobs 2013). It is hypothesized, then, that unemployed persons, subject to general economic anxiety and uncertainty, will express more racially conservative attitudes relative to those who are not unemployed.

As discussed at some length above, there is a very large literature analyzing the effect of subjective **inter-group contact** (differently conceptualized) on racial attitudes. While there is evidence for both contact and threat effects in the literature, most research has focused on using objective measures of intergroup contact such as population distribution data from the US census. As previously mentioned, there is growing evidence that the correlate of prejudice with real explanatory value is actually *perception* of intergroup presence (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005, Gallagher 2003). For this reason, the present chapter will rely on a single discrete subjective measure of neighborhood racial composition available in the GSS data to evaluate the effect of inter-group contact on our racial attitude outcome variables. Again, this measure is a subjective self-evaluation, which has the advantage of evaluating the respondent's perception irrespective of the actual composition of the neighborhood. The variable for neighborhood contact is coded 1 for those living in a racially integrated neighborhood and 0 for those who do not. It is hypothesized that those who live in a racially integrated neighborhood will express less conservative racial attitudes than those who do not.

Another means of evaluating subjective vulnerability to racial threat is to measure **financial status.** Apart from unemployment, which may pose a greater financial problem to some respondents than others, this measure serves to provide a measure for the actual perceived degree of economic stress experienced by the respondent. As with measures like unemployment used by previous researchers, this variable is included in order to test the hypothesis that persons experiencing higher levels of economic insecurity would be more vulnerable to competition, and thus

threat, from racial out-groups with whom they may be competing for jobs and other resources. This particular kind of subjective measure could not be found in the inter-group attitudes literature and as such represents a unique contribution of the present chapter. While still imperfect given that some individuals are much better suited (financially and otherwise) to endure financial hardship, it provides another dimension of measurement to more fully evaluate the racial effects of economic insecurity on racial attitudes. Of particular interest is the opportunity to evaluate how personal unemployment and personal financial circumstances might act independently of one another in the models employed here. This variable is coded 1 for those who reported a worsening of their personal economic situation and 0 for those who did not report such a worsening of circumstances. It is hypothesized that those who report a worsening of financial circumstances will express more racially conservative attitudes.

3.7.3 Contextual-Level Independent Variables

As discussed in some length before, the **racial composition** of a local context has been demonstrated repeatedly to predict racial attitudes in white respondents (Avery and Fine 2012, Chetty et al. 2014, DeFina and Hannon 2009). While the nature of this threat- and indeed the effect of racial population parameters in general- remains in debate, it remains a factor that scholars in this area must consider (Avery and Fine 2012, Becker, Wagner and Christ 2011, David Jacobs and Daniel Tope 2007, Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004, Dixon 2006, Quillian 1995, Quillian 1996). As mentioned previously, however, given the growing racial diversity and the complex nature of the perception of racial threat, the present chapter chooses to focus instead

on the relative size of the *in-group.* In order to extend the current literature, the present chapter utilizes the percentage of Non-Hispanic White (hereafter NHW) persons in the respondent's county of residence as a measure of the (lack of) this "threat". This will allow evaluation of more comprehensive population dynamics on the one hand and judge whether, for instance, it is a relatively high percent NHW that influences white racial attitudes, or is it a relatively low percent NHW (and the paucity of resources and opportunities in such places) population. Relatively rapid local demographic shifts are almost never the product of an influx of similarly situated members of a racial or ethnic out-group (Quillian 1995). The evidence suggests that residential demographic changes that occur within a relatively short period of time are mostly the product of the moving in of socially and economically marginal members of a racial out-group, and frequently the out-migration of Whites (Durrant et al. 2010, Johnson, Pais and South 2012, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Valentino, Brader and Jardina 2013).

As such, the percentage of county residents who are identified as White and non-Hispanic is included in both waves of the survey, and a variable representing the rate of change (mostly decrease) is included in the change model. To be clear, though a substantial (and growing) number of Latinos identify as White, those persons are not included in the population parameters included here[13] (Feliciano, Lee and Robnett 2011, Hitlin, Brown and Elder 2007). Given that this particular measure has not yet

[13] It should be noted that "threat" is based on perception of the respondent and the ethnic and racial make-up of the county are based on individual self-identification to Census workers, and that these classifications may or may not be the same.

been widely used, it is not know whether or not the effect of percent NHW is linear. As such, this variable is used in the models untransformed.[14] It is hypothesized that those living in counties with a lower percent NHW will express more conservative attitudes than those who reside in counties with a higher such percentage.

In order to evaluate the effect of local socio-economic context, a county-level annual **local unemployment** rate variable is included. This variable is included in order both to contrast with the individual level measures of economic insecurity, and in order to attempt to replicate the findings of recent research that has used local-level unemployment data (Burns and Gimpel 2000, Johnson 2001, Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). These data, from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, reflect the annual average of unemployment for all persons in the county- not just white residents, as has been the practice in previous research. The inclusion of the entire labor market is likely to more accurately evaluate the complex effects of local economic on white respondents beyond one's own job prospects. This inclusion of the entire labor market, in other words, is a better overall proxy for local economic conditions- the kind of effect recently demonstrated to be more important than personal economic insecurity in predicting prejudice (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011). Variables included measure the county-level unemployment rate in 2006, 2010 and a differential variable (mostly of increase) in the change models. Critically, these two data points represent nearly the greatest points of contrast in unemployment rate

[14] Alternative models including a quadratic term were constructed to account for potential non-linearity of effect. These models did not yield significant differences from those included in this study.

across the recession as unemployment hovered near "economic normal" and "full employment" in 2006, and at nearly the height of the employment crisis in early 2010 at the time that most respondents were re-interviewed that year (Durso and Jacobs 2013). It is hypothesized that those living in counties with higher levels of unemployment will express more racially conservative attitudes than those who reside in counties with lower such levels of unemployment.

Region of residence is customarily included in racial attitude measures, and is usually coded such that residents of the US South[15] are compared with all other respondents in the study. The unique racial conservatism of this region is the subject of considerable research focus which has found that, as operationalized, 'the more Southern, the more prejudiced' are both individual respondents and respondents clustered into larger groups such as counties (Burr, Galle and Fossett 1991, Carter et al. 2005, Hardie and Tyson 2013, Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997, Middleton 1976). Debates about whether or not this racial conservatism is a result of a so-called "southern subculture of honor and violence," or –instead—the result of other structural and demographic factors unique to the region is also ongoing (Carter et al. 2005, Ellison 1991, Key 1949, McVeigh 2012, Valentino and Sears 2005). What is clear, however, is that region of residence is frequently found to be a significant predictor of a variety of racial attitudes in that respondents in the South report more traditional prejudice, racial resentment and opposition to race-targeted policy. This

[15] Coding employed here reflects the classification of the US Census. The literature remains divided about this classification, noting in some cases that there is at least as much within-South variation as between the South and Non-South. Given the relative sparse population of sub regions, however, conventional Census categories were used.

variable (south) is coded 1 for residents in the US South and 0 for those outside that region. It is hypothesized that residents of the South will express more racially conservative attitudes than those residing in the non-South across all racial attitudes.

Recent research has given more attention to **race-of-interviewer** effects on responses to racial attitude questions, revealing a troubling response bias resulting in under-estimation of racial prejudice and related attitudes (Durrant et al. 2010, Hill 2002, Krysan and Couper 2003, Rhodes 1994). Most frequently, white respondents faced with an interviewer of color underreport anti-black affect, prejudiced attitudes and opposition to race-targeted policies. This is largely theorized to be as a result of social desirability biases which privilege declaration of more racially liberal attitudes- especially in the presence of a person presumed to be the subject of those attitudes. More researchers are beginning to include these measures and when included, the effects of race-of-interviewer have often been significant, especially on measures of traditional prejudice (Durrant et al. 2010). Because the research has suggested the greatest social distance from, and greatest "racial filter" between African American and White persons, this variable has been coded Black/Non-Black (Bobo et al. 2012). The majority of non-Black interviewers self-identified as White, a substantial subset of whom also identifying as Hispanic. This racial categorization is based on the self-identification of the interviewer, not the perception of the respondent[16]. In order to capture the complexity of this effect, especially in the change model, two dummy

[16] The GSS does not attempt to match the race of respondent and interviewer, and African American interviewers represented a larger portion of the NORC staff (and a larger portion of completed interviews in 2010)- thus creating valuable variability between waves of observation.

variables have been created. First, for the 2006 and 2010 models, the variable is coded 1 if the respondent has a black interviewer and 0 if s/he has a non-black interviewer.

In the change models, three dummy variables were created. The variable in the change models refers to those who have a non-Black interviewer in 2006 and a Black interviewer in 2010. The variable in the change models refers to those who have a Black interviewer in 2006 and a non-Black interviewer in 2010. The variable in the change models refers to those whose interviewer race (with respect to 'Blackness') did not change from wave to wave, and this variable is omitted from all models as the reference category. It is hypothesized that those with non-Black interviewers will respond with more racially conservative attitudes than those with Black interviewers.

3.7.4 Dependent Variables: Racial Attitude Measures

The racial attitudes literature is full of contestation about measurement of racial attitudes and numerous debates about how to most accurately and efficiently measure underlying orientation toward race and topics involving race. While the present chapter doesn't seek to offer radical new ways of measurement, it does proceed from the fundamental assumption that these attitudes are often discrete from one another, contextually dependent, and greatly influenced by the way(s) in which they are measured. Great attention has been paid in the selection of the variables used here in order to evaluate the dimensions of racial attitudes that best represented in the literature. Where possible, multiple dependent variables measuring the same underlying construct have been used. Given the limitations of model complexity and

relatively modest sample sizes, these variables were not factor analyzed or measured as an index. Rather, each model represents a different dimension of a discrete racial attitude. In sum, this modeling strategy allows for the evaluation of effects across different related, but separate attitudes. In this way, the potential for consistent effects across these diverse variables would suggest a discrete effect that bleeds across boundaries and is therefore more robust.

3.7.4.1 Opposition to Race-Targeted Policy

Two different items were employed here to measure non-Hispanic Whites' orientation toward formal norms and laws involving race-targeted public policy issues. Because research has suggested that, perhaps more than any other kind of racial attitude, questions about race-targeted policy are particularly sensitive to framing in general and instrument wording in particular (Federico and Sidanius 2002, Jacobson 1985, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Reyna et al. 2005, Summers 1995). For this reason, two separate measures are employed here to evaluate the degree of opposition to race-targeted policy. The first variable is derived from a prompt asking respondents to declare degree of support for the prompt: "*Do you favor preference in hiring Blacks?"* with higher values representing more opposition. The second variable is derived from a prompt asking: "*Some people think that African-Americans have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to African-Americans. Where would you place yourself on*

this scale?" Again, higher values on this variable correspond to a higher level of opposition to race-targeted government support.

3.7.4.2 Traditional Prejudice

Two separate items are employed here to evaluate traditional prejudice. Collectively, these indicators describe dimensions of a respondent's explicit belief in out-group inferiority and/or undesirability. In spite of the decline in the incidence of openly stated antipathy toward a racial out-group, measures of traditional prejudice or "old fashioned racism" remain powerful indicators of a persistent social phenomenon- especially for certain segments of the population. Of particular interest to this measure is a belief that such characteristics are inherent and/or natural, attitudes that are not necessarily captured by other measures. These negative attributions also have the distinction of having been well-entrenched into the cultural consciousness as well as having been relatively durable across time and space (Peffley and Hurwitz 1998, Watt and Larkin 2010). The first measure is an index of the respondent's evaluation of the degree to which African Americans are less intelligent than Whites. Higher values on this measure suggest that the respondent believes that Whites are much more intelligent than African Americans. The second item, very similar to the first, is an index of the respondent's evaluation of the degree to which African Americans are lazier than Whites. Higher values on this measure suggest that the respondent believe that African Americans are lazier than Whites. The two measures used here been widely used by scholars whose interest was in parsing out the differences among racial attitudes and their causes, and the available evidence continues to suggest that

traditional prejudice is a unique underlying construct worthy of distinct treatment (Bobo 1999, Dixon 2006, Huddy and Feldman 2009, Krysan 2000, Kunovich 2004, Quillian 2006, Sears and Henry 2003, Taylor 1998, Wagner et al. 2006, Wilson and Nielsen 2011).

3.7.4.3 Racial Resentment

There is perhaps no other construct, and indeed no specific variable that has been used more and with greater consistency in the racial attitudes literature than the one employed here. *Racial Resentment* represents a combination of individual attribution of racial inequality and anti-black affect. (Blanton and Jaccard 2008, Bobo 1999, Ditonto, Lau and Sears 2013, Feldman and Huddy 2005, Kinder and Sears 1981, Semyonov et al. 2004, Taylor 1998, Tuch 1987a, Tuch and Hughes 2011, Vron 2008, Wilson and Davis 2011). The GSS variable included here represents the respondent's degree of agreement with the following prompt: "*Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors,"* has been so reliable in its effects that it has been included verbatim in other nationally representative surveys like the National Election Survey (NES). The measure has been consistently demonstrated to be an indicator of the underlying construct of '*racial resentment*,' first identified by Political Scientist Donald Kinder (Kinder and Sears 1981). This measure has been used elsewhere in the literature to capture dimensions of racial antipathy not captured by conventional racial attitude measures. Careful work has been done by other researchers to isolate the effects this variable from many attitudinal variables with

which it co-varies, and the research is clear that it is a unique underlying construct independent of other measures (Kinder and Sears 1981, Tuch and Hughes 2011). As such, it is critical to the present analysis.

These attitudes have been demonstrated to operate with some similarity, though in a distinct manner, relative to other attitudes about race. Previous research has identified a discrete underlying mechanism that informs attitudes about racial policy among non-Hispanic Whites, and much of this work has relied on similar measures to those employed here (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo and Charles 2009, Gilens 1999, Krysan 2000, Olzak 2003, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Wilson and Nielsen 2011). In order to capture the distinct nature of each attitude (rather than, for example, referring to all of them as "racial prejudice"), the term "racially conservative" is employed here to refer to attitudes that endorse racial resentment, opposition to race targeted programs and express traditional prejudice. As mentioned previously, though these attitudes and their sources are diverse, political conservatives reliably express more endorsement of each of these indicators than do political liberals (Bobo et al. 2012, Hutchings and Valentino 2004, Levin and Sidanius 1999, Schuman, Bobo and Krysan 1992, Schuman et al. 1997).

Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Wave One (2006)

	Variable	*N*	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
Racial attitudes	Opposition to affirmative action	765	3.41	0.85	1.00	4.00
	Opposition to "help Blacks"	777	3.66	1.13	1.00	5.00
	Blacks less intelligent	767	6.33	1.13	0.00	12.00
	Blacks more lazy	768	4.70	1.35	0.00	10.00
	Racial resentment	781	3.97	1.17	1.00	5.00
Individual-level variables	Birth cohort[a]	1216	0.00	13.80	-51.04	46.40
	Sex (male)[a]	1222	0.00	0.42	-0.95	0.87
	Political views[a]	1198	0.00	1.21	-4.29	3.91
	Education (some college)[a]	1222	0.00	0.40	-0.95	0.94
	Live in integrated neighborhood[a]	1189	0.00	0.35	-0.96	0.88
	Education (some college)[a]	1221	0.00	0.40	-0.96	0.91
	Employment status (unemployed)[a]	1221	0.00	0.16	-0.50	0.96
Context-level variables	County percent NHW	1222	0.68	0.21	0.12	0.98
	County unemployment rate	1222	5.28	1.89	2.30	12.90
	Region of residence (South)	1222	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00
	Black interviewer	1152	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00

[a] Variables centered on the mean of the county of observation.

Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Wave Three (2010)

	Variable	*N*	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
Racial attitudes	Opposition to affirmative action	765	756	3.37	0.87	1.00
	Opposition to "help Blacks"	777	770	3.77	1.12	1.00
	Blacks less intelligent	767	760	6.63	1.37	0.00
	Blacks more lazy	768	765	4.33	1.13	0.00
	Racial resentment	781	778	3.97	1.12	1.00
Individual-level variables	Birth cohort[a]	1216	1208	0.00	13.32	-52.55
	Sex (male)[a]	1222	1222	0.00	0.40	-0.90
	Political views[a]	1198	1189	0.00	1.20	-4.38
	Education (some college)[a]	1222	1222	0.00	0.40	-0.95
	Live in integrated neighborhood[a]	1189	1176	0.00	0.36	-0.92
	Education (some college)[a]	1221	1219	0.00	0.40	-0.90
	Employment status (unemployed)[a]	1221	1221	0.00	0.18	-0.80
Context-level variables	County percent NHW	1222	1222	0.67	0.21	0.11
	County unemployment rate	1222	1222	0.39	0.49	0.00
	Region of residence (South)	1222	1222	9.78	2.21	4.80
	Black interviewer	1152	1168	0.13	0.34	0.00

Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for Change Model (2010 Values–2006 Values)

	Variable	*N*	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
Racial attitudes	Change in opposition to AA	741	-0.03	0.88	-3.00	3.00
	Change in opposition to HelpBlk	743	0.10	1.15	-4.00	4.00
	Change in Blacks less intelligent	750	-1.99	1.57	-10.00	10.00
	Change in Blacks lazier	747	1.93	1.47	-5.00	8.00
	Change in Racial resentment	776	0.01	1.17	-4.00	4.00
Individual-level variables	Birth cohort (Younger) -wave 3[a]	1208	0.00	13.32	-52.55	41.29
	Sex (male) – wave 3[a]	1222	0.00	0.40	-0.90	0.89
	Change in political views (conservative)[a]	1176	0.00	1.05	-4.93	4.38
	Education level (some college) – wave 3[a]	1222	0.00	0.40	-0.95	0.94
	Change in employment status (Unemployed)[a]	1220	0.00	0.23	-1.33	1.31
	Change in financial situation (worsen)[a]	1216	0.00	0.50	-1.70	1.20
	Neighborhood more integrated[a]	1147	0.00	0.37	-1.50	1.25
Context-level variables	Change in county percent NHW	1222	-0.02	0.05	-0.40	0.60
	Change in county-level Unemployment Rate	1222	4.50	2.49	-5.60	11.00
	Region of residence (South) – wave 3	1222	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
	Change Black to non-Black interviewer	1098	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
	No change in interviewer race (reference cat.)	1098	0.81	0.39	0.00	1.00
	Change Non-Black to Black interviewer	1098	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
	Change in county location	1222	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00

[a] Variables centered around the mean of the county of observation (in wave 3).

3.8 Hypotheses

Proceeding from the research goals laid out above, there are a number of hypotheses to be tested here. The unique data and measures employed here make possible the adjudication of several key questions from the research literature. Each of these hypotheses will be tested directly and the results of those analyses will follow.

H_1: (Change in) Local economic context (as measured by unemployment) will be more predictive of racial attitudes than will individual employment status or "scapegoating effect".

H_2: (Change in) "Racial threat", as measured by percent Non-Hispanic White, will be negatively correlated with all racial attitude measures.

H_3: Among the various attitudinal measures, opposition to race targeted programs and racial resentment will be the most sensitive to context effects.

H_4: Race of interviewer will be a consistent predictor of the expression of racial attitudes, especially in the change model.

3.9 Findings

As expected, the variety of models employed here yielded a nuanced and complex picture of the nature of racial attitudes at the beginning of the 21st century. The data seem to suggest, as has other research, that each different kind of racial attitude is subject to different causes and is expressed differently under different circumstances. What is striking is that in some cases, a strong and statistically significant relationship existed at one time for a respondent and not at all for that

same respondent at a different time. The present research therefore reinforces the great volume of existing work that demonstrates the complexity and contextual nature of the expression of these attitudes (Bobo et al. 2012, Schuman et al. 1997). Whether this variability reflects actual differences in the underlying thoughts and feelings associated with racial issues is an important question, but beyond the scope of the present research.

This is not to say, of course, that this project has not yielded any novel findings or cast new light on the conventional wisdom established in the racial attitudes literature. For example, the effect of residence in the US South is relatively small and shows up in only two of fifteen total models. This may be accounted for by the increasing political homogeneity in this region, as political views remain a strong and consistent predictor across most every cross-sectional model. Interestingly, the effect of gender shows up only in the change model, revealing that men in the sample grew to see African Americans as lazier over the course of the 4 years between waves of the survey, but women did not. This is an interesting insight to the way(s) in which the gendered nature of our racial attitudes are embedded in larger contexts.

Several important findings were generally in line with the literature and stated expectations. As mentioned briefly above, the most consistent effect across nearly all models was the force of political conservatism in shaping racial attitudes. Holding all other individual and contextual factors constant, more conservative respondents were more likely to express opposition to race targeted programs, express traditional prejudice, and express racial resentment in both waves. The change model also revealed that those who became more conservative were more likely to oppose

government spending on African Americans, as described in Table 8. This seems to suggest the ongoing centrality of race to our national politics, in spite of significant public comment to the contrary. Cohort effects were observed as expected, with younger respondents expressing less racially conservative attitudes in most models. Level of education was a more prominent factor in the 2010 model than in 2006, in those cases meeting the expectation that those who attended at least some college would express less racially conservative attitudes than those who did not. To the extent that several of the individual-level variables were of less significance than expected, the present author suggests that the inclusion of the key contextual variables accounts for much of the variation that might otherwise be measured in the individual-level measures, thereby rendering their effects non-significant. Many other substantial and more important findings were revealed as well, the discussion of which follows according to the models involved.

3.9.1 First Wave Findings

The most substantial (and surprising) finding in the analysis of the first wave data was that percent NHW was *positively* correlated with conservative racial attitudes in three of the four models and *negatively* in the other. Contrary to expectations, it appears that, except with respect to the belief that African Americans are lazier than Whites, higher percentages of NHW residents in the county correspond to more conservative racial attitudes. Thus **H_2** (the hypothesis that % NHW will be positively correlated with all measures of racial conservatism) is not supported, suggesting that – at least in most cases- percent NHW might be a better measure of inter-group contact than group threat. An addendum to this finding is the fact that the

only model in which an integrated neighborhood was correlated with racial attitudes was found in 2006. As expected, those who lived in an integrated neighborhood were less likely to endorse the idea of Black laziness than those who did not.

The second important finding is that, as can be seen in Tables 4 and 5, having a Black interviewer was negatively correlated with conservative racial attitudes in four of the five models. This was especially true for opposition to race targeting and belief in Black laziness, as the coefficients for this variable were greater than for any other factors in the models. It seems clear that among all of the context effects, the ROI was the most consistent. Thus, **H_4** (the hypothesis that race of interviewer would predict racial conservatism) is strongly confirmed.

The role played by individual economic insecurity was smaller overall than expected in the first wave of the survey and local economic context seemed to play no role at all. A worsening financial situation did not prove to be a significant factor in any of the models, and being unemployed was only a significant factor in opposing government spending for African Americans in 2006. In this latter case, the direction of association was as expected and the relationship was very strong, but the lack of a consistent relationship across all models was a surprise. Perhaps a greater surprise was the absence of any socioeconomic context effect as the literature and **H_1** (the hypothesis that local economic context would be a better predictor of racial conservatism than would individual economic circumstances) would have suggested. For this first wave of data, then, this hypothesis is rejected.

Table 3.4. Multilevel Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model—Traditional Prejudice (2006)

		Blacks less intelligent	Blacks lazier
Individual-level variables	Younger cohort*	-0.008**	-0.01**
		(0.003)	(0.003)
	Sex (male)*	0.1	-0.137
		-0.088	-0.112
	Political views (conservative)*	0.021	0.104*
		-0.03	(0.046)
	Education (some college)*	-0.1	-0.282
		-0.195	-0.174
	Financial situation (worse)*	0.022	-0.094
		-0.126	-0.128
	Currently unemployed*	0.356	-0.221
		-0.219	-0.267
	Integrated neighborhood*	0	-0.377**
		-0.099	(0.127)
Context-level variables	Percent NHWHT in county	0.404	-0.939*
		-0.29	(0.374)
	County unemployment level	-0.011	-0.071
		-0.03	-0.039
	Black interviewer	-0.598**	-1.129**
		(0.218)	(0.277)
	Region of residence (south)	0.104	0.071
		-0.115	-0.148
Intercept	Constant	6.085**	5.659**
		(0.285)	(0.368)
Fixed effects	County variation in FINWORSE	-0.981	-1.556**
		0.717	(0.326)
	County variation in POLVIEWS	-0.496	0.147
		-0.266	-0.161
	County variation in SOMECOLL	0.467**	-0.592**
		(0.107)	(0.123)
	County variation in RACLIVE	-0.852**	0.745
		(0.131)	-0.385
	R^2	.11	.15
	Model Sample Size	$N = 680$	$N = 681$

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 3.5. Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression Models (2006)

		Resent	Oppose AA	Oppose HelpBlk
Individual -level variables	Younger cohort*	-0.011	-0.005	-0.008
		-1.52	-0.007	-0.006
	Sex (male)*	-0.148	-0.236	-0.211
		-0.65	-0.219	-0.193
	Political views (conservative)*	0.447**	0.421**	0.638**
		(3.42)	(0.087)	(0.075)
	Education (some college)*	-0.923**	-0.137	-0.192
		(2.76)	-0.236	-0.274
	Financial situation (worse)*	0.072	0.536	-0.067
		-0.24	-0.401	-0.247
	Currently unemployed*	0.259	0.003	1.116*
		-0.45	-0.536	(0.522)
	Integrated neighborhood*	-0.495	-0.006	-0.156
		-1.92	-0.277	-0.237
Context-level variables	Percent NHWHT in county	1.807*	1.829*	1.602**
		(2.05)	(0.773)	(0.573)
	County unemployment level	0.01	-0.018	0.133
		-0.1	-0.083	-0.068
	Black interviewer	-1.722	-1.456**	-1.397**
		-1.83	(0.544)	(0.480)
	Region of residence (south)	1.445**	0.097	0.435
		(3.98)	-0.315	-0.285
	Integrated neighborhood*	-0.495	-0.006	-0.156
		-1.92	-0.277	-0.237
Intercepts	Cut 1	-2.714**	-2.559**	-1.884**
		(3.06)	(0.755)	(0.619)
	Cut 2	-0.903	-1.43	-0.763
		-1.05	-0.74	-0.599
	Cut 3	0.278	0.523	1.76**
		-0.32	-0.736	(0.601)
	Cut 4	2.315		3.093
Fixed effects	County variation in FINWORSE	1.53	3.141	0.52
		-1.38	-1.663	-0.596
	County variation in POLVIEWS	0.659*	0.046	0
		(2.51)	-0.024	0
	County variation in SOMECOLL	3.243*	1.781	2.432*
		(2.22)	1.381	(1.111)
	County variation in RACLIVE	0.041	0.636	0.781
		-0.089	-0.462	0.311
	County variation in UNEMP	0.781	1.305	.941
		-0.371	-0.813	-0.712
	Pseudo R^2	.057	.069	.127
	Model Sample Size	$N = 688$	$N = 677$	$N = 696$

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

3.9.2 Second Wave Findings

Perhaps the first thing to note – and a finding that serves as a reminder of the limitations of a single-observation evaluation of attitudes- is that a not unsubstantial number of correlations varied between the waves. For example, interviewer effects on responses were very strong in 2006, but totally absent in 2010. Though the re-interview of respondents in 2010 did yield several changes from 2006, there were some notable consistencies with the first survey. Just like 2006, having a poor evaluation of one's financial situation had no effect on racial attitudes in 2010. This may be attributable to the fact that the actual income and wealth of respondents is fairly heterogeneous, resulting in a diversity of vulnerability posed by poor financial circumstances. Likewise, employment status did not rise to the level of significance in 2010. Political ideology remained a strong predictor in each racial attitude model, in most cases with larger coefficients in 2010 than in 2006. This last finding can be interpreted as a continuation of increasing political polarization and ideological consistency since the 1990s documented by a number of researchers (Berinsky 2002, Blodorn and O'Brien 2013, Bobo et al. 2012, Wilson and Brewer 2013).

The changes in the expression of traditional prejudice were especially interesting. While there was a substantial reduction in the endorsement of the idea of Black intellectual inferiority, there was a similarly large increase in the endorsement of the idea of Black relative laziness. It is first notable that such significant changes were observed at all in such a short period of time. This asymmetrical change might be explained by the fact that respondents interpreted the latter (laziness) variable to be a *cultural* rather than *biological* question. This would be very much in keeping with

the general trend away from biological notions of racial inequality and toward cultural ones (Bobo et al. 2012). This does call into question, however, whether and to what extent these variables remain well suited to measure the same underlying construct. On the other hand, the changes in opposition to race targeting and racial resentment were much more modest, with two of the three measures increasing slightly and only opposition to Affirmative Action reducing very slightly between the two surveys.

Compared with the first wave, both cohort and level of education were more important in predicting racial conservatism in 2010. In every single third-wave model, those who had attended college expressed less conservative attitudes than those who did not. This may suggest an uneven racialization, with those who did not attend college becoming more racially conservative as the political and economic environment changed- a finding worthy of further examination, but beyond the scope of the present chapter. Similarly, the effect of having been born later was much more important in 2010 than in 2006, with later-born respondents expressing less conservative racial attitudes in four of the five models.

Two other factors were most notable in 2010 by comparison to the survey four years earlier. First, the effect of having a Black interviewer only rose to the level of significance in one model (Black laziness). This is notable given the fact that the effect was so strong and so widely observed across models in the earlier wave. This is perhaps attributable to the larger number of respondents interviewed by a person of color in this wave, and might be attributable to the loss of statistical power caused by the loss of respondents from wave one to wave three. The second key finding is that

the percent NHW was not significant in any model, though it had been in four of the five models in the earlier wave. Whether a measure of contact or threat, the county-level racial composition did not have the same effect on the respondents in 2010 that it did just four years earlier. Perhaps, as some recent research has suggested, the effects of racial composition are more properly (and increasingly) captured by other variables as models improve and demographic sorting along lines of race, class and political ideology intensifies (Johnson, Pais and South 2012)

Table 3.6. Multilevel Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models—Traditional Prejudice (2010)

		Blacks Less Intelligent	Blacks Lazier
Individual-level variables	Younger cohort*	-0.01**	-0.008*
		(0.003)	(0.003)
	Sex (male)*	-0.123	-0.254*
		-0.097	(0.113)
	Political views (conservative)*	0.101*	0.13*
		(0.040)	(0.052)
	Education (some college)*	-0.328*	-0.309*
		(0.143)	(0.153)
	Financial situation (worse)*	-0.002	-0.231
		-0.12	-0.14
	Currently unemployed*	-0.216	-0.137
		-0.23	-0.262
Context-level variables	Integrated neighborhood*	0.045	-0.072
		-0.135	-0.123
	County unemployment level	-0.031	-0.026
		-0.024	-0.034
	Percent NHWHT in county	0.056	-0.316
		-0.271	-0.386
	Black interviewer	-0.394	-0.857**
		-0.251	(0.278)
	Region of residence (south)	0.327**	0.046
		(0.111)	-0.157
Intercept	Constant	4.415*	7.084**
		(0.371)	(0.453)
Fixed effects	County variation in FINWORSE	-0.47*	0.384
		(0.219)	-0.311
	County variation in POLVIEWS	-0.419	-0.261
		-0.22	-0.202
	County variation in SOMECOLL	-1.819**	-1.24**
		(0.374)	(0.247)
	County variation in RACLIVE	-0.067	-0.097
		-0.155	-0.19
	County variation in UNEMP	-0.738**	-0.239*
		(0.102)	(0.094)
	R^2	.081	.11
	Model sample size	$N = 671$	$N = 672$

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 3.7. Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression Models (2010)

		Resent	Oppose AA	Oppose HelpBlk
Individual-level variables	Younger cohort*	-0.027**	-0.024*	-0.001
		(0.009)	(0.010)	-0.19
	Sex (male)*	0.219	0.263	0.049
		-0.288	-0.325	-0.19
	Political views (conservative)*	0.693**	0.571**	0.675**
		(0.108)	(0.166)	(5.64)
	Education (some college)*	-0.95*	1.115*	-0.574*
		(0.438)	(0.445)	(2.18)
	Financial Situation (worse)*	0.063	0.232	-0.124
		-0.37	-0.329	-0.36
	Currently unemployed*	0.68	-0.196	-0.166
		-1.246	-1.313	-0.27
	Integrated neighborhood*	-0.084	0.166	0.423
		-0.492	-0.468	-1.09
Context-Level Variables	Percent NHWHT in county	1.225	1.749	2.697**
		-0.962	-1.113	(3.24)
	County unemployment level	0.062	-0.055	-0.003
		-0.084	-0.098	-0.05
	Region of residence (south)	0.732	0.419	0.583
		-0.394	-0.455	-1.74
	Black interviewer	-0.84	-1.433	-0.454
		-0.775	-1.953	-0.68
Intercepts	Cut 1	-4.603**	-4.603**	-3.362**
		(1.176)	(1.380)	(3.30)
	Cut 2	-1.734	-2.712	-1.533
		-1.127	(1.341)*	-1.55
	Cut 3	-0.32	0.206	1.543
		-1.123	-1.323	-1.56
	Cut 4	2.409*	2.21	3.12**
		(1.138)	.913	(3.12)
Fixed Effects	County variation in FINWORSE	-1.734	1.213	4.497*
		-1.12	1.15	(2.31)
	County variation in POLVIEWS	0.712	0.817	0.396*
		-0.221	-0.431	(2.01)
	County variation in SOMECOLL	7.325*	4.565	3.523
		(3.096)	-2.858	0.211
	County variation in RACLIVE	3.473*	0.817	4.723*
		(1.954)	-0.431	(2.11)
	County variation in UNEMP	15.911	13.191	17.381
		-10.94	-11.537	-9.349
	Pseudo R^2	.07	.10	.14
	Model sample size	$N = 681$	$N = 663$	$N = 696$

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

3.9.3 Findings from the Change Models

The most important contribution of the present chapter is the evaluative analysis made possible by the longitudinal nature of the data employed here. The very fact that some racial attitude predictors were significant in one year's model but not the other suggests that some observed relationships may be artifacts of the single moment in which the data were gathered. The ability of these data to evaluate within-person change over time is of great value, and there were a number of key findings and that make important contributions to the literature.

The first notable factor is the absence of significant effects in the change model for two key contextual variables. First, changes in percent NHW did not yield any significant effect on any of the models[17]. Though the population changes may have been modest over the course of a relatively short time, none of the racial attitude models was correlated with change in county-level racial population composition. These data seem to suggest that declining percent NHW does not constitute a threat that motivates racial attitudes. Secondly, a change in local economic context, measured by count-level unemployment rate, was significant only in one model: attribution of Black Laziness, but the coefficient was *negative.* Though a relatively weak relationship, the finding here is that residing in a county in which unemployment has *gone down* is associated with an increase in endorsement of black laziness. While this finding suggests that traditional prejudice may be the most sensitive to changes in local economic context (a rejection of $\mathbf{H_3}$), what is striking is

[17] Alternative and more traditional measures of racial composition (Percent Black, etc.) were alternatively modeled and none of them rose to the level of significance in any model.

the absence of effect across the other attitudinal models. This is especially compelling given the very significant variability (substantial increases) in unemployment rate from wave one to wave three.

While change in personal financial status did not yield significant effects in any models, those who became unemployed since wave one were more likely to express both increased racial resentment and increased opposition to government assistance to African Americans after wave three. While modest, these findings suggest that, contrary to recent research, personal economic context is more important than general local context in predicting racial attitudes- at least within person and across time. Modest as though this finding is, it does provide support for the "scapegoating" view of racial attitudes, and that even when controlling for local socioeconomic and racial contexts, one's economic vulnerability is a key indicator of her beliefs about the racial distribution of opportunity.

While political ideology was among the most consistent factors in predicting racial attitudes in both waves of the survey, only one change model revealed a significant effect. Only in opposition to government assistance to African Americans did an increase in conservatism predict change in any racial attitude. This may be the result of relatively entrenched political attitudes that did not vary much across the period of the survey, but it is notable that this lone significant effect mirrors overall rising opposition to race targeting among whites during the same period (Bobo et al. 2012). Again, this trend, along with the fact that political ideology is becoming less heterogeneous and more consistent among different issue areas, may help explain this novel finding.

One curious finding to repeat is that, among the non-dynamic controls included in the change model, only the sex variable was significant. This finding that White men became more convinced of Black laziness relative to their female peers- over the same period- is interesting. Recent research has suggested that the instability and uncertainty of the great recession has resulted in a "crisis of masculinity" in which many men began to grasp ever tighter to their remaining social privilege in a patriarchal society (Kimmel 2013). Perhaps this finding is evidence of a corollary increase in racial chauvinism as well.

Change in county location was not significant in any of the change models. This is important for two reasons. First, it offers evidence that the changes observed here are not as a result of self-selection effects. In other words, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that individuals are necessarily selecting themselves into county contexts more consistent with their own views. Secondly, this measure captures some of the small amount of variation not accounted for my the fact that all observations are clustered on the basis of the county of residence at wave one, though persons may have moved (and been thereby differentially clustered) at wave three.

The final, and most consistent findings in the change model revealed the significant importance of race of interviewer in the expression of racial attitudes. In two of the five models, *both* change from and change to Black interviewer were significant predictors. In the former case, respondents were less likely to express racially conservative attitudes and in the latter case, they were more likely to do so relative to respondents whose interviewer did not vary racially. These findings are important in a number of ways. First of all, these effects (especially those who

changed TO an interviewer of color) were the largest coefficients in the entire model, and were in some cases orders of magnitude greater than other significant factors. The second finding of note is that the apparent "switching" on the basis of ROI was strongest when switching TO an interviewer of color, suggesting that the greater portion of this effect is understatement – not overstatement- of racial conservatism. Taken together with the fact that race of interviewer was of the greatest importance in each model, these findings suggest the possibility of significant underestimation of the expression of racial conservatism across much of the previous research, as interviewers of white respondents remain overwhelmingly white (Durrant et al. 2010)

Table 3.8. Multilevel Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model—Change from 2006–2010

		Blacks Less Intel.	Blacks Lazier	Resent	Oppose AA	Oppose HelpBlk
Individual-level variables	Younger cohort (wave 3)	-0.008 -0.004	0.101 -0.004	-0.004 -0.003	-0.001 -0.002	0.004 -0.003
	Male (wave 3)	-0.096 -0.139	-0.302* (0.135)	0.003 -0.113	0.019 -0.078	0.058 -0.101
	Political view change	0.047 -0.076	-0.077 -0.077	0.079 -0.043	-0.025 -0.047	0.145** (0.049)
	Education (wave 3)	-0.336 -0.255	-0.075 -0.19	0.086 -0.151	0.117 -0.099	-0.051 -0.105
	Neighborhood more integrated	0.143 -0.147	-0.153 -0.147	-0.177 -0.118	0.073 -0.083	0.02 -0.131
	Worse finances	0.086 -0.145	-0.053 -0.11	-0.109 -0.089	0.044 -0.062	-0.121 -0.097
	Unemployment change	-0.137 -0.227	-0.022 -0.225	0.392* (0.184)	0.103 -0.13	0.504** (0.180)
Context-level variables	Change in percent NHW	-1.123 -0.963	1.902 -2.138	-1.123 -0.746	-0.866 -0.609	1.125 -0.978
	Unemployment rate change	-0.036 -0.029	-0.059* (0.026)	0.01 -0.024	-0.019 -0.017	0.027 -0.023
	Region (south)	0.228 -0.159	0.21 -0.144	-0.23 -0.134	0.039 -0.092	0.174 -0.123
	White to Black interviewer	0.555* (0.237)	0.869** (0.219)	0.884** (0.200)	0.424** (0.132)	0.776** (0.196)
	Black to White interviewer	-0.191 -0.241	-0.664** (0.222)	-0.17 -0.199	-0.047 -0.171	-0.661** (0.202)
	Change in location	-0.169 -0.21	0.024 -0.279	0.306 -0.17	-0.057 -0.125	-0.066 -0.188
Intercept	Constant	-1.959** (0.160)	2.262** (0.147)	-0.085 -0.135	-0.457** (0.045)	-0.034 -0.125
Variance components	County variation in FINWORSE	-0.242 (-0.2)	2.379** (0.357)	-0.075 (-0.17)	-0.814 (-0.424)	-0.607 (-0.453)
	County variation in POLVIEWS	-0.778** (0.172)	-0.744** (0.170)	-0.663** (0.119)	-1.139** (0.148)	-1.007* (0.493)
	County variation in SOMECOLL	0.682** (0.114)	0.199 (-0.202)	-0.009 (.002)	-0.657** (0.253)	-0.581 -0.318
	County variation in RACLIVE	-0.531** (0.116)	-0.972* (0.383)	-0.194 (0.212)	-1.1** (0.161)	-1.344** (0.267)
	County variation in UNEMP	-0.521 (-0.2)	-.412 (0.357)	-0.598 (-0.17)	-0.511 (-0.424)	-0.796** (-0.453)
	R^2 Model sample size	.09 N =671	.11 N =672	.051 N = 603	.07 N = 578	.14 N = 696

*p < .05. **p < .01.

3.9.4 General Findings

Except for the important findings with respect to ROI, context effects did not play the role observed in the broader literature in predicting racial attitudes. Generally speaking, the "racial threat" variables employed either produced no significant effect (as in 2010 and in the change model) or actually seemed a better measure of contact than threat (as in the 2006 models). This could be attributable to the novel measure used in the present chapter[18], but also adds weight to the notion that individual effects might be more important than other researchers have suggested. Of all models employed, in only one was local economic context (as measured by county unemployment rate) significant, and in this case, higher local unemployment was associated with *lower* expression of traditional prejudice. The effect of living in the South, also long demonstrated to be a significant predictor of racial attitudes, is also relatively weak and contingent in this analysis. While these findings may be artifacts of the particular sample and novel social and political context from which cases were drawn, it must also be considered that underlying demographic and political changes may falsify long-held assumptions about the source and nature of racial prejudice. Again, taken in sum, the data do not support the notion that socioeconomic or racial contexts are the primary driver of racial attitudes.

On the other hand, moderate support was found for the proposition that individual economic insecurity (measured by unemployment) helps to explain

[18] Though, as mentioned elsewhere, measures for percent black and percent (non-white) Hispanic showed no significant effect in any model, even when the measures were transformed into quadratic terms to accommodate for non-linearity.

variation in racial attitudes. This evidence is especially compelling in that change employment status predicted two different indicators. Individual political ideology remained a strong and consistent predictor across all racial attitude models, with more conservative respondents expressing more prejudice, resentment, and opposition to race-targeted programs. As expected, education and cohort played prominent roles as well, with younger persons and more educated persons expressing less conservative racial attitudes overall.

Among the various racial attitude outcomes included in this chapter, opposition to government aid to African Americans (identified in tables as "*Oppose HelpBlk*") was the most responsive to the variables included in the models. For example, in the change model, change in political views (becoming more conservative), becoming unemployed, and a change in the race of interviewer all had significant influence on opposition to this race targeting variable, and it was the one attitude that the racial contextual variable (% NHW) predicted in both waves of the cross-sectional data. Perhaps this is the measure that best captures expression of competition and threat- and one that is most bound up with the perception of deservingness, cultural resentment, and individual and group-based anxiety so common to current social and political moment (Kimmel 2013, Kurzman et al. 2014, Tesler 2012, Wilson and Brewer 2013).

3.10 Discussion and Conclusion

The most important contributions to the literature from the present chapter are these: first, key context effects (as measured in earlier research) seem to be less important than previously thought. At least when measured at the county level, one's

socioeconomic and racial context- as well as one's region of residence account for less variation in racial attitudes than previous research would predict. Except when ROI is included as such a context effect, individual differences within those contexts appear to be more important overall in explaining the variations in observed expression of a variety of racial attitudes. Second, an important finding of this project is that the ROI is a very strong factor in shaping responses to questions about race. While the previous research suggests that the nature of this effect is unclear, the present chapter offers new evidence that the differential responses observed here are attributable primarily to underreporting of prejudice, resentment and opposition to race targeting. While not the primary focus of this chapter, these findings are worthy of further exploration- especially given the novelty of the panel data recently available.

To the extent that prejudice is connected to discrimination, these findings are important. Because discrimination is more difficult than it once was to observe and measure, public commentators have suggested that perhaps the degree of anti-Black discrimination is overstated. The observation and reporting of reductions in the expression of prejudice over the last 50 years has been cited in support of the claims of overstatement, with the implication that there is no longer any reason for discrimination (Oh et al. 2010, Wilson and Brewer 2013). These findings suggest that the degree of racial animosity in the white population may be higher than previously assumed, which lends credence to claims that there is a greater need to be attentive to claims of discrimination, both individual and institutional. It bears repeating that prejudice does not necessarily lead to discrimination, but those who are concerned

about the durability of racial inequality are justified in taking note of the overstatement of reduction in prejudice suggested in the findings presented here.

Perhaps more directly, the degree to which these racial attitudes animate putatively non-racial social policy issues is also worth consideration. If, as a number of scholars have suggested, racial attitudes help to shape the policy positions of white citizens, it is worth considering the actual degree of racial animosity still expressed by that population (Tesler 2012). If opposition to public investments in general and means-tested public benefits in particular are attenuated by "hidden" racial animosity, the impact would be considerable. A full and accurate accounting of true nature of these attitudes may well provide a framework within which the true merits of a given public policy question might be fully evaluated, rather than being animated by unexpectedly high levels of racial prejudice.

In the most general sense, especially with respect to traditional prejudice and racial resentment, those interested in reducing the incidence –and effects- of these attitudes should also be invested in an accurate measurement of them. It seems a rather uncontroversial position that any society would benefit from a rather lower incidence of inter-group animosity, whether racial or otherwise. This is perhaps especially true as levels of inter-group contact and interaction are increasing for most citizens; a phenomenon that is only likely to increase as the society becomes more geographically mobile and in most every way more diverse. There is, however, a countervailing trend underway as well that is worthy of note: US citizens are increasingly sorting themselves into more and more homogenous locales to the extent they are able (Bishop and Cushing 2009). This is true for socioeconomic status, race

and even political views. This alternative trend also portends trouble as those with the means to do so can isolate themselves from those who may challenge their post-racial worldview with the reality of a durably racialized society outside their door.

If such a modern society is to avoid the pitfalls of apartheid societies of the past, power must not be concentrated in the hands of a resentful numerical minority. The demographic trends in the United States present a real challenge: the rate at which the nation is peopled by those other than white men is increasing at a much greater pace than is an increase in the equality of opportunity and outcome for women and people of color. Our society is in danger, then of quickly becoming one in which white men are a significant numerical minority, but retain most of the power, resources, and opportunity. Such a maldistribution of power and opportunity is only possible when inter-group animosity remains high and systems of racial domination remain salient. Such ideological systems are only possible when racial anxieties can be masked, hidden, or otherwise underappreciated. Such is the value of an accurate accounting of these attitudes.

3.11 Limitations and Areas for Future Research

This project suffers from several limitations. First, the contextual data included are from the county level rather than that of the MSA or census tract. While a number of influential studies have used county-level data, several researchers have demonstrated the utility in the use of more localized levels of data in order to more properly assess residential and labor market segregation and inter-group contact more generally. Because, as mentioned previously, counties and metropolitan areas with the highest percentage of non-white persons are also among the most segregated, it is

clear that finer-level data would greatly benefit this analysis. Future research should make use of data at both a more granular level *and* analyze the way that effects are manifested differently at different levels. It would be very beneficial, for example, to find out that socioeconomic context matters at the neighborhood level, but not at the state level—or that an increase in the percentage of persons of color increases white anxiety at the county level, but decreases it at the neighborhood level.

Second, though the time during which the data were drawn is one that was very dynamic in a number of ways, four years may not be enough to richly evaluate the effects of social processes which often require much longer to develop and to be made manifest. In this way, the novel value of the panel study and the within-person analysis it provides is to some extent offset by relatively small variation in circumstances and attitudes over the course of just four years. Future research would benefit from both a greater passage of time between observations (notwithstanding the dropping out of respondents associated with lengthy longitudinal research) and a greater number of observations. The second element is especially important, of course, such that one could establish more clearly whether or not individual observations constitute a trend as opposed to an artifact of the context in which it was observed.

Thirdly, the novel sampling strategy used by GSS makes available fantastic measures and outstanding generalizability, but relatively modest sample sizes in the variables of interest to the present chapter. Greater statistical power would make possible the construction of indices that would more accurately evaluate the underlying constructs associated with the constellation of related racial attitudes.

Larger sample sizes would also allow for more robust methods of analysis and greater overall confidence in the significant factors identified here. Current limitations of available data analysis tools also make multilevel analysis of ordinal data with imputed data very difficult.

Fourthly, because much of the most recent context-effect research has focused on local educational profiles (as opposed to the local unemployment rate used here), future longitudinal research would benefit from the inclusion of these data. While the specific nature of the effect socioeconomic context remains somewhat unclear, subsequent research would be greatly improved with the inclusion of several socioeconomic contextual variables, but especially with the inclusion of this local educational profile. After all, while income, employment and education often co-vary, the effect of a well educated but fairly high-unemployment context is likely to be different from a low-education, low unemployment context. Future research, then, should make it a priority to include local education context.

Finally, data that make it possible to more directly and accurately evaluate the same effects at both the individual and contextual levels would greatly improve the present chapter. While, for instance, county- level racial composition data and individual subjectively reported local neighborhood composition are of great value, perfect symmetry across levels of analysis would make for more robust conclusions. It may be true that, for instance, an individual lives in a neighborhood that is relatively integrated, but in a county that is deeply segregated. By matching these levels of evaluation- both individual and contextual- both subjective and objective- the conclusions reached here would be more robust. Because the literature remains

divided about the relative importance of individual versus contextual factors in predicting racial prejudice, it is especially important to clearly and symmetrically measure each level of analysis.

CHAPTER 4. "BUT I DON'T SEE RACE": COLOR-BLINDNESS AND OPPOSITION TO RACE-TARGETED POLICY

4.1 Abstract

Among non-Hispanic whites, is opposition to race-targeted policies, such as affirmative action, influenced more by a desire for "color-blind" fairness or group-based racial evaluations? Sniderman and his colleagues (1997, 2000) argue that whites' opposition to these programs is the result of "principled conservatism," while Bobo and his colleagues (1993, 2012) have identified "New Racism" as the primary factor in this opposition. The present chapter tests a key element of the Sniderman thesis, namely, that a principled desire for specifically *color-blind* policy is behind whites' opposition to race targeting. In addition to this key aim, this chapter also tests two related hypotheses derived from the literature—namely the moderating effect of education and traditional prejudice on the relationship between color-blindness and opposition to race-targeted policy. Findings indicate that whites' color-blind attitudes are *not* associated with support for nearly all race-targeted policies examined, even among more educated or more prejudiced respondents. However, color-blind ideology was inversely related to one measure of race-targeted policy (opposition to increased spending on "black schools"). In fact, this finding demonstrated that *less* color-blindness was associated with *more* opposition to these programs. Instead of color-blind ideology, indicators of Racial Apathy, Anti-Black Affect, Stratification

Beliefs, and Racial Resentment were related to opposition to race-targeted policies. Taken together, these findings suggest that opposition to race targeting is much more the product of race-based group evaluations than a desire for color-blind public policy. Implications for a theory of color-blindness as well as measurement of racial prejudice and racial policy are briefly discussed.

Just twenty years ago, a majority of US citizens polled opposed the idea of interracial marriage, yet today many citizens and leaders argue strenuously that we have arrived in a post-racial society (Newport 2013). The question of whether racial prejudice continues to animate politics in the United States is one that is fiercely debated both within the academy and in the broader public discourse. While it is clear that both attitudes and circumstances have changed since the Civil Rights era and before, it remains unclear how much, if any, impact racial prejudice has on how people formulate support or opposition to a given public policy measure.

While a growing body of research suggests that racial attitudes influence even putatively non-racial public policy, most of the empirical work in this area has focused on public policy that addresses race directly (Gilens 1999, Schuman et al. 1997, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000). In most cases, this literature addresses the question of how racial attitudes shape, for example, opposition to so-called Affirmative Action programs or support for increased government spending on people of color. One thing that is not in debate is the fact that since at least the 1970s, white survey respondents are *less* likely to declare that they do not support such programs because of the inferiority or undesirability of the target group (usually African Americans) (Bobo et al. 2012, Quillian 2006). The overwhelming majority of

those who declare opposition to race-targeted programs (hereafter RTPs), then, say that they do so for non-racial reasons.

Whether or not this opposition is actually animated by racial attitudes, however, remains a matter of significant and ongoing debate among scholars. Numerous scholars have noted that, over the last quarter century, while survey respondents are less and less willing to express racial prejudice, they are also less and less willing to support programs designed to address persistent (and often growing) levels of racial inequality. One interpretation of this so-called "principles – implementation gap" is that levels of actual prejudice remain relatively high, but increasingly well hidden from those who measure these attitudes (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996, Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997, Jackman and Muha 1984, Schuman et al. 1997, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Sears and Henry 2003, Wodtke 2012). Researchers have suggested, for example, that the reliably demonstrated link between increased education and reduced expression of prejudice is at least partly the result of a more sophisticated masking of prejudice, not just a reduction in actual prejudiced attitudes (Glaser 2001, Gomez and Wilson 2006, Jackman and Muha 1984, Wodtke 2012).

Over the last several decades, researchers have sought to explain this "principles –implementation gap" by designing new and increasingly complex measures to try to locate both the correlates and the character of the racial attitudes not captured by traditional measures. Collectively, this research represents what is often referred to as the "New Racism" school in the racial attitudes literature, a body of evidence that suggests that it racial attitudes are still an important factor, but that

those attitudes are better masked than before. While the testing of each of these constructs is beyond the scope of the present chapter, at least two of them (color-blindness and racial resentment) will be included in the present analysis, and a brief discussion of this research is included in the pages that follow.

In response to the scholarship suggesting the existence of a previously unmeasured underlying racial prejudice, a group of scholars have suggested that opposition to RTPs were the result of putatively non-racial "principled conservatism"; an amalgam of values of individualism and opposition to government influence in opportunity structures. The primary assumption of this research is that this opposition is explicitly *not* based on group-based feelings or evaluations, but instead, based on a commitment to treat members of any race as individual persons.

While this debate is well established and has been the source of a great body of research, new data now make it possible to adjudicate one previously unexplored element of this debate. Those in favor of the "principled conservatism" position have suggested that their position is influenced strongly by a desire for "color-blindness," and to treat people as individuals rather than treating them- with favor or disfavor- as members of a particular racial group. These new data include a previously absent variable measuring the respondent's adherence to this ethic of color-blindness.

The present chapter will extend the race-targeting attitude literature in three ways. First, it will empirically test a key assumption of Sniderman's "principled conservatism" theory of opposition to race-targeting; namely by evaluating the role played by "color-blindness." Secondly, it will test two relationships hypothesized or observed in other research: the moderating effects of education and prejudice on the

relationship between color-blindness and opposition to race targeting. Finally, it will analyze the role of a prominent and theoretically distinct category of racial attitudes – racial apathy- yet untested against race-targeting attitudes in a large-scale nationally-representative survey.

4.2 Background

The present chapter is animated primarily by four areas of research: the literature on affirmative action and race-targeted policy attitudes, the relatively new body of research into the phenomenon of "color-blind" attitudes, the research into "New Racism," and the theorists of "principled conservatism." These areas of research share in common a concern with how and why underlying (often unmeasured) values shape racial attitudes and policy preferences. While there is significant overlap among these literatures, the relevant contributions of each will be briefly discussed here.

4.3 Determinants of Attitudes toward Race-Targeting

Since the closing of the Civil Rights Era and the end of formal racialization of political and economic opportunity in the US, sociologists and political scientists have turned their attention to the origins of attitudes about RTPs such as Affirmative Action. There are a few consistent findings across both time and method in terms of attitudes about race targeting. First, attitudes about race targeting are surprisingly independent of gender or class based affirmative action programs (Feldman and Huddy 2005, Kravitz 1995). Perhaps less surprisingly, the less likely one is to believe s/he can benefit from the program, the more likely s/he is to oppose it (Bobo 1998, Jacobson 1985, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Neblo 2009, Oh et al. 2010). Second, Given

the significant change in other kinds of racial attitudes, especially old-fashioned prejudice, there is remarkable stability across time in opposition to-race targeting (Bobo 1998, Bobo et al. 2012, Quillian 2006). Opposition to Affirmative Action, for example has changed fairly little over the past 40 years across the population, and only whites have shown substantial change- being slightly more opposed today than was the case in Civil Rights Era (Bobo et al. 2012). Next, both the kind of program and the description of that program have a significant effect on white opposition. For example, while direct redistribution of resources receives the least white support, race-targeted job training frequently garners the most support (Park 2009, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Summers 1995). Whites are also less likely to offer support to programs that include words like "preference" or "quota" and more likely to support programs associated with "assistance" and "support."(Bobo et al. 2012)

4.3.1 Individual Factors

Three individual characteristics are reliable factors in predicting white opposition to race targeting. First, respondent race is an extremely significant predictor of opposition to race-targeting with white persons much more likely to oppose these programs than are all others- and these differences are remarkably stable across time (Bobo et al. 2012, Kluegel and Smith 1983). Second, except among white persons, women are reliably more likely to favor-race targeting than men. In some studies, white women have been *more opposed* to race targeting than are their white male peers (Hughes and Tuch 2003, Kim 2006). Third and finally, political ideology and partisanship remains a very significant predictor of opposition to race targeting

with conservatives and those who identify as Republican much more likely than their liberal or Democratic-identifying peers to oppose race targeting.

The effects of so-called self-interest factors are relatively mixed in the race targeting literature. The role of one's own position in the economy and potential competition for resources is complicated and highly contextual. For example, those who earn a higher income and are more educated are often more likely to oppose race targeting, but there is also evidence of non-linearity as those at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum are more likely than their middle-class peers to oppose race-targeting. For example, unemployment and low SES identification have both been associated with opposition to race targeting. This paradox of high and low status opposition may be explained by the different mechanisms, as noted by Williams et al (1999).

4.3.2 Contextual Factors

Among the various context effects, there are notable trends to cite. Consistent with the "group threat" theory of racial attitude formulation, there is evidence that whites living in labor markets (counties or MSAs) with a large percentage of people of color are more likely to oppose race targeting. On the other hand, intergroup contact has been shown to reduce opposition to various programs, especially those of the educational variety. Reflecting a broader racial conservatism, residents of the US South are more likely than other whites to oppose race-targeting programs. Residents of rural areas are also more likely than their urban-dwelling peers to oppose race targeting.

There are four kinds of racial attitude correlates that have been frequently subjected to analysis with race targeting policy: Traditional Prejudice, Racial Affect, Stratification Beliefs, and Racial Resentment. Each category of attitudes (or index of attitudes) has been demonstrated to be predictive of opposition to race targeting. As might be expected, those who exhibit higher levels of traditional prejudice, higher levels of anti-black affect, stronger belief that racial inequality is primarily caused by people of color, and persons who express high levels of racial resentment are all more likely to oppose race targeting.

A number of studies have undertaken to evaluate the relative weight or importance of each of these categories of variables and while the results are mixed, but in most cases stratification beliefs are the most powerful predictor among the categories of racial attitudes in predicting opposition to race targeting. In other words, the belief that blacks are primarily responsible for their own relatively low social position is a powerful predictor of opposition to programs designed to assign collective responsibility for improvement of the African American condition.

4.3.3 Color-Blindness

The focus of scholars on the notion of color-blindness and its role in US society is relatively recent, presumably given that an explicitly white supremacist normative conception of the social order was predominant until it began to come under challenge in the second half of the twentieth century (Arsneault 2012, Bonilla-Silva 2003, Bonilla-Silva, Lewis and Embrick 2004, Poteat and Spanierman 2012, Thakore 2014). Color-blindness is the notion of a personal attitude, a social norm, or even a set of social relations that are based upon the idea that race shouldn't be (or is

not) an important factor in social life. The preponderance of research in the area of color-blindness has been outside the realm of large-scale empirical research. Perhaps the best-known and most influential area of scholarship is primarily theoretical in nature- that of scholars such as Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (Bonilla-Silva 2002, Bonilla-Silva 2003, Bonilla-Silva, Lewis and Embrick 2004, Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011). On the other hand, scholars of Education, Social Psychologists and Psychological researchers have dominated most of the empirical work done on the subject—with the most work being done by those in the final category (Awad, Cokley and Ravitch 2005, Eastwick et al. 2009, Garcia 2010, Gushue and Constantine 2007, Holoien and Shelton 2012, Mazzocco, Cooper and Flint 2012, Neville et al. 2000, Neville et al. 2011).

There are a few examples in the literature of research analyzing the link between a form of color-blindness and attitudes about Affirmative Action, but they are limited in a number of ways. Each of these studies uses relatively small and non-representative samples of racially diverse undergraduate students. They also rely on indirect measures of color-blindness such as the frequently used CoBRAS or Color-blind Racial Attitude Scale (Ansell 2006, Mazzocco, Cooper and Flint 2012, Neville et al. 2000, Neville et al. 2011, Oh et al. 2010). While this scale has demonstrated strong reliability, it was developed with racially diverse undergraduate students and does not include a direct evaluation of the respondent's own color-blindness. None of the items in this scale directly referenced the idea of color-blindness and many of the indicators used are very similar to the measures used by Forman (2000, 2010) in his

"racial apathy" construct. For these reasons, the generalizability of the findings based on this scale are limited.

There are, however, two findings worth mentioning. In several of the studies using the scale, color-blindness was positively associated with opposition to race targeting (Awad, Cokley and Ravitch 2005, Mazzocco, Cooper and Flint 2012). In other words, persons with a higher degree of color-blindness were more likely to oppose race targeting. It is hypothesized that this relationship will not be replicated in the present chapter given the differences in both sample and measurement. Secondly, two separate studies found that color-blindness mattered more to high-prejudiced persons than to low prejudiced persons in terms of opposition to race targeting (Neville et al. 2000, Neville et al. 2011). This finding, on the other hand, is expected to be replicated in the present chapter. If color-blindness is to predict opposition to race targeting, then it is assumed that it will do so through traditional prejudice.

Among Sociologists, the best known and most prolific scholar on the issue of color-blindness is Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (Bonilla-Silva 1997, Bonilla-Silva 2002, Bonilla-Silva 2003, Bonilla-Silva, Lewis and Embrick 2004, Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011). For Bonilla-Silva, color-blindness is another and more virulent form of "new racism," a way of thinking and speaking about race that hides racial animus in putatively non-racist frames. He identifies four main themes that make up what he calls "color-blind racism:" (1) abstract liberalism (2) cultural racism (3) naturalization of inequality, and (4) minimization of the effects of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2003, Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011). Like other "new racism" concepts, color-blind racism involves a combination of various evaluations and normative explanations of

individualism, combined with a number of other attitudes *about* race that are putatively not representative of prejudice.

Bonilla-Silva's greatest contribution with the notion of color-blind racism is theoretical, and most of his work in this area has been qualitative and discursive in nature. While the theoretical tools that he makes available to other scholars are of great utility in uncovering the process of racial ideology and identity formation, they are somewhat lacking in their ability for quantitative measurement. It's also important to point out that for Bonilla-Silva and those who have used his work and the concept of color-blind racism to for empirical analysis, the focus has been primarily on the social and normative level as opposed to the personal and evaluative level (Ansell 2006, Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011, Garcia 2010, McArdle 2008, Thakore 2014). In other words, color-blind racism as described by Bonilla-Silva and others is largely a description and critique of a dominant social order rather than a detailed examination of the nature of the attitude(s) that are presumed to support that social order. Put more simply, the extant literature includes a great deal of work on the impact of color-blindness, and fairly little empirical research on what the individual attitude is (or is not).

Besides Bonilla-Silva, other researchers have used the term color-blind racism to denote individual components of his concept, related concepts or even concepts that are significantly different from his framework. Most of the scholarship using related concepts are, like Bonilla-Silva, qualitative in nature. There is, however, a nascent quantitative literature forming as well, among which most has focused on color-blindness or color-blind ideology as an outcome. For example, Poteat and

Spanierman (2012) focus on how personality characteristics might predict color-blindness; while Vargas (2013) is interested in how racial self-identification impacts one's expression of color-blindness; and Warren (2012) found that those more hostile toward refugees from Hurricane Katrina were more likely to endorse color-blind frames (Poteat and Spanierman 2012, Vargas 2013, Warren 2013). Each of these scholars uses a different indirect measure of color-blindness, never referring to the word directly. While scholars are certainly drawing upon a relatively broad set of shared assumptions, the quantitative empirical literature has yet to develop a clear and consistent set of measures for color-blindness and/or color-blind racism.

These are some of the secondary objectives of the present chapter: to evaluate whether and to what extent color-blindness is a distinctive racial attitude, whether or not it can and should be thought of only as a measure of prejudice/racism, and finally to propose a useful single-item measure of color-blindness and to situate that measure into the broader racial attitudes literature. As racial attitudes change (and become more difficult to measure), scholars would benefit from the development of a shared understanding of the role played by color-blindness and a better understanding of how it informs the broader racial outlook of white persons in particular.

Once again, though, the primary objective in this project is to evaluate the role played by color-blindness, whatever its underlying causes, in the formulation of attitudes toward race targeting. Rather than an extended theoretical and philosophical engagement with theorists of color –blind racism, the primary goal is to test a much more basic claim: namely that whites oppose race targeting because they prefer policy

that does not take account of race- presumably because they have principled objections to group-based preferences.

4.3.4 "New Racism" Theses

With the significant decline in the expression of old-fashioned prejudice among whites in the context of continued segregation, discrimination and inequality, researchers began to wonder if they were observing less than honest responses on racial attitude surveys. Researchers surmised that white respondents were overstating their racial liberalism in order to appeal to changing racial norms in spite of their own much more conservative attitudes. Particular attention was given to a number of attitudes *about* race in which white respondents consistently reported attitudes significantly different than those of their non-white peers.

There is considerable diversity in both the theory and measurement of these "new racism" concepts, but they do have many common elements. First, they frequently involve minimization or denial or prejudice (Blodorn and O'Brien 2013, Bobo et al. 2012). Second, they often involve an evaluation of how non-white persons or groups fail to live up to the individualist norms of US society (Bonilla-Silva 2003, Tuch and Hughes 2011). Next, they often describe a resentment of demands for racial justice (Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Tesler 2012). They often also include individual attribution for racial inequality (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997, Thakore 2014). Finally, each of these theoretical models reference support for systems of meritocracy—the key element of which includes the assumption that the current racial order is the result of an existing system of meritocracy (Quillian 2006, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000). These

measures of "new racism" are distinct from, though often correlated with "traditional prejudice" based on beliefs in inherent inferiority of non-white persons. While the claims of new racism are often explicitly indictments of the culture of habits of non-white persons, they are never claims about biological inferiority or undesirability. In keeping with the general trend away from biological/traditional prejudice since the 1960s, each of these models reflects a greater underlying shift toward endorsement of cultural explanations for inequality and a similar rejection of structural explanations (Bobo et al. 2012, Quillian 2006). This trend is observed for persons of all races, but is especially pronounced for whites.

Among the forms of "new racism" that have been the most thoroughly tested by scholars are "symbolic racism," (Sears and Henry 2003, Tarman and Sears 2005) "racial resentment," (Tuch and Hughes 2011, Wilson and Davis 2011, Wilson and Brewer 2013) "modern racism," (Awad, Cokley and Ravitch 2005, Poteat and Spanierman 2012) "laissez-faire racism," (Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997) "racial apathy," (Forman 2010) and "color-blind racism."(Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2011, Poteat and Spanierman 2012, Vargas 2013, Warren 2013) Each of these constructs have been leveraged to explain variation in a variety of racial and non-racial attitudes, but they have been used (save the last two) primarily to explain variation in white opposition to race targeting. With very few exceptions, each of these constructs powerfully predicts opposition to race targeting, with higher scores on "new racism" indicators associated with increased opposition to RTPs. Because of the non-racial individualist elements of these constructs, great care has been taken to disentangle them from related phenomena such as traditionalism, conservatism, individualism,

and the so-called "social dominance orientation." Considerable debate remains around just how discrete each of these measures are from related attitudes. It is likely, however, that as survey respondents are less and less likely to express traditional prejudice and researchers develop ever-more complicated methods of capturing racial attitudes through measures like "new racism," the process of making these distinctions continue to be more and more difficult.

4.3.5 The "Principled Conservatism" Thesis

> Moreover, the anger of white Americans over race preferences is not rooted in prejudice. On the contrary, it reflects in the main a color-blind conviction that effort and individual merit…should decide who gets ahead.
>
> —Sniderman and Carmines (1999, p. 178)

Largely in response to the claims of the various "new racism" theorists, Paul Sniderman undertook a research agenda to challenge the assumption that whites remain significantly prejudiced. The important work of Sniderman and his colleagues has advanced the notion that the primary source of opposition to race-targeted policies is non-racial, and that that opposition rests instead with a principled attachment to individualism and opposition to group-based solutions to social problems- what Sniderman calls "principled conservatism." These advocates of the so-called "principled conservative theory" (hereafter PCT) acknowledge that racial prejudice does animate opposition to Affirmative Action programs, but they believe that these attitudes account for only a small amount of opposition, and among a relatively small group of persons- namely the less-well educated.

Notably, advocates of the PCT framework also reject the idea that so-called "self-interest" is at play in the formulation of white attitudes toward race-targeted

policies. For these researchers, whether or not one stands to personally gain or lose from a policy program is subordinate to one's principles. Given that there exist such substantial differences between race targeting and (and other political attitudes) between white and non-white persons, PCT advocates spend surprisingly little time explaining how and why whites are so much more attached to the principles of individualism than are non-whites. They seem to reject the idea that underlying racial attitudes may be themselves animating the attachment to individualism to which they so consistently point.

In response to the work of Kinder and Sanders (1987) which showed that symbolic racism was a far greater predictor of opposition to Affirmative Action than was political ideology, Sniderman countered that among highly educated conservatives, the relationship between symbolic racism and opposition to race targeting disappeared. Sniderman thus suggested that uneducated whites oppose race targeting because of prejudice, but more educated whites opposed these policies based on principle. A very large number of studies in response called Sniderman's conclusions into question, showing that education did not, in fact, mediate the relationship between symbolic racism and opposition to race targeting (Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Sears and Henry 2003, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996). At least two studies, in fact, found the opposite.

In sum, Sniderman and other PCT advocates have argued that those who seek to advance the interests of poor people of color should do so by working to build a "color-blind coalition in order to advance a color-blind politics." Those with this view have suggested that, though other factors may play a role, opposition to race targeting

is first and foremost about political principles. Remarkably, though, the role of color-blindness in the formulation of this opposition has never been directly tested. Such is the primary goal of this project.

The present chapter finds great sympathy with the assumptions that animate the "new racism" researchers. Besides the compelling research done by the "new racism" researchers themselves, findings from experimental and qualitative research have convincingly demonstrated the continued prominence of racial attitudes in US society (Durso and Jacobs 2013, Enos 2014, Steele 2010, Tesler 2012). As such, it is expected that the data employed here will **not** provide support for the PCT view of race targeting. Instead, it is expected that other attitudes, among them several various indicators of "new racism" will provide explanatory power in the way(s) observed in previous research conducted by the scholars of the various forms of "new racism"

4.4 Data and Method

The data employed in this study (total n= 4,910) come from a merged dataset composed of three different subsamples collected by the General Social Survey (hereafter 'GSS') in 2010. The first subsample (n=2,044) is composed of the normal biennial cross-sectional sample interviewed in 2010. The second subsample (n=1,571) is made up of unique respondents from the second GSS panel study who were interviewed for the second time in 2010. The third subsample (n=1,276) is made up of unique respondents from the first GSS panel study who were interviewed for the third time in 2010. The GSS is a carefully weighted, nationally representative survey made up of English and Spanish speaking non-institutionalized adults. Along

with the National Election Survey, it is the primary source of data on which a very large portion of the racial attitudes literature is based.

These particular data were chosen for the present chapter for three reasons: first, the data include the first and only direct measure of color-blindness of any nationally representative attitudinal survey. Second, the relatively large sample size associated with the merged data set for the same calendar year allows for analysis of less-frequently-asked items while retaining statistical power sufficient for analysis. Finally, the data were collected from respondents during a particularly dynamic economic, social, and political period in the United States (Avery and Fine 2012, Becker, Wagner and Christ 2011, Blee and Creasap 2010, Tesler 2012). Taken in sum, the data gathered at this particular socio-historical moment represent an ideal environment in which to test the hypotheses outlined above.

Previous research has consistently demonstrated that the racial attitudes of white persons are most distinct from the racial attitudes of all others (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Bobo et al. 2012, Quillian 2006, Schuman et al. 1997, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000). As the focus of this research is on the racial attitudes of white persons, all respondents of color were eliminated from the sample. Also, given the emerging body of research suggesting a growing effect of Hispanicity on racial and ethnic attitudes, the sample is constrained to Non-Hispanic whites only, leaving a final sample size of 3,776 respondents (Brown, Steven and H. 2006, Hitlin, Brown and Elder 2007, Roth 2010).

Because the GSS utilizes a modular system in which one-third to two-thirds of respondents are not asked all questions, and because many of the variables of interest

in this study were not asked to all respondents, there are substantial numbers of missing data across the sample. As the study is designed, respondents do not answer all questions, thus there is no systematic bias including or excluding respondents, an approach referred to in the literature as *Observed at Random* or (OAR). Based on this survey design, the data were missing completely at random (MCAR). Though still common practice until recently in the Social Sciences, list-wise deletion of cases with missing values often leads to biased estimates and distorted standard errors in the data (Allison 2011, Johnson and Young 2011, Raykov 2011, Raykov, Lichtenberg and Paulson 2012)Instead of utilizing the list-wise technique, the present chapter makes use of the robust Multiple Imputation (MI) techniques in order to analyze a complete data set- thereby retaining statistical power for analysis. Numerous studies have established that multiple imputation is among the most robust and reliable techniques for analyzing data- even when substantial data are missing (Allison 2011, Johnson and Young 2011, Raykov, Lichtenberg and Paulson 2012, Von Hippel 2007).

Missing data were multiply imputed using the ice command in the STATA 13 software package to provide parameter estimates for 3,776 complete cases across all models. This procedure uses a complex algorithm to use the available information contained in extant variable responses to create a large number of probable responses for each missing value. A secondary algorithm is then used to take a weighted average of these probable responses to impute a single value for each missing response. In order to maintain variability in the presences of numerous missing values, a very high number of iterations (100) were generated to produce the

completed estimates presented in the present chapter[19] The percentage of imputed values for each variable ranged from 0 to 68 percent, with the majority of the variables including most or all responses, as the GSS Panel program features a very low percentage of biased non-answers. All tables and information presented here reflects this particular analytic strategy as well as this final sample n of 3,776.

Allison (2001) raised concerns about the inclusion of dependent variables in imputation models, but more recent work has demonstrated, especially when a large number of imputation iterations are generated, that it is appropriate to include those measures in both imputation and analysis models (Raykov 2011, Young and Johnson 2011). Depending on model specification, inclusion of the dependent variable provides valuable information for efficient and accurate imputation of values for other variables. The secondary benefit of this approach is to retain sufficient statistical power for items otherwise more difficult to analyze.

4.5 Measures

The present chapter includes seven categories of variables: a category composed of six different dependent variables, one category of key control variables demonstrated in previous research to be correlates of race-targeting attitudes, a category of traditional prejudice variables, a category of racial apathy variables, a category of indicators of (racial) social distance, a category composed of measures of racial stratification beliefs, and finally; a category of racial resentment measures. Like the control variables employed here, each category of racial attitudes is derived from

[19] The analysis of variables with a high degree of missingness benefits greatly from a greater number of imputation iterations. For more discussion, see Raykov (2011)

previous research that has treated these measures as theoretically connected. A brief discussion of each category and its specific variables follows, and the full text of each survey prompt can be found at the end of this chapter in *Appendix A*.

With the exception of a few differential index measures used to capture the difference between two observed variables, discrete racial attitude variables are included separately in the analyses here. This analytic strategy is employed for three reasons. First and foremost, in almost all cases, factor analysis yielded fairly low alpha scores across most constructs- in many cases weaker than similar indices used in the past. Second, in the case of the dependent variables used here to measure opposition to RTPs, the literature clearly demonstrates the novel nature of response to each kind of program, and each variation in wording. Finally, there are a number of measures employed here that have not previously been analyzed in additive index form, and for which there remains some theoretical debate about how discrete the measures are from one another (Hodson and Busseri 2012, Thakore 2014, Unnever and Cullen 2012).

4.5.1 Race Targeting Attitudes

Though the literature is clear that in general, white persons are more opposed than supportive or race-targeted policy, there is considerable diversity in this regard (Bobo et al. 2012, Samson 2013). As has been repeatedly demonstrated, survey measures of opposition to race-targeted policy are highly sensitive not only to the policy referenced, but also how the questions are posed. As such, a variety of diverse race-targeted variables are included in the present chapter and are analyzed

independently of one another, as the underlying mechanisms of each of these variables are theorized to be relatively distinct.

"Preference in hiring and promotion" varies from 1 to 4 with 4 indicating a high level of opposition (strongly opposed). "Improve the Living Standards of Blacks" varies from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating a high level of opposition. "Improve the Condition of Blacks" varies from 1 to 3 with 3 indicating a high level of opposition. "Assistance to Blacks" varies from 1 to 3 with 3 indicating a high level of opposition. "Special Scholarships For High Achieving Black Students" varies from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating a high level of opposition. Finally, "Increased Spending on Black Schools" varies from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating a high level of opposition.

4.5.2 Stratification Beliefs

Building on the work of Bobo and Kluegel (1993), scholars have shown that beliefs about the sources of racial inequality have a significant bearing on white racial attitudes in general and attitudes about race targeting in particular. Simply put, those who make individual attributions for racial inequality or "blame the victim," as it is sometimes described, are more likely to oppose race targeting. In general terms, denial of discrimination and disadvantage is associated with increased opposition to these policies, especially for whites considering the racial disadvantage of African Americans. As such, the present chapter has included a number of stratification beliefs to analyze along with color-blindness.

The first two items included represent an assertion that African Americans do not suffer from discrimination (1) in the workplace and (2) in the housing market. Along with these two, 5 binary variables have been included that evaluate whether the

respondent endorses structural or individual explanations for racial inequality. For example, respondents are asked whether or not racial inequality can be attributed to overt discrimination, lack of educational opportunity, “inborn disability”, lack of will, or poor upbringing. Each of these binary variables is coded 1 for an individual attribution and 0 for a structural attribution. This is so that higher responses for each of the 7 items will reflect a belief that racial stratification is attributable to individual (or group) failings, not structural limitations. In other words, in the event that any of these items is a significant positive predictor of opposition to RTPs, it suggests that beliefs about group characteristics, not a desire for individualism, lies behind that opposition.

4.5.3 Racial Resentment

Racial resentment is among the most tested of the new-racism constructs and represents the extent to which whites believe that the target group, usually African Americans, is unfairly advantaged relative to whites. This is frequently measured in the opposite manner, evaluating the extent to which whites are perceived to be at a disadvantage relative to the target group. More racially resentful whites are much more likely to oppose race targeting. A great deal of research has focused on this construct and linked it not just with opposition to race targeting, but to many other political and social attitudes as well (Blodorn and O’Brien 2013, Tesler 2012, Tuch and Hughes 2011). Most recently, for example, racial resentment was found to be a significant predictor of support for voter ID requirements, a putatively non-racial policy issue that critics suggest would disproportionately disenfranchise voters of color (Wilson and Brewer 2013).

The measures employed here include a response to “Blacks should work their way up,” “Whites are hurt by Affirmative Action,” “Whites are worse off than members of other racial groups,” “I am tired of all the talk about racism,” “Racism is mostly just used as an excuse,” “Racism is in the past,” and finally “I resent the special considerations that Blacks are allowed.” All responses are likert items and vary from 3 to 5 response categories.

4.5.4 Anti-Black Affect

Following Bogardus’s (1947) concept of social distance, social psychologists turned their attention to the role of *feelings* in intergroup dynamics. Sociological researchers then began to investigate the extent to which negative feelings toward a group or members of that group might shape behaviors or policy preferences. By referring to “anti-black affect,” Kluegal and Smith (1983), along with other researchers, empirically verified the intuitive conclusion that whites who have negative feelings toward blacks were less likely to support policies intended to help them (Kluegel and Smith 1983, Steele 2010, Tolsma, Graaf and Quillian 2009). This finding has been replicated over and over and anti-black or *racial affect* has been implicated in countless studies of race-targeting attitudes among whites (Bobo et al. 2012). It is among the most reliable predictors of opposition to race targeting, though, like all other indicators (racial and otherwise), racial affect is sensitive to the kind of race targeting in the analysis.

Three measures of anti-black affect are included in the present chapter, and each is composed of the standardized product of difference between white and black affect. For example, one variable is the product of the difference between the

preference for a close family member to marry a white person and the preference to marry a person of color. A second variable is the product of the difference between the preference to live among white people and the preference for living among people of color. Finally, the last variable is the product of the difference between how close the respondent feels to white people and how close s/he feels to people of color. In all cases, higher values indicate a feeling of preference for fellow whites and of dislike or distance for people of color.

4.5.5 Racial Apathy

Among the very newest constructs in the racial attitude literature is that of "racial apathy," and as conceived by Lewis and Forman (2004) it is the attitude that racism, race relations and in fact even members of other racial groups are not important to the respondent (Forman 2014, Forman 2004, Forman and Lewis 2006, Forman 2010). This attitudinal construct is distinct from affect in that it does not denote negative feelings but rather the absence of feeling. It is distinct from stratification beliefs in that it makes no claim about inequality, but rather ignores it (Forman 2004, Forman and Lewis 2006, Forman 2010). It is distinct from racial resentment in that it is not concerned with advantage or disadvantage, at least not actively (Forman and Lewis 2006). This new source of emphasis captures the degree to which whites are simply disconnected from the experiences and struggles of non-whites given their privileged status in the racial hierarchy (Forman 2014, Forman and Lewis 2006). Analysis of racial apathy is intended to evaluate the ways in which disengagement as opposed to hostility, sins of omission as opposed to sins of commission, might shape modern race relations. To date, no nationally representative

survey has taken up the task of evaluating the effects of racial apathy on opposition to race targeting. This is therefore intended to be a contribution of the present chapter- and it is hypothesized that more racially apathetic persons will be more opposed to race targeting.

Two measures of racial apathy are included here. The first is a response to the prompt "I am not concerned with race relations," scored 1 to 4 with higher numbers signifying more agreement with the statement and a higher level of racial apathy. The second is a response to the prompt "Racism is none of my business," which is also scored 1 to 4 with higher numbers signifying more agreement with the statement and a higher level of racial apathy. Note that neither item refers to a specific race or specific issue and are both very general.

4.5.6 Primary Independent Variable

Color-blindness is the primary focus of this research. As discussed above, this is the first large-sample nationally representative study to include a direct measure of this attitude in the analysis of other racial attitudes. The present chapter draws upon a single item for this analysis, which is composed of responses to the prompt "*For the most part, I'm color-blind; that is, I don't care about what race people are."* Again, this is the first such direct measure included in a nationally representative survey and, rather than indirectly measuring the constituent elements, directly evaluates the respondent's own attitude. It is hypothesized that this direct measure will vary Responses range from 1-4 with 4 indicating "Strong Agreement" and 1 indicating "Strong Disagreement." Those with higher scores on this item will be described as being "more color-blind" in subsequent discussion and analysis.

4.5.7 Key Controls

Previous research has demonstrated the relatively reliable influence of a number of key variables in predicting change in racial attitudes. These factors have been demonstrated across contexts and across time and as such, warranted inclusion in each of the racial attitude models under examination in the present chapter. A very brief discussion of the relevant research associated with each of these controls follows.

References to the belief that members of a stigmatized racial out-group are inherently and immutably inferior are sometimes called "old fashioned racism" or "Jim Crow racism," but will be here referred to as **traditional prejudice.** This differs from most other commonly used measures of prejudice in it is not a cultural or normative attribution- it is a biological one. This particular racial attitude is among the most stigmatized today and has seen the largest decrease since the 1960s. Although scholars have used different measures and indices to capture this concept, the constitutive elements of the one employed here is the most commonly used in the literature (Bobo et al. 2012, Quillian 2006, Zamudio and Rios 2006). This individual measure is composed of a standardized product of the difference between a respondent's evaluation of white intelligence and that of black intelligence, with a higher value representing a belief that whites are more inherently intelligent than blacks. The variable is a single item measure of Traditional Prejudice.

Along with political ideology, the most reliable predictor of most racial attitudes is level of **education**-variously measured. This is much less, true, however, with attitudes about race targeting. In the case of most other attitudes associated with

racial conservatism, increased education has a liberalizing effect. This is not so with race targeting as in many cases, more educated persons have been demonstrated to be more opposed to race targeting- especially in the educational domain. While education has been measured in a variety of different ways in these models, there is an emerging consensus that the point at which there is a salient difference is in racial attitudes is between those who attend at least some amount of higher education and those who do not (Aaron 2006, Moore and Ovadia 2006, Radloff 2007, Schuman, Bobo and Krysan 1992). There remains some disagreement about whether or not this particular point of divergence is the result of the education itself on the one hand, or the kinds of social opportunities and experiences that are often attendant to those who at least pursue higher education on the other. For the analysis used in this chapter, the education variable has been dichotomized into a variable whose values are 1 for those who have attended at least one year of post-high school formal education and 0 for those who have not.

Though not usually the primary focus of researchers, the effect of **gender** on opposition to race targeting is frequently included in research models. Though white female respondents are slightly less likely to express traditional prejudice and low racial affect, they are sometimes more likely to express racial resentment and opposition to RTPs (Hughes and Tuch 2003, Johnson and Marini 1998, Stack 1997). Because white men are the least likely to benefit from affirmative action programs in general, it stands to reason that this group would be the least supportive of those programs, whether they be gender, race, or class-based, and the literature bears this out (Kim 2006, Stack 1997). It should be noted that the interviewer records this value

and it not self-reported by the respondent, yielding at least two concerns. First, many scholars have suggested that a gender binary is problematic and does not reflect the variety of human experience. Second, persons may personally identify differently than they "appear" to the interviewer(Kim 2006). This variable is coded 1 for men and 0 for women.

One very reliable indicator of a variety of racial attitudes, especially traditional prejudice, is age or **birth cohort**[20]. Older or earlier born respondents are more likely to express racial prejudice and resentment, though this effect is non-linear (Forman 2010, Nteta and Greenlee 2013, Wilson 1996). And though this relationship is frequently attributed to the effect of being socialized under more conservative racial norms, recent experimental evidence has suggested that-- fear induced by confrontation with mortality on the one hand, and a less-well regulated "social filter" on the other- may explain much of this effect (Gonsalkorale, Sherman and Klauer 2009, Radvansky, Copeland and Hippel 2010). Research has yielded weak or no relationship between birth cohort and opposition to race targeting, with very weak evidence that younger persons are more opposed to Affirmative Action programs (Forman 2010). This variable is measured by year of birth, and thus higher values represent younger respondents.

As a very general measure of social position, **income** is often included in research modeling racial attitudes. There remains a relatively high degree of

[20] Birth cohorts were arranged by decades, generations and presidential administrations, as is the custom in the literature. None of the variations to the strategy employed here were found to be significantly different.

occupational, and especially residential racial segregation in the United States, and both one's job and one's residence are closely correlated with income (Massey and Denton 1993, Massey, Rothwell and Domina 2009, Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). Given the relatively durable relationship between race and class in the US, a high income, then, means that high-income whites are less likely than low-income whites to come into contact with people of color at work or in one's neighborhood, and the existing research on measures of social distance bear this relationship out, and this is the only kind of racial attitude on which income seems to have a relatively reliable effect (Bobo 1999, Bobo et al. 2012). The income variable is coded categorically with the highest income respondents coding 12 and the lowest income group coding 1.

Ideological identification as **conservative** has been strongly and repeatedly associated with nearly every kind of racial construct used in the literature (Bobo et al. 2012, Quillian 2006). There remains considerable debate about how independently political ideology operates from several other constructs with which it is closely associated such as traditionalism, authoritarian personality, social dominance orientation, and so-called right wing authoritarianism (Duckitt and Bizumic 2013, Levin et al. 1998, Levin and Sidanius 1999, Pena and Sidanius 2002, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Thomsen et al. 2010). As referenced in detail above, a corresponding debate focused primarily on racial policy attitudes is ongoing between Sniderman and his colleagues, who suggest that the relationship between political ideology and racial attitudes is simply the result of "principled conservatism," while a large number of other scholars have consistently and successfully critiqued this position (Kinder and

Sears 1981, Sears, Sidanius and Bobo 2000, Sears and Henry 2003, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996, Sniderman, Tetlock and Carmines 1993, Sniderman and Carmines 1997). The political ideology variable is coded 1 for "extremely liberal," and 7 for "extremely conservative".

As discussed at some length above, there is a very large literature analyzing the effect **of inter-group contact** (differently conceptualized) on racial attitudes. While there is evidence for both contact and threat effects in the literature, most research has focused on using objective measures of intergroup contact such as population distribution data from the US census (Dixon 2006, Quillian 1995, Quillian 1996). As previously mentioned, there is growing evidence that the correlate of prejudice with real explanatory value is actually *perception* of intergroup presence (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005, Gallagher 2003). For this reason, the present chapter will rely on single discrete measures of both neighborhood and workplace racial composition available in the GSS data to evaluate the effect of inter-group contact on our racial attitude scales. The variable for neighborhood contact is coded 1 for those living in an integrated neighborhood and 0 for those who do not, while the variable for workplace contact is coded 1 for an all-white workplace and 5 for a workplace made up of almost all African Americans.

Region of residence is customarily included in racial attitude measures, and is usually coded such that residents of the US South (most often defined by census region) are compared with all other respondents in the study. The unique racial conservatism of this region is the subject of considerable research focus which has found that, as operationalized, 'the more southern, the more prejudiced' are both

individual respondents and respondents clustered into larger groups such as counties (Burr, Galle and Fossett 1991, Carter et al. 2005, Hardie and Tyson 2013, Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997, Middleton 1976). Debates about whether or not this racial conservatism is a result of a so-called "southern subculture of honor and violence," or –instead—the result of other structural and demographic factors unique to the region is also ongoing (Carter et al. 2005, Ellison 1991, Key 1949, McVeigh 2012, Valentino and Sears 2005). What is clear, however, is that region of residence is frequently found to be a significant predictor of a variety of racial attitudes in that respondents in the South report more prejudice, racial resentment and opposition to race-targeted policy. This variable is coded 1 for residents in the US South and 0 for those outside that region.

Also, given the very early work on prejudice and **social mobility**- a construct distinct from insecurity- and the availability of measures in the present data set, a measure for *perceived* economic mobility was also included in the present chapter. For example, research has suggested that, for whites at least, both upward and downward mobility are associated with increased probability of out-group derogation (Seeman, Rohan and Milton 1966, Silberstein and Seeman 1959). The measure included here represents the difference between the respondent's evaluation of her own relative economic status at age 16 and at a separate evaluation at the time of the survey. Higher values on this variable represent upward mobility.

As a few other researchers have included **unemployment** controls on previous research in racial attitudes, such a measure is included here. The literature reveals two relatively consistent trends in this area: (1) perceived insecurity is more important

than objective measures of insecurity and (2) social insecurity is more important than personal insecurity (Burns and Gimpel 2000, Hogan, Chiricos and Gertz 2005, Lauterbach 1952, Richmond 1950). Though the available data do not contain an ideal subjective social-level evaluation of insecurity, the available unemployment variable is included in lieu of a more robust alternative. This variable is coded 1 for having been unemployed and looking for work at any time in the last year and 0 for having been continuously employed over that period.

4.5.8 Analytic Strategy

As each of the race-targeting dependent variable measures includes a limited number of likert-like response categories, ordinal logistic regression[21] will be employed to evaluate the relationships under examination. In order to evaluate the effects of color-blindness on a variety of attitudes about race targeting, the present chapter will employ four distinct models for analysis. Each will include all of the key control variables described above, but also include indicators for a different kind of racial attitude construct. Namely, one ordinal logistic regression model each for indicators of racial affect, stratification beliefs, racial apathy, and racial resentment. As imputed values were created for all missing items, the *micombine* STATA command was utilized with the conventional ordinal logistic regression command to converge the parameter estimates from 100 imputed data sets and to produce coefficients and standard errors for each item in the regression table.

[21] The Brant test post-estimation procedure in STATA was used to reject a violation of the parallel regression assumption for each model, confirming that ordinal regression analysis was best suited to the data.

Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Group	Variable	*N*	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
Opposition to RTPs (higher values signify opposition)	Preference in hiring and promotion	3776	3.39	0.86	1.00	4.00
	Improve living standards	3776	3.79	1.15	1.00	5.00
	Improve conditions of blacks	3776	2.11	0.66	1.00	3.00
	Assistance to blacks	3776	1.94	0.65	1.00	3.00
	Spend more on black schools	3776	2.36	1.02	1.00	5.00
	Special coll. Scholarships for high achievers	3776	2.49	1.02	1.00	5.00
Key controls	Color-blind	3776	3.47	0.72	1.00	4.00
	Traditional prejudice[a]	3776	0.00	1	-5.74	5.07
	Conservative	3776	4.18	1.44	1.00	7.00
	South	3776	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
	Male	3776	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
	Cohort	3776	1958.20	3.21	1916.00	1987.00
	Rural	3776	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00
	Some college	3776	0.57	0.49	0.00	1.00
	Income	3776	11.14	2.04	1.00	12.00
	Unemployed in last year	3776	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
	Integrated workplace	3776	2.00	0.78	1.00	5.00
	Integrated neighborhood	3776	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
	Upward social mobility[a]	3776	0.00	1.00	3.68	3.91
Racial apathy	Don't care about race	3776	2.43	0.86	1.00	4.00
	Racism is not my business	3776	2.24	0.85	1.00	4.00
Racial affect	Not close to blacks[a]	3776	0.00	1.00	3.07	2.67
	Prefer not to live among blacks[a]	3776	0.00	1.00	3.39	3.26
	Prefer family member doesn't marry blacks[a]	3776	0.00	1.00	2.82	2.21
Stratification beliefs	No housing discrimination	3776	2.47	0.89	1.00	4.00
	No job discrimination	3776	2.28	0.82	1.00	4.00
	Not discriminated	3776	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00
	Not lack of education	3776	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
	Inborn disability	3776	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
	Lack of will	3776	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00
	Poor socialization	3776	0.78	0.42	0.00	1.00
Racial resentment	Racism used as excuse	3776	3.25	0.82	1.00	4.00

Group	Variable	*N*	*M*	*SD*	Min	Max
	Racism in the past	3776	2.60	0.95	1.00	4.00
	Tired of hearing about racism	3776	3.13	0.88	1.00	4.00
	Whites hurt by aa	3776	1.81	0.69	1.00	3.00
	Blacks should work way up	3776	4.00	1.14	1.00	5.00
	Whites disadvantaged	3776	2.34	0.86	1.00	3.00
	Special considerations are unfair	3776	2.74	0.91	1.00	3.00

[a] Item represents a standardized scale of difference.

4.6 Hypotheses

Several hypotheses are presented here in order to evaluate a number of competing claims about the relationship between color-blindness and opposition to race targeted policy. Each of these hypotheses will be tested in a number of different models in order to provide rigorous evaluation of each.

H_1: Contrary to the claims of the "principled conservatism" advocates, color-blindness will **not** be a significant predictor of opposition to race targeting.

H_2: Well-educated respondents will **not** be more likely than the less well educated to observe a significant relationship between color-blindness and race-targeting.

H_3: Traditional prejudice will not be a significant predicator of opposition to any race-targeted policy question.

H_4: Highly prejudiced respondents **will be** more likely than low prejudice respondents to observe a significant relationship between color-blindness and race targeting.

H_5: Measures of Racial Apathy will be highly correlated with opposition to race targeting.

4.7 Findings

In the interest of parsimony, findings associated with each racial attitude model are presented and discussed here absent discussion of the control variables (save color-blindness and traditional prejudice), which will follow after the salient findings for each of the racial attitude groups have been presented. Following

discussion of each model and presentation of each corresponding table, a correlation matrix for significant findings across all racial attitude models is also presented.

4.7.1 Stratification Beliefs

In keeping with the prominent Sociological literature on race-targeting attitudes, beliefs about stratification and racial inequality figured prominently in predicting opposition in each of the models (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Taylor and Merino 2011, Tuch and Hughes 2011). Denial of discrimination and individual (as opposed to structural) attribution of inequality were strongly associated with opposition to race each race targeting dependent variable. Most prominent among stratification beliefs was denial of educational discrimination for people of color, which predicted opposition to all six policy questions. As shown in table 2, the policy most responsive to the various predictors was the policy question aimed at "improving living standards of blacks," with five different measures of stratification belief significantly correlated. Also of note is the finding that most of the stratification belief predictors are much stronger predictors than political ideology. The strongest predictor of any independent variable in any model was also among the racial resentment indicators, with the denial of discrimination in producing racial inequality was four times as strong as the association between conservatism and all of the RTPs. The domain of stratification belief was also not limited in its effect on oppositional attitudes, as denial of job discrimination predicted opposition to spending on black schools and denial of educational inequality predicted a number of resource-oriented policies. Also as hypothesized, neither color-blindness nor traditional prejudice predicted opposition to any policy, but *less* color-

Table 4.2. The Effect of Stratification Beliefs on Opposition to RTPs

		Preference in Hiring and Promotion	Improve Living Standards	Improve Conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special Coll. Scholarships For Elite Blacks	Spend More on Black Schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.093	0.039	-0.001	-0.114	-0.033	-0.426*
		(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.179)	(0.169)
	Traditional prejudice	-0.001	0.148*	0.036	0.158*	0.103	-0.066
		(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.088)
Stratification beliefs	Housing discrimination	0.020	0.096	0.433**	0.302*	0.171	0.098
		(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.138)
	Job discrimination	0.124	0.311**	0.568**	0.295*	0.275	0.468**
		(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.165)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.140)
	Lack education	0.290**	0.776**	0.708**	0.364*	0.878**	0.607**
		(0.103)	(0.122)	(0.167)	(0.149)	(0.209)	(0.222)
	Inborn disability	-0.272	0.344	-0.358	0.137	0.075	0.378
		(0.175)	(0.250)	(0.305)	(0.274)	(0.356)	(0.371)
	Lack will	0.366**	0.456**	0.571**	0.605**	0.227	0.314
		(0.105)	(0.127)	(0.154)	(0.160)	(0.221)	(0.222)
	Poor socialization	0.343	0.615*	0.321	-0.052	0.194	-0.042
		(0.201)	(0.273)	(0.301)	(0.276)	(0.223)	(0.234)
	Deny discrimination	0.629**	0.836**	0.434*	1.034**	0.299	0.159
		(0.111)	(0.146)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.237)	(0.244)
Key controls	Conservative	0.202**	0.279**	0.184**	0.234**	0.167*	0.169*
		(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.071)
	South	0.019	-0.090	-0.172	0.131	-0.356*	-0.363
		(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.125)	(0.111)	(0.181)	(0.196)
	Male	0.012	0.037	0.052	0.114	-0.172	0.003
		(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.126)	(0.104)	(0.191)	(0.184)
	Younger cohort	-0.010**	0.001	-0.009**	-0.007*	-0.005	-0.006
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.007)
	Rural	0.165	0.043	-0.129	-0.050	0.145	0.123
		(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.202)	(0.200)

	Preference in Hiring and Promotion	Improve Living Standards	Improve Conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special Coll. Scholarships For Elite Blacks	Spend More on Black Schools
Some college	0.424**	0.237*	0.225	0.142	0.305	-0.317
	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.160)	(0.127)	(0.224)	(0.229)
Income	0.116**	0.053*	-0.026	-0.018	-0.028	-0.145*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.061)	(0.054)
Unemployed	0.293	-0.014	0.245	0.051	0.164	-0.147
	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.258)	(0.294)
Work integrated	-0.134	-0.015	-0.232*	-0.160	-0.280*	-0.163
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.116)	(0.129)	(0.148)
Neighborhood integrated	-0.271*	0.052	0.042	0.109	0.025	-0.103
	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.121)	(0.136)	(0.207)	(0.206)
Upward mobility	0.022	-0.020	-0.106	0.234**	0.059	0.043
	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.108)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.101)
Cut 1	-19.405**	2.595	-16.065*	-13.458	-9.081	-14.340
	(5.107)	(5.633)	(6.979)	(6.663)*	(12.302)	(13.480)
Cut 2	-18.389**	3.656	-12.575	-10.192	-7.055	-12.299
	(5.100)	(5.635)	(6.962)	(6.644)	(12.310)	(13.471)
Cut 3	-16.704**	5.773			-5.846	-10.880
	(5.101)	(5.630)			(12.288)	(13.459)
Cut 4		6.961			-4.435	-9.633
		(5.629)			(12.300)	(13.466)
N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776
Pseudo R^2	.075	.123	.170	.157	.086	.096

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 4.3. The Effect of Stratification Beliefs on Opposition to RTPs (Plus Interaction Terms)

		Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships for elite Blacks	Spend more on Black primary schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.063	0.038	0.022	-0.180	-0.276	-0.529*
		(0.154)	(0.171)	(0.188)	(0.190)	(0.249)	(0.231)
	Traditional prejudice	0.074	0.790	0.577	-0.219	-0.189	-0.141
		(0.349)	(0.455)	(0.606)	(0.435)	(0.476)	(0.484)
Stratification beliefs	Housing discrimination	0.026	0.110	0.445**	0.305*	0.196	0.110
		(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.136)	(0.126)	(0.122)	(0.135)
	Job discrimination	0.121	0.307**	0.569**	0.293*	0.249	0.457**
		(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.165)	(0.129)	(0.153)	(0.136)
	Lack education	0.291**	0.786**	0.713**	0.364*	0.892**	0.611**
		(0.103)	(0.128)	(0.168)	(0.152)	(0.213)	(0.228)
	Inborn disability	-0.274	0.373	-0.338	0.118	0.040	0.369
		(0.186)	(0.262)	(0.317)	(0.275)	(0.348)	(0.366)
	Lack will	0.367**	0.470**	0.586**	0.600**	0.215	0.316
		(0.105)	(0.128)	(0.156)	(0.162)	(0.226)	(0.221)
	Bad socialization	0.350	0.636*	0.338	-0.054	0.212	-0.043
		(0.198)	(0.272)	(0.308)	(0.280)	(0.220)	(0.233)
	Deny discrimination	0.625**	0.822**	0.426*	1.047**	0.293	0.158*
		(0.113)	(0.147)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.237)	(0.247)
Key controls	Conservative	0.204**	0.280**	0.184**	0.237**	0.170*	0.169*
		(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.068)	(0.072)
	South	0.022	-0.075	-0.162	0.130	-0.354	-0.361
		(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.130)	(0.111)	(0.183)	(0.200)
	Male	0.015	0.040	0.056	0.120	-0.151	0.014
		(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.130)	(0.108)	(0.191)	(0.180)
	Younger cohort	-0.010**	0.001	-0.009*	-0.007*	-0.005	-0.006
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.007)
	Rural	0.164	0.041	-0.134	-0.047	0.153	0.131
		(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.202)	(0.199)
	Some college	0.286	0.249	0.341	-0.173	-0.808	-0.768

		Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships for elite Blacks	Spend more on Black primary schools
		(0.604)	(0.648)	(0.742)	(0.713)	(0.989)	(1.081)
	Income	0.116**	0.046	-0.032	-0.015	-0.025	-0.145**
		(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.060)	(0.055)
	Unemployed	0.291	-0.030	0.230	0.058	0.177	-0.147
		(0.155)	(0.150)	(0.183)	(0.179)	(0.255)	(0.300)
	Work integrated	-0.133	-0.017	-0.236*	-0.158	-0.280*	-0.162
		(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.120)	(0.129)	(0.147)
	Neighborhood integrated	-0.267*	0.071	0.053	0.104	0.032	-0.101
		(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.128)	(0.139)	(0.207)	(0.207)
	Upward mobility	0.025	-0.018	-0.107	0.237**	0.071	0.048
		(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.110)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.100)
Interaction effects	Color-blind * some college	0.047	0.013	-0.023	0.091	0.353	0.143
		(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.277)	(0.299)
	Color-blind * traditional prejudice	-0.022	-0.191	-0.161	0.113	0.088	0.022
		(0.103)	(0.136)	(0.178)	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.140)
	_Cut1	-19.765**	2.223	-16.218*	-13.492*	-10.700	-15.094
		(5.673)	(5.963)	(7.300)	(6.812)	(12.111)	(13.237)
	_Cut2	-18.745**	3.291	-12.696	-10.204	-8.653	-13.045
		(5.664)	(5.967)	(7.288)	(6.797)	(12.125)	(13.228)
	_Cut3	-17.052**	5.426			-7.432	-11.613
		(5.664)	(5.965)			(12.109)	(13.216)
	_Cut4		6.625			-5.992	-10.344
			(5.966)			(12.132)	(13.230)
	N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776
	Pseudo R^2	.77	.128	.176	.161	.094	.101

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

blind respondents were found to be significantly more likely to oppose increased spending on “black schools”.

4.7.2 Racial Resentment

Consistent with a great deal of existing research, measures of racial resentment were significantly predictive of opposition to race targeting. Among the seven resentment variables in the model the variable associated with “resentment of blacks’ special treatment” was the most reliable predictor across different RTPs. As was the case in the earlier stratification beliefs model, the policy most responsive to the various resentment predictors was the policy question aimed at “improving living standards of blacks,” with four different measures of resentment belief significantly correlated. Also in keeping with the previous attitude model, Table 3 shows that almost all of the significant racial resentment indicators are more strongly associated with opposition to race targeting than is political ideology. Traditional prejudice is again not significantly related to any of the policies under examination. Once again, more color-blind respondents are not more likely to oppose race targeting for five of the six policy issues, but less color-blind persons are more likely to oppose “increased spending on black schools.” The full models including the interaction terms, neither of which were significant did prove to better fit the data, as the increase in R^2 statistics in all cases suggest.

Table 4.4. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Opposition to RTPs

		Preference in Hiring and Promotion	Improve Living Standards	Improve Conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special Coll. Scholarships For Elite Blacks	Spend More on Black Schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.074	-0.022	-0.028	-0.119	-0.113	-0.500**
		(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.119)	(0.107)	(0.182)	(0.147)
	Trad. prejudice	-0.049	0.151*	0.027	0.161*	0.076	-0.066
		(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.093)	(0.095)
Racial resentment	Work way up	0.392**	0.361**	0.158	0.136	0.097	0.078
		(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.108)	(0.124)
	Whites hurt By aa	0.087	-0.029	0.101	0.295**	0.223	0.223
		(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.101)	(0.152)	(0.168)
	Whites worse off	0.104	0.319**	0.479**	0.195	0.364*	0.501**
		(0.111)	(0.086)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.142)	(0.129)
	Tired of race talk	0.054	0.135	0.192	0.007	0.026	-0.020
		(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.128)	(0.121)	(0.156)	(0.152)
	Racism is excuse	0.222	0.468**	0.094	0.217	0.176	0.177
		(0.106)*	(0.117)	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.158)	(0.165)
	Racism in past	-0.318	0.131	0.197	0.041	0.150	0.354**
		(0.107)**	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.117)	(0.129)	(0.132)
	Resent	0.543**	0.486**	0.556**	0.787**	0.341*	0.212
		(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.135)	(0.157)	(0.143)	(0.147)
Controls	Conservative	0.135**	0.201**	0.172**	0.215**	0.100	0.081
		(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.078)	(0.074)
	South	0.082	-0.010	-0.016	0.246	-0.163	-0.217
		(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.129)	(0.119)*	(0.204)	(0.209)
	Male	-0.029	-0.049	0.049	0.127	-0.065	0.069
		(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.209)	(0.197)
	Younger cohort	-0.006*	0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.001	-0.007
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)

	Preference in Hiring and Promotion	Improve Living Standards	Improve Conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special Coll. Scholarships For Elite Blacks	Spend More on Black Schools
Rural	0.135	0.048	-0.177	-0.061	0.149	0.050
	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.221)	(0.210)
Some college	0.531**	0.426**	0.370*	0.232	0.338	-0.245*
	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.158)	(0.140)	(0.236)	(0.234)
Income	0.138**	0.107**	0.023	0.014	0.024	-0.112
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.059)	(0.052)
Unemployed	0.224	-0.068	0.111	-0.030	0.088	-0.341
	(0.169)	(0.161)	(0.185)	(0.203)	(0.276)	(0.239)
Work integrated	-0.116	-0.041	-0.217*	-0.179	-0.235	-0.137
	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.135)	(0.144)	(0.145)
Neighborhood integrated	-0.322**	-0.041	0.008	0.038	-0.083	-0.127
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.126)	(0.139)	(0.211)	(0.230)
Upward mobility	0.023	0.040	-0.079	0.211*	0.018	0.013
	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.087)	(0.096)
Cut1	-9.186	11.662	-5.667	-5.203	-0.973	-14.123
	(5.880)	(6.007)	(7.521)	(7.297)	(14.784)	(13.088)
Cut2	-8.109	12.852*	-2.221	-1.825	1.099	-11.945
	(5.873)	(6.009)	(7.506)	(7.292)	(14.765)	(13.060)
Cut3	-6.266	15.221*			2.322	-10.426
	(5.872)	(6.018)			(14.772)	(13.060)
Cut4		16.496**			3.737	-9.147
		(6.018)			(14.764)	(13.057)
N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776
Pseudo R^2	.118	.168	.167	.180	.089	.117

Table 4.5. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Opposition to RTPs (Plus Interaction Terms)

		Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships for elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.038	-0.039	-0.066	-0.157	-0.340	-0.561*
		(0.152)	(0.165)	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.239)	(0.221)
	Traditional prejudice	0.033	0.657	0.103	-0.118	-0.244	-0.313
		(0.320)	(0.476)	(0.572)	(0.453)	(0.464)	(0.472)
Racial resentment	Work way up	0.393**	0.354**	0.156	0.139	0.095	0.080
		(0.062)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.108)	(0.124)
	Whites. hurt by AA	0.086	-0.036	0.104	0.299**	0.231	0.227
		(0.103)	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.152)	(0.167)
	Whites worse off	0.100	0.307**	0.476**	0.203	0.358*	0.505**
		(0.111)	(0.086)	(0.124)	(0.114)	(0.144)	(0.128)
	Tired of race talk	0.058	0.142	0.196	0.006	0.035	-0.019
		(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.164)	(0.154)
	Racism is excuse	0.215*	0.462**	0.089	0.217	0.160	0.172
		(0.104)	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.146)	(0.156)	(0.165)
	Racism in past	-0.317**	0.141	0.202	0.036	0.166	0.358**
		(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.132)	(0.118)	(0.128)	(0.131)
	Resent	0.548**	0.499**	0.560**	0.790**	0.353*	0.212
		(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.144)	(0.146)
Controls	Conservative	0.134**	0.201**	0.171**	0.216**	0.102	0.083
		(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.079)	(0.073)
	South	0.087	0.006	-0.009	0.238	-0.164	-0.221
		(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.132)	(0.123)	(0.204)	(0.207)
	Male	-0.028	-0.051	0.053	0.130	-0.050	0.076
		(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.210)	(0.192)
	Younger cohort	-0.006*	0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002	-0.007
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)

		Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships for elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
	Rural	0.134	0.047	-0.179	-0.053	0.158	0.054
		(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.227)	(0.213)
	Some college	0.368	0.367	0.200	0.058	-0.724	-0.505
		(0.612)	(0.606)	(0.604)	(0.690)	(1.035)	(1.021)
	Income	0.138**	0.102**	0.023	0.016	0.028	-0.111*
		(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.054)
	Unemployed	0.222	-0.082	0.111	-0.026	0.102	-0.332
		(0.166)	(0.163)	(0.183)	(0.208)	(0.271)	(0.237)
	Work integrated	-0.119	-0.047	-0.221*	-0.178	-0.239	-0.137
		(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.144)
	Neighborhood integrated	-0.318**	-0.025	0.013	0.032	-0.087	-0.136
		(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.208)	(0.230)
	Upward mobility	0.025	0.043	-0.076	0.212*	0.027	0.015
		(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.096)
Interaction terms	Color-blind * some college	0.057	0.030	0.058	0.049	0.339	0.079
		(0.198)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.221)	(0.297)	(0.292)
	Color-blind * traditional prejudice	-0.024	-0.151	-0.023	0.083	0.095	0.073
		(0.093)	(0.141)	(0.169)	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.136)
	_Cut 1	-9.558	10.739	-6.193	-5.112	-2.810	-14.417
		(6.051)	(6.166)	(7.559)	(7.254)	(15.052)	(13.124)
	_Cut 2	-8.477	11.935	-2.729	-1.713	-0.717	-12.227
		(6.045)	(6.165)	(7.549)	(7.244)	(15.036)	(13.092)
	_Cut 3	-6.626	14.320*			0.519	-10.694
		(6.039)	(6.174)			(15.046)	(13.099)
	_Cut 4		15.606*			1.964	-9.397
			(6.173)			(15.047)	(13.099)
	N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776
	Pseudo R^2	.121	.172	.171	.184	.098	.122

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

4.7.3 Racial Affect

Again, consistent with earlier research, measures of racial affect- or feeling toward members of the racial out-group- were significantly related to opposition to race targeting. The findings of the present chapter were bounded in some important ways. First, none of the three measures of racial affect had any effect on education-oriented race targeting questions. The effects were confined instead to policies associated with employment and resource allocation. Also, the measure for closeness to blacks (more accurately, the standardized difference between closeness to whites and closeness to blacks) was not correlated with any of the measures of race targeting. On other hand, both measures of marriage and neighborhood affect were consistently related to each of the four non-education policy variables. As such, there is no individual affect indicator or policy dependent variable that stands out in Table 4. The strength of these racial affect effects were weaker on average than those observed in either the racial resentment or stratification belief models, and in general more on par with the strength of the political ideology measure. As with both previous racial attitude models, color-blindness was only *negatively* associated with opposition to spending on black schools and traditional prejudice was not significant in any model. Consistent with previous attitudinal models as well, Table 7 shows better overall fit in each model that includes the interaction terms relative to the base models in Table 6.

Table 4.6. The Effect of Anti-Black Racial Affect on Opposition to RTPs

		Preference in Hiring and Promotion	Improve Living Standards	Improve Conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special Coll. Scholarships For Elite Blacks	Spend More on Black Schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.096	0.042	0.045	-0.068	-0.030	-0.447**
		(0.101)	(0.092)	(0.123)	(0.103)	(0.196)	(0.167)
	Traditional prejudice	-0.030	0.121*	-0.028	0.114	0.086	-0.041
		(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.085)
Racial affect measures	Not live w/ blacks	0.156**	0.280**	0.193**	0.215**	0.146	0.175
		(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.109)	(0.108)
	Not marry blacks	0.183**	0.216**	0.320**	0.316**	0.150	0.132
		(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.113)	(0.098)
	Not close to blacks	-0.001	0.059	-0.042	0.148	0.015	-0.113
		(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.108)	(0.101)
Controls	Conservative	0.273**	0.401**	0.343**	0.349**	0.250**	0.249**
		(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.070)	(0.070)
	South	0.059	0.009	-0.079	0.211	-0.188	-0.237
		(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.107)	(0.105)*	(0.213)	(0.203)
	Male	0.020	0.067	0.096	0.192	-0.034	0.102
		(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.100)	(0.093)*	(0.167)	(0.184)
	Younger cohort	-0.006*	0.008**	0.002	0.002	0.000	-0.000
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
	Rural	0.213*	0.154	-0.040	0.038	0.174	0.152
		(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.188)	(0.209)
	Some college	0.347**	0.031	-0.010	0.020	-0.035	-0.646**
		(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.223)	(0.226)
	Income	0.129**	0.076**	0.011	0.004	0.005	-0.109*
		(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.054)
	Unemployed	0.214	-0.120	0.096	-0.009	0.142	-0.177
		(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.261)	(0.333)
	Work integrated	-0.103	0.019	-0.156	-0.158	-0.248	-0.172

	Preference in Hiring and Promotion	Improve Living Standards	Improve Conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special Coll. Scholarships For Elite Blacks	Spend More on Black Schools
	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.148)	(0.159)
Neighborhood integrated	-0.281**	0.013	0.085	-0.003	-0.058	-0.070
	(0.103)	(0.088)	(0.116)	(0.110)	(0.193)	(0.216)
Upward mobility	0.022	-0.033	-0.102	0.149	0.143	0.135
	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.105)	(0.092)
Cut1	-10.902*	14.406**	4.799	2.808	-0.269	-5.025
	(5.426)	(5.037)	(6.681)	(5.834)	(10.644)	(11.140)
Cut2	-9.919	15.400**	7.779	5.749	1.581	-3.103
	(5.419)	(5.040)	(6.684)	(5.824)	(10.640)	(11.144)
Cut3	-8.292	17.287**			2.690	-1.755
	(5.417)	(5.044)			(10.647)	(11.136)
Cut4		18.348**			4.004	-0.577
		(5.044)			(10.665)	(11.133)
Pseudo R^2	.057	.069	.072	.094	.047	.065
N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 4.7. The Effect of Anti-Black Racial Affect on Opposition to RTPs (Plus Interactions)

		Preference in hiring and promotion	improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships For elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.063	-0.016	0.013	-0.140	-0.288	-0.584
		(0.156)	(0.174)	(0.219)	(0.172)	(0.211)	(0.235)*
	Traditional prejudice	0.192	0.555	0.319	-0.177	0.168	0.123
		(0.342)	(0.451)	(0.616)	(0.442)	(0.485)	(0.495)
Racial affect measures	Not live w/ blacks	0.162**	0.292**	0.203**	0.207**	0.148	0.183
		(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.107)	(0.106)
	Not marry blacks	0.184**	0.221**	0.322**	0.313**	0.146	0.128
		(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.112)	(0.098)
	Not close blacks	-0.009	0.043	-0.053	0.151	-0.003	-0.127
		(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.108)	(0.102)
Controls	Conservative	0.272**	0.401**	0.344**	0.352**	0.254**	0.250**
		(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.069)	(0.070)
	South	0.067	0.022	-0.069	0.209	-0.178	-0.229
		(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.116)	(0.110)	(0.208)	(0.202)
	Male	0.026	0.076	0.105	0.200*	-0.009	0.117
		(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.172)	(0.192)
	Younger cohort	-0.006*	0.007**	0.002	0.002	0.000	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	Rural	0.211*	0.154	-0.043	0.042	0.173	0.152
		(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.191)	(0.209)
	Some college	0.174	-0.259	-0.184	-0.298	-1.290	-1.281
		(0.606)	(0.664)	(0.770)	(0.672)	(0.867)	(0.934)
	Income	0.128**	0.073**	0.008	0.007	0.003	-0.114*
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.054)
	Unemployed	0.204	-0.139	0.080	-0.001	0.132	-0.193
		(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.253)	(0.337)

		Preference in hiring and promotion	improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships For elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
	Work integrated	-0.107	0.015	-0.161	-0.161	-0.261	-0.181
		(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.150)	(0.162)
		-0.272*	0.030	0.100	-0.009	-0.046	-0.059
	Neighborhood integrated						
		(0.107)	(0.093)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.190)	(0.217)
	Upward mobility	0.025	-0.030	-0.099	0.151	0.157	0.141
		(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.110)	(0.094)
Interaction terms	Color-blind * Some college	0.060	0.101	0.064	0.096	0.399	0.203
		(0.192)	(0.208)	(0.243)	(0.206)	(0.246)	(0.266)
	Color-blind * Trad. prejudice	-0.066	-0.129	-0.103	0.088	-0.024	-0.049
		(0.101)	(0.138)	(0.182)	(0.130)	(0.145)	(0.148)
	_Cut 1	-11.258*	13.883**	4.287	2.668	-2.062	-6.133
		(5.670)	(5.285)	(6.928)	(6.015)	(10.973)	(11.217)
	_Cut 2	-10.271	14.882**	7.295	5.625	-0.188	-4.204
		(5.663)	(5.289)	(6.930)	(6.007)	(10.966)	(11.218)
	_Cut 3	-8.636	16.784**			0.933	-2.841
		(5.659)	(5.291)			(10.969)	(11.210)
	_Cut 4		17.854**			2.275	-1.637
			(5.291)			(10.987)	(11.208)
	N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776
	Pseudo R^2	.054	.073	.078	.098	.057	.070

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

4.7.4 Racial Apathy

Though this is the first large-scale analysis of the effects of racial apathy on race targeting attitudes, the results were as expected. Each racial apathy indicator was predictive of four different RTPs. Of particular interest were the effects of racial apathy on opposition to education spending and college scholarships- a strength and consistency of effect distinct among the four racial attitude models. Among the six policy questions, the variable associated with spending to "spending more on black schools" elicited the strongest effect from each apathy indicator, and in terms of predictive power, the "not concerned with racial issues" was the better overall predictor of opposition to race targeting. Finally, in keeping with each of the three previous models, color-blindness was not predictive of opposition to race targeting in any model, but less color-blind persons were more opposed to spending on "black schools." Once again, traditional prejudice was not associated with any of the six policy measures. In sum, the results of Table 5 suggest that H_4 is supported; racial apathy is a strong predictor of opposition to race targeting in the same way that racial resentment, anti-black affect and stratification beliefs are.

Table 4.8. The Effect of Racial Apathy on Opposition to RTPs

		Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships For elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.078	0.017	0.074	-0.104	-0.106	-0.439*
		(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.128)	(0.109)	(0.149)	(0.173)
	Trad. prejudice	0.013	0.162**	-0.008	0.178**	0.097	-0.069
		(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.094)	(0.088)
Racial apathy measures	Unconcerned about race	0.031	0.404**	0.297*	0.267**	0.151	0.307*
		(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.116)	(0.102)	(0.113)	(0.126)
	Racism not my business	0.130	0.171	0.542**	0.175	0.235	0.332**
		(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.121)	(0.127)
Controls	Conservative	0.296**	0.413**	0.348**	0.383**	0.261**	0.236**
		(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.069)	(0.066)
	South	0.116	0.106	0.082	0.299**	-0.098	-0.126
		(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.120)	(0.101)	(0.198)	(0.216)
	Male	0.025	0.026	0.096	0.146	-0.036	0.120
		(0.087)	(0.078)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.187)	(0.203)
	Younger cohort	-0.009**	0.001	-0.007*	-0.005	-0.005	-0.008
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	Rural	0.195*	0.107	-0.075	0.005	0.236	0.169
		(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.207)	(0.220)
	Some college	0.326**	0.059	0.058	-0.015	0.044	-0.584*
		(0.106)	(0.095)	(0.130)	(0.114)	(0.232)	(0.242)
	Income	0.139**	0.093**	0.040	0.028	0.029	-0.096
		(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.057)	(0.060)
	Unemployed	0.235	-0.116	0.135	0.010	0.235	-0.146
		(0.159)	(0.127)	(0.197)	(0.166)	(0.250)	(0.288)

	Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships For elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
Work integrated	-0.093	0.026	-0.162	-0.132	-0.247	-0.133
	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.113)	(0.124)	(0.152)	(0.154)
Neighborhood integrated	-0.266**	-0.036	0.010	0.048	-0.062	-0.200
	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.240)	(0.213)
Upward mobility	0.062	0.023	-0.068	0.198*	0.100	0.086
	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.090)
Cut 1	-16.684**	2.976	-11.896	-8.974	-10.083	-14.209
	(5.559)	(5.373)	(6.876)	(6.370)	(10.685)	(11.437)
Cut 2	-15.704**	3.971	-8.818	-6.090	-8.124	
	(5.558)	(5.371)	(6.851)	(6.348)	(10.695)	
Cut 3	-14.096*	5.865			-6.908	
	(5.553)	(5.372)			(10.681)	
Cut 4		6.928			-5.557	
		(5.370)			(10.683)	
N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776
Pseudo R^2	.046	.068	.092	.082	.048	.077

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

Table 4.9. The Effect of Racial Apathy on Opposition to RTPs (Plus Interactions)

		Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships For elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
Key racial attitudes	Color-blind	0.010	-0.106	0.019	-0.213	-0.318	-0.570*
		(0.154)	(0.182)	(0.204)	(0.183)	(0.204)	(0.236)
	Traditional prejudice	0.140	0.431	0.567	-0.179	0.128	0.121
		(0.334)	(0.474)	(0.543)	(0.384)	(0.520)	(0.450)
Racial apathy measures	Unconcerned with race	0.027	0.401**	0.303**	0.257*	0.138	0.301*
		(0.090)	(0.081)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.116)	(0.128)
	Racism not my business	0.142	0.192*	0.562**	0.187	0.266*	0.356**
		(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.121)*	(0.125)
Controls	Conservative	0.296**	0.414**	0.347**	0.388**	0.263**	0.236**
		(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.068)	(0.067)
	South	0.129	0.120	0.102	0.299**	-0.082	-0.112
		(0.098)	(0.093)	(0.125)	(0.107)	(0.195)	(0.212)
	Male	0.034	0.039	0.104	0.158	-0.015	0.134
		(0.091)	(0.082)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.193)	(0.204)
	Younger cohort	-0.009**	0.001	-0.008*	-0.005	-0.005	-0.009
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)
	Rural	0.195*	0.108	-0.082	0.010	0.241	0.172
		(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.210)	(0.217)
	Some college	0.007	-0.497	-0.207	-0.521	-0.953	-1.191
		(0.639)	(0.715)	(0.796)	(0.670)	(0.942)	(1.081)
	Income	0.138**	0.092**	0.035	0.032	0.031	-0.099
		(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.054)	(0.059)
	Unemployed	0.228	-0.132	0.113	0.016	0.235	-0.156
		(0.159)	(0.131)	(0.197)	(0.169)	(0.254)	(0.291)
	Work integrated	-0.097	0.020	-0.171	-0.135	-0.255	-0.142

		Preference in hiring and promotion	Improve living standards	Improve conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special coll. scholarships For elite Blacks	Spend more on Black schools
		(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.153)	(0.152)
	Neighborhood integrated	-0.260*	-0.026	0.026	0.043	-0.055	-0.194
		(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.124)	(0.114)	(0.236)	(0.210)
	Upward mobility	0.065	0.028	-0.064	0.202*	0.111	0.093
		(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.097)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.089)
Interaction terms	Color-blind * Some college	0.107	0.185	0.098	0.155	0.321	0.198
		(0.204)	(0.224)	(0.246)	(0.208)	(0.256)	(0.303)
	Color-blind * Traditional prejudice	-0.038	-0.080	-0.172	0.106	-0.011	-0.059
		(0.101)	(0.141)	(0.158)	(0.115)	(0.151)	(0.129)
	_cut 1	-17.183**	2.201	-12.916	-8.947	-11.438	-19.821
		(5.606)	(5.568)	(6.931)	(6.418)	(10.831)	(11.450)
	_cut 2	-16.200**	3.202	-9.803	-6.044	-9.462	-17.797
		(5.607)	(5.564)	(6.908)	(6.395)	(10.843)	(11.440)
	_cut 3	-14.584**	5.113			-8.236	-16.377
		(5.604)	(5.565)			(10.827)	(11.426)
	_cut 4		6.187			-6.858	-15.159
			(5.563)			(10.825)	(11.447)
	N	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776	3,776
	Pseudo R^2	.047	.056	.057	.074	.047	.064

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$.

4.7.5 General Findings

The findings of the present chapter both confirm earlier general findings in the race targeting literature and also represent some key challenges to existing assumptions. As the data employed here are very recent, some of the differences may be attributable to actual changes in the population, changes in the measures used, or differences in the sociopolitical context in which the responses were given. In any event, the large sample size and number of specific measures represent a very robust test of the relationships so well documented in the literature, and as such the new and contradictory findings presented are worthy of note.

Among the confirmatory findings of this project is the finding that the *kind* of race targeted policy significantly affects the nature of opposition or support among white respondents. Relatively small changes in wording about resource and opportunity allocation targeted at people of color elicits significant differences in response, and the findings of the present chapter are no different. For example there is much greater opposition to "preference in hiring," than in "special scholarships for high achieving students of color," and the control variables included in each model explain much more of the variation in the former than in the latter. It's also worth noting that the pattern of opposition to these programs (in both relative and absolute terms) was largely the same as in previous research. Specifically, white respondents are the most opposed to direct redistribution of resources, a bit less opposed to race targeting in the work place, even less opposed to race targeting in education, and the least opposed to race targeting in job-training. To the extent measured, these relationships are also found in the data used here

(Jacobson 1985, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Kravitz 1995, Park 2009, Reyna et al. 2005, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996).

More than any single predictor in any model, political ideology was the most consistent (and often the strongest) predictor of opposition to race targeting. It should ne noted that this relationship, too, varied according to the kind of race targeting, but did so largely in the way(s) observed in previous research. Namely, like the pattern for white mentioned above, conservative ideology predicted opposition most strongly when the program in question was focused on direct redistribution of resources, and was weakest (or absent) when educational opportunity was the focus. The consistency of this correlation across time and sources of data is worth emphasis and has been the subject of a substantial portion of the racial attitude literature- especially with respect to analyzing the predictors of conservative ideology. It is well established that conservative ideology is correlated with various measures of prejudice, and in spite of the decline in the expression of traditional prejudice, this relationship is has held relatively constant across time (Bobo et al. 2012, Tuch and Hughes 2011, Wilson and Davis 2011). Very recent work has suggested that politics in the US are becoming increasingly polarized and increasingly *racialized* (Bobo et al. 2012, Duckitt and Bizumic 2013, Samson 2013, Tesler 2012, Unnever and Cullen 2012, Valentino, Brader and Jardina 2013). In this way, it is suggested, though not tested here, that political ideology is becoming an increasingly robust proxy for (and socially acceptable alternative to) underlying racial prejudice in many forms(Feldman and Huddy 2005).

Also in keeping with the preponderance of the research, traditional prejudice was not correlated with any measure of opposition to race targeting (Bobo and Kluegel 1993,

Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997, Bonilla-Silva 2003). As mentioned earlier, it is hypothesized that the prejudicial effects on these policies are now expressed primarily through the variety of "new racism" indicators also employed in the present chapter instead of the direct relationship between prejudice and opposition observed in earlier surveys.

There was one finding that provided evidence of an increasingly consistent relationship relative to prior research. The literature has documented an often-weak and item-dependent positive relationship between age (birth cohort) and opposition to race targeting, and the present chapter found relatively weak, but consistent evidence in that direction. In three of the six measures of race targeting, older respondents were more opposed- a finding much more robust than had been observed in the past. As demographers have suggested, this may be due to significant differences by cohort in racial make-up of US society, with whites making up a smaller and smaller proportion of the population in each successive birth cohort. Strikingly, however, in one model, younger persons were more likely to oppose "improving the living standards of blacks," suggesting, again, that attitudes vary significantly by type of policy.

This chapter also expands a relatively under-examined relationship: the effects of inter-group contact on opposition to race targeting. Usually operationalized in terms of residential contact, a few studies have demonstrated a link between neighborhood contact and *increased support* for race targeting, but the associations were weak. The present chapter extends those findings by demonstrating a significant relationship between both workplace and residential racial integration on a variety of measures of race-targeted policy. The most robust finding was that living in an integrated neighborhood made

respondents across all models less likely to oppose race targeted policy. It is worth pointing out that intergroup contact at the neighborhood or workplace level is treated as a "contact instead of threat effect," as measurements of racial composition of larger units like counties or MSAs have yielded more mixed results for race targeting attitudes.

There were a number of ways in which the findings of the present chapter run counter to much of the previous research. Perhaps the most striking of these was the lack of regional effect. That is, net all other factors, whites living in the US South were no more likely to oppose any form of race targeting than those living outside of the region. The unique racial conservatism of the South has been well documented on just about every measure of racial attitude and across many sub-sets of the white population- including and especially opposition to race targeting (Carter et al. 2005, Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens 1997, Lee et al. 2007, Oh et al. 2010). The lack of observation of this effect may be due to several factors, including oversampling of persons from the more racially liberal "border South," the fact that the South is increasingly conservative relative to the non-South, and rural (two factors that account for variation in these attitudes) relative to the rest of the nation, or the relatively recent influx of more racially liberal northern whites into the South. Whatever the reason(s), it is notable that the effect of Southern residence is for the time being less important than other research would suggest- subsequent study is required to verify whether and to what extent this change is part of a trend or an artifact of the context of the survey.

It is also relatively surprising that level of education did not yield a significant effect on any race-targeting attitudes. Race targeting is the one kind of racial attitude in which education confers either no effect or, especially in the case of education-related

Table 4.10. Summary of Findings: Correlation Matrix for Racial Attitude Models

	Preference in Hiring and Promotion	Improve Living Standards	Improve Conditions of Blacks	Assistance to Blacks	Special Coll. Scholarships For Blacks	Spend More on Black Schools
Color-blind	—	—	—	—	—	(-) SB, R, AF, AP
Traditional prejudice	—	—	—	—	—	—
Conservative	(+) SB, R, AF, AP	(+) SB, R, AF, AP	(+) SB, R, AF, AP	(+) SB, R, AF, AP	(+) SB, AF	(+) SB, AF
South	—	—	—	(+) AP	—	—
Male	—	—	—	(+) AF	—	—
Younger cohort	(-) SB, R, AF, AP	(+) AF	(-) SB, AP	(-) SB	—	—
Rural	(+) AF, AP	—	—	—	—	—
Some college	—	—	—	—	—	—
Income	(+) SB, R, AF, AP	(+) R, AF, AP				(-) SB, R, AF
Unemployed	—	—	—	—	—	—
Work integrated	—	—	(-) SB, R	—	(-) SB	—
Neighborhood integrated	(-) SB, R, AF, AP	—	—	—	—	—
Upward mobility	—	—	—	(+) SB, R, AP,	—	—
Color-blind × Some college	—	—	—	—	—	—
Color-blind × Trad. prejudice	—	—	—	—	—	—

Note. Which Attitudinal Models Included: SB - Stratification Beliefs, R - Racial Resentment, AF - Racial Affect, AP - Racial Apathy.

policies, yields more opposition. Even with several distinct race-targeting measures, no significant effect was measured in any model.

4.8 Discussion and Conclusion

Opposition to race targeting is not about color-blindness. The results from each racial attitude model- all of which demonstrated a number of significant relationships between other racial attitudes and opposition- make it clear that those who oppose race targeting do so for reasons other than a desire for color-blindness. Contrary to the suggestions of advocates of the "principled conservatism" theory of opposition to race targeting, more educated whites were no more likely to be motivated by color-blindness in their attitudes about race targeting than were their less educated peers. $\mathbf{H_1}$ (the proposition that color-blindness would NOT be positively related to opposition to RTPS) is confirmed because not only are the color-blind not more likely to oppose race targeting, but in at least one case the less color-blind are more likely to oppose race targeting. Taken together, these findings constitute a further refutation of the position advocated by Sniderman and his colleagues and in so doing add more weight to the scholars of the "new racism" position(s). For this first time, this analysis uses a nationally representative sample to directly falsify Sniderman's claim that opposition to RTPs is primarily driven by a respondent's endorsement of "color-blindness". Using diverse measures of attitudes about RTPs, this chapter demonstrates that it is not a color-blind desire to treat potential beneficiaries as individuals, but rather group-based evaluations that mostly drive opposition to RTPs.

Even for the well-educated, opposition to race targeting was driven primarily by political ideology, negative affect toward persons of color, racial resentment, racial apathy, and denial of discrimination-- not color-blindness. **H_2** (the proposition that education does NOT moderate the relationship between color-blindness and opposition to RTPs) is confirmed because; contrary to the suggestions of Sniderman (1997, 2000), more educated respondents do not use color-blindness instead of prejudice to make up their minds about race targeting. While critics of the "new racism" position may continue to argue that racial politics play only a minor role in the formulation of opposition to Affirmative Action, for instance, the evidence against such a conclusion continues to mount.

It appears that opposition to race targeting is also not primarily about traditional prejudice- at least not directly. Traditional prejudice was not associated with opposition to race targeting in any of the racial attitude models for any of the policy indicators. **H_3** (the proposition that tradition prejudice would not be related to opposition to RTPs) is confirmed because, while nearly every other kind of racial attitudes seems to be related to opposition to race targeting, traditional prejudice lacks any direct effect. Though this is not a surprise in general, the consistency of this confirmation of the null hypothesis was striking given the variety of policy attitudes examined in the present chapter. Though substantially untested here, it remains the informed hypothesis of the present author that latent racial prejudice, whether measured or not, still animates a significant portion of opposition to race targeting among whites.

Color-blindness, at least as understood by respondents in this sample, is also distinct from other racial attitudes. Contrary to the work of Mazzocco and to the expectation of **H4** (the proposition that traditional prejudice will moderate the relationship between color-blindness and RTPs), color-blindness is neither associated with traditional prejudice, nor does it moderate the relationship between prejudice and opposition to race targeting[22]. Specifically, high prejudiced whites were no more likely than their less prejudiced peers to be motivated by color-blindness in their attitudes about race targeting. When asked directly about color-blindness, whites' response seems to indicate a unique formulation about race and racism that is not necessarily captured by other measures. In this way, ironically, it may be that the first large-scale empirical measurement of color-blind attitudes may be distinct from the most prominent theoretical work on color-blindness and especially color-blind racism. In other words, one of the unique contributions of this chapter is the finding that, at least as measured here, color-blindness is not (necessarily) a form of racism akin to racial resentment, anti-black affect, denial of discrimination or even its close cousin racial apathy. This may be, in part, due to the fact that the question, as asked is more personal than social and more evaluative than normative. In other words, while color-blind racism might accurately be described as a set of beliefs about how society should be, the indicator used in the present chapter is a description of how the

[22] Along with the traditional prejudice measure, the color-blind variable was regressed on a number of theoretically derived indicators of racial and political attitudes, and none was found to be significant. This suggests that color-blindness a novel attitudinal measure distinct from others presented in the racial attitudes literature.

individual is. This theoretical distinction would benefit from further research and more diverse measures.

In addition to the findings outlined above, a key contribution of this project is the empirical establishment of the relationship between racial apathy and opposition to race targeting. **H_5** (the proposition that racial apathy measures are predictive or opposition to RTPs) is confirmed because both measures of racial apathy used here were significantly related to a number of race-targeting policies. Notably, though, the effects of racial apathy were constrained to policies about distribution of jobs, resources and opportunity and they did not have a significant effect on policies related to education.

As Forman (2000, 2004) suggests, racial apathy may be the "vessel" through which prejudiced attitudes are expressed to a much greater degree in the future. Further, this finding demonstrates that these measures of racial apathy are distinct from a direct measure of color-blindness-which is important for future measurement of these apparently distinct attitudes. The findings here also suggest that the so-called CoBRA scale is more rightly described as a measure of racial apathy, not color-blindness. While several of the indicators of racial apathy included here were predictive of opposition to RTPs, color-blindness, again, was not.

As such, future research focusing on the role of "new racism" in shaping political opinion more broadly would benefit from the inclusion of racial apathy measures. As a variety of scholars and commentators have suggested, especially as the US legal and political system moves away from direct interdiction in matters of prejudice and discrimination, there is an increasing probability that many whites will

"mistake what they wish the world was for what it actually is." (Kurzman et al. 2014, Nteta and Greenlee 2013, Penner and Saperstein 2013, Thakore 2014) In such a world, racial apathy is likely to play a significant role in explaining variation in political attitudes more generally going forward.

The scholars of "principled conservatism" have suggested repeatedly that the best way to build a coalition to address the needs of the poor and disadvantaged of all races is to appeal to broader support for color-blind application of class-based social programs. As outlined above, this argument is based largely on the underlying assumption that opposition to race targeting was animated primarily by white color-blindness. The evidence presented here casts serious doubt on that assumption and, as a result, the political prescription it is associated with. If it is indeed racism and not principled opposition that is substantially responsible for opposition to RTPs, advocates of such policies would do well not merely to advocate for race-neutral assistance to the poor. Their energies would be more rightly channeled into understanding and combating the sources of prejudice. Further, the findings of this chapter suggest that it is not the lack of a savvy political movement unable to align with the true feelings of a color-blind white population, but rather latent prejudice and resentment that lies at the heart of opposition to race targeting. In other words, if the goal, ultimately, is to overcome racial inequality, then the findings presented here suggest that only race-conscious tactics are likely be successful.

In a society in which racial segregation and inequality are in many ways *increasing,* this is not merely an academic concern. Whatever the causes of that inequality and segregation, there is precious little support for measures to combat

these problems- especially among white people. In fact, there is some evidence that the inequality and segregation are themselves helping to drive white anxiety and prejudice toward persons of color. It has been rightly pointed out that there must be more than one way to ameliorate these problems, and while that is certainly true, the evidence suggests that any solution must first attend to the reality of the ongoing role of racial attitudes in forming policy preferences. And by rejecting the idea that white opposition to race targeting is merely the product of a racially agnostic desire for a color-blind society.

4.9 Implications for Theorizing About and Measuring Race and Racism

The yawning gap between our public sentiments and the persistence of racial inequality (especially between whites and African Americans) demands explanation. How could it be, one asks, that inequalities in wealth grow larger at the same time that declaration of traditional prejudice steadily decline? Part of the answer, of course, is historical and structural, owing to a long history of discrimination and differential access to opportunity structures (Harris 1992, Ignatiev 1995, McVeigh 2004, Omi and Winant 1994, Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). Much of it, though, the evidence suggests is a persistence of both interpersonal and institutionalized racism, with the latter buttressed by the former. This "new racism," though sometimes difficult to measure, is part of both the cause and the consequence of these racial inequalities. With this in mind, the present chapter's main theoretical contribution to the racial attitudes literature is twofold. First, to further establish the utility of "new racism" and the assumptions that underlie them- especially as it relates to RTPs. Theories that don't take account of prejudice in explaining very large differences in

racial outcomes and support for racial policies do not stand up to the empirical evidence. Second, this chapter establishes color-blindness as a novel racial attitude distinct from others that are often measured. It seems clear from the analysis here that respondents report commitment to color-blindness for a variety of reasons- some of them in tension with each other. While the established literature on the set of social relations often referred to as "the color-blind era" or "color-blind racism" is of great use, it is important to disentangle these broader social relations (and the norms that support them) from individual attitudes or orientations toward race. Future research would do well to either treat these constructs separately or make a clearer empirical case for their connection.

In the "arms race" between scholars who develop increasingly clever and precise tools to measure racial attitudes and the respondents who are increasingly adept at masking those attitudes, it is critical that researchers continue to develop strong new theoretical and empirical tools. While there is much interest in, and relative consensus about, the concept of color-blindness and color-blind racism among those in the "New Racism" school, there is fairly little agreement about how to uniformly measure this idea- or even how it is distinct from other constructs in common currency in the literature. This chapter demonstrates that color-blindness, when directly measured, is distinct from racial apathy and that it operates differently than do scales and indices used to measure the idea in the past. Direct measurement of color-blindness yields a novel relationship to opposition to RTPs not observed in the past, and suggest that direct prompting about a concept (when possible) is preferable to the construction of scales and indices that indirectly measure that construct. Given

its normative value among (especially white) persons in the modern US, the invocation of color-blindness is not expected to carry the same stigma or potential for priming that the direct reference to other racial attitudes does. For this reason, the findings of the present chapter suggest that, at least insofar as survey research is concerned, color-blindness should be measured directly though specific prompts. This is the only way that the literature can continue to move forward and evaluate just how novel this notion is relative to other attitudes about race.

4.10 Limitations and Areas for Future Research

While ambitious in scope and relatively robust in its findings, this project is limited by three main factors. First, like all survey data, it relies on an assumption that respondents are reporting actual attitudes that reflect their own deeply held thoughts and feelings and NOT merely responses that reflect norms of "politically correct" orientations to the questions asked. There is ample evidence that, perhaps even to an increasing extent, survey data alone are insufficient for an adequate analysis of attitudes that are so fraught with emotion and anxiety. Among these, (race of) interviewer effects, increasing non-answers/refusals by those with strong attitudes, and relatively basic measures for complex attitudes are among the largest areas of concern. A truly robust evaluation of the role of color-blindness in the formulation of other racial and political attitudes would include qualitative methods as well as quantitative analysis and make use of experimental settings as well. These two research methods have yielded much of the most important work in this area over the last few years, and as such, expansion of this project would benefit as well from the application of these mixed-method approaches.

Secondly, this research relies primarily on a single measure of color-blindness. Most of the earlier empirical work in this area has utilized highly valid and complex index measures like the CoBRAS. Though these scales have only been used with relatively small and non-representative samples and do not specifically include a measure for preference for color-blind policy, they do capture a number of dimensions of attitudes related to color-blindness. The construction of such a scale including more direct and specific policy-oriented items would be of great benefit in subsequent survey research. As mentioned above, future research should isolate very clearly the personal from the social and the normative from the evaluative when constructing measures of color-blindness. Stronger measures of color-blindness would greatly benefit any future research in this area.

Finally, the cross-sectional nature of these data limits the conclusions that can be drawn from its findings. Though composed of a large sample from three distinct subsamples, the findings presented here – especially those that are relatively idiosyncratic and or disconfirmatory of the established literature—may be to some extent an artifact of the context in which the data were gathered. Perhaps, for example, there was something unique about the sociopolitical environment in 2010-the mid-term election and the emergence of the Tea Party—that produced results that are not likely to be replicated in 2012 or 2014. Longitudinal data would help establish both patterns of change and consistency within individual respondents, as well as track the changes in the population over time. Future research into the effects (or causes) of color-blind attitudes would benefit greatly from repeated observations of the same respondent.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

This dissertation has contributed to the racial attitudes literature in a number of important ways. First, as demonstrated in chapter one, economic insecurity interacts in important ways with one's level of education in shaping racial attitudes. With respect to both traditional prejudice and racial resentment, the analyses suggested that the economic insecurity associated with unemployment was more powerful among those without a high school degree. This particular finding lends further support to the work of Glaser (2001) in suggesting that, at least in part, increased education is about insulation from competition more than mere enlightenment. Second, the research presented in chapter two suggests that, counter to what much recent research would predict (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, Taylor and Mateyka 2011, Taylor and Reyes 2014), personal characteristics remain an important factor in shaping racial attitudes relative to context effects. When analyzed across time and within person, changes in local context characteristics proved less important than previous research would have suggested. Thirdly, substantial evidence is provided in contradiction of the "principled conservatism" claims of Sniderman (2000, 2007) that opposition to race targeted programs is driven primarily by racial color-blindness. Consistent with a the research of a variety of other scholars, however, evidence is provided in support of the "new racism" thesis; namely that

opposition to these programs is driven by other more subtle racial attitudes (Bobo 1998, Feldman and Huddy 2005, Jacobson 1985, Kluegel and Smith 1983, Oh et al. 2010, Wilson and Brewer 2013).

In spite of a public discourse that aspires to (and in many cases assumes) the existence of a post-racial society, the research presented here suggests that race remains deeply embedded in US culture. For the non-Hispanic whites who were the primary subjects of this project, it is clear that race is still an important factor in shaping attitudes and orienting them toward their increasingly non-white world. As numerous other scholars have pointed out, this presents a substantial challenge given the prominence of the post-racial narrative in a world in which racial segregation is so durable and so many racial inequalities remain (Berinsky 2002, Bonilla-Silva 2003, Kurzman et al. 2014).

Beyond the "continued centrality of race in American social and political life," as Vincent Hutchings put it, the analyses in the preceding chapters also makes clear that the measurement of racial attitudes is a complicated task (Hutchings and Valentino 2004). Indeed, in a social order in which there is often a greater social cost for expressing racial prejudice than for practicing racial discrimination, a full and accurate accounting of those attitudes is a significant challenge (Berinsky 1999, Schuman et al. 1997, Wise 2010). Stronger norms against expression of prejudice, more diverse interviewers, increasing rates of non-response (in lieu of support for prejudice) and an increasingly educated population make the challenge of really understanding the nature of racism in the modern United States more and more difficult (Bobo and Charles 2009, Schuman et al. 1997).

Complicated as though this measurement may be, the preceding chapters succeeded in reviewing the relevant literature and identifying several key factors yet fully unexplored in that literature. While many of the findings were relatively modest, the complex nature of these relationships and the great wealth of earlier work in this area make these contributions nonetheless valuable. In addition to the expansion of knowledge in the general area of racial attitudes, the preceding chapters also serve as a solid point of departure for a number of important questions that have emerged in the creation of this dissertation project. Some of these will be discussed in the coming pages.

Perhaps more than anything else, this dissertation project revealed the complexity of white racial attitudes. In spite of the significant and unique nature of white racial attitudes relative to those of other racial groups, there is much important diversity *among* whites. This diversity that is given expression not just across demographic differences, but also provoked by the ways in which questions are asked and the time at which they are asked. For example, respondents in chapter two demonstrated solid and consistent predictive relationships between racial context and a variety of racial attitudes in 2006, but the identical sample yielded no such relationship in 2010. In another case from chapter three, relationships predictive of opposition to race targeted programs varied substantially (sometimes even in the *direction* of association) based on the way the questions were posed to the respondent. As mentioned in the introduction to this project, however, these complex and contingent outcomes make consistent findings, where observed, all the more compelling.

5.1 Consistent Findings of Note Across All Chapters

There were several factors that were notable across all chapters of this project. Some of them were notable merely for their consistency across analyses, but some were notable also in their deviation from relationships well documented in the literature. First, the effect of region played a much smaller role than the literature would have predicted in the analyses. In general one finds that those living in the US South are far more racially conservative, even when controlling for other relevant factors, than those living outside the South (Key 1949, Lee et al. 2007). In the nearly 50 models included in this project, region of residence was a significant factor in less than ten of these models, and there was substantial variation in *which* attitudes southern residence seemed to provide significant influence.

The second- and by far most consistent- factor observed in all three chapters was the role of political ideology in shaping racial attitudes. In most models, political ideology played the largest role in predicting almost every single racial attitude- with more conservative respondents reporting more racial resentment, opposition to race targeting, traditional prejudice and so on. While this finding is not new, its consistency is worthy of note. As US politics- both within and outside of the US South are growing particularly racialized, one expects that racial attitudes will become increasingly consistent and arranged along partisan and ideological lines (Tesler 2012, Wilson and Brewer 2013).

The third thing to note is that inter-group interaction, whether conceptualized as “contact” or “threat” and whether measured by subjective assessment or by objective external data, confers very different effects depending on the measure and

circumstances. Subjective reporting of integration of neighborhood or workplace was significant rarely in predicting various racial attitudes, and associations were relatively weak when those relationships were observed. The contextual effect of percentage NHW at the county level, again, yielded significant effects in one wave (though in the opposite direction expected), and was not at all significant in the next wave. It seems clear that the role of inter-group interaction, while important to the formation and expression of white racial attitudes, is highly contingent on the circumstances within which that interaction occurs. This conclusion is consistent with the emerging context-effects literature reviewed in chapter two.

Among the attitudinal outcome variables included in these analyses, two seemed particularly (and consistently) sensitive to the independent variables introduced in each model. Questions associated with (1) racial resentment and (2) affirmative action programs described as "helping black people" were reliable in evoking significant responses among white people. In general terms, especially those who were less educated, more conservative, older, male and less well situated economically. While important ancillary goal of the research was to evaluate a variety of racial attitudes across theoretical and empirical models, these two attitudes – and the variables associated with them- were the most reliable in evoking significant relationships to personal and contextual variation among white people. This finding may suggest that while the other measures are of value, subsequent research using a diversity of attitudinal outcomes should be certain to include these attitudes.

Finally, the role of education seems to be highly contingent as well, especially outside of traditional prejudice measures. While there is perhaps no better-established

correlate of racial tolerance than the level of one's education (however debated the mechanism for this may be), education played a less prominent role in chapters two and three than expected. One thing that might account for this finding is that increasing ideological commitment to racial issues- which have become politicized anew in the Obama era- has to some degree overcome the effects of education. In any case, education was a much less prominent and consistent predictor of these racial attitudes than was anticipated.

5.2 Chapter One: Key Findings, Implications & Limitations

The key theoretical aim of chapter one was to provide evidence to clarify whether or not education's moderating effect on racial prejudice was primarily the result of "enlightenment" on the one hand, or of "insulation" from competition on the other. Though the findings were relatively modest, qualified evidence for the "insulation" theory was provided. In the case of both traditional prejudice and racial resentment, the dummy variables *High School Degree* and *Graduate Degree* were significant in interaction with unemployment, suggesting that at both levels, those who were unemployed were more resentful and more traditionally prejudice relative to those without a HS degree. This finding is important insofar as it demonstrates that: (1) unemployment does not predict racial attitudes in the same way for persons at all levels of education and that (2) neither economic vulnerability or lack of education *alone* are reliable indicators of racial prejudice.

In general, both subjective and objective economic insecurity was less predictive of racial attitudes than expected. Indeed, once the full models including all interaction terms were included, only unemployment was a significant predictor of

traditional prejudice, with unemployed persons expressing more traditional prejudice than those with who were currently employed. This came as a surprise in that previous research in a variety of areas had suggested that it is the perception of conditions more than – necessarily- the conditions themselves that shapes attitudes (Burns and Gimpel 2000, Hogan, Chiricos and Gertz 2005, Richmond 1950).

Other findings of note include the number of factors that were not significant in the analysis. Contrary to most of the research literature, living in the US South was not predictive of any of the racial attitudes in the full models. Nor were measures of racial contact/threat, with neither neighborhood nor workplace integration exerting any significant influence on any racial attitudes in the full models.

There were at least two key limitations to the research presented in this chapter. First, the data were cross-sectional in nature and as such captured idiosyncratic evaluations of the various measures- especially the subjective insecurity variables. Insecurity is best measured in relative terms and multiple data points would allow for a fuller evaluation of the impact of insecurity across time and circumstances- something better achieved (to greater effect) in chapter two. Second, complex constructs like insecurity and racial prejudice might best be evaluated with qualitative research methods that allowed for the expression of nuanced attitudes and perspectives. Allowing respondents to directly describe the interaction between their own educational and economic experiences might shed new light on this relationship.

5.3 Chapter Two: Key Findings, Implications & Limitations

Put simply, the modeled context effects were of less overall import to the expression of the racial attitude outcome variables than was expected. Socioeconomic

context, represented by local unemployment rate, exerted almost no effect on any racial attitude model, save a very weak effect on racial resentment in the change model. Racial context, represented by local percent Non-Hispanic White, was a factor, but in a much more contingent and variable way than expected. Across several racial attitude models- counter to expectations- the higher percentage NHW was associated with more racially conservative attitudes- with the exception of traditional prejudice, for which the relationship was inverted in just one model. Critically, these relationships were observed only in 2006. In both the 2010 and change models the amount (or decrease) in percent NHW had no bearing on the expression of racial attitudes.

On the other hand, change in personal employment status between waves did play a significant role in two of the five attitude models. This is significant in that, contrary to much of the literature, personal economic insecurity was much more important than the socioeconomic character of the local context. Given that this is among the first such studies to incorporate a *change* in personal economic circumstances, it's worth of note and perhaps replication. It may be that being unemployed doesn't necessarily exert consistent effects on racial attitudes, but instead that *becoming* unemployed might influence a change in these attitudes. More research is needed to replicate these findings.

As in other chapters, political ideology played a significant role, reliably predicting higher racial resentment, higher levels of traditional prejudice and more opposition to race targeted programs in both 2006 and 2010. Those who *became* more conservative between the waves also *became* more likely to oppose increased funding

to African Americans (race targeting) across the two waves. If there was any surprise, it was that change in ideology did not predict more of the racial attitude models given the consistency of the ideological finding.

Though not the focus of this chapter, one other substantial finding is worth attention. Among all the effects in the models, race-of-interviewer effects reliably exerted significant influence on nearly all of the racial attitude models, net all other effects. In general terms, the NHW respondents expressed more racially conservative attitudes to white interviewers than to interviewers of color. This was, perhaps, not a surprise given the well-known nature of social desirability bias, etc. The evidence from the change models, however, was very interesting in that the effect of changing from white to black interviewer was much greater than changing from black to white in the prediction of various racial attitudes (though both were significant in most attitudinal models). This is important in that it suggests that white persons are more likely to underreport their racial liberalism than they are to over report their racial conservatism. This suggests that at least some of the recent moderation in the declaration of racial conservatism might be attributable to a diversifying interviewer pool, not to an actual change in attitudes. Further attention to race-of-interviewer effects in subsequent panel research is warranted.

There were several key limitations to chapter two worth mentioning. First, though several alternatives were tested, it's not clear that percent NHW is the best indicator of racial threat. Future research should employ racial context indicators that more ably take account of the multiracial context without collapsing all people of color into the same category. Second, the use of local unemployment rate as a

socioeconomic indicator was valuable, but perhaps does not as well incorporate the primarily education-oriented effects captured by other SES indicators in the literature. Future such analyses will benefit either from the inclusion of educational contextual data, or the construction of a more complex indicator that takes education into account. The final, and perhaps most important limitation of the chapter was the use of contextual data at the county level. Considerable research has suggested that the level of specificity of the context is very important to identifying the nature and even direction of racial and socioeconomic effects. Future research would benefit from the inclusion of data at a finer level (census tract) as well as the ability to evaluate the effects across multiple levels.

5.4 Chapter Three: Key Findings, Implications & Limitations

The objectives of chapter three were threefold- two empirical and one theoretical. The first empirical charge was to understand how color-blindness, as measured by a direct survey prompt, influenced opposition to race targeted programs. The second empirical aim was, for the first time, to evaluate the relationship between multiple measures of *racial apathy* and opposition to race targeted programs. Third, the theoretical challenge was to evaluate the competing claims of Sniderman and colleagues, who suggested that opposition to race targeted programs was primarily about color-blindness (the *principled opposition* position), and Bobo and colleagues who suggested that that opposition was primarily related to other racial attitudes (the *new racism* position).

On the first empirical question, color-blindness was related only to one race-targeting program (spending more on Black schools), but the analysis revealed that

those who were *less* color-blind were more likely to oppose this program. On the second empirical question, both measures of *racial apathy* were found to be predictive of a variety of race targeting attitudes, and these measures of *racial apathy* were among the very strongest predictors of opposition to race targeting of all of the racial attitudes analyzed.

These findings, then, provided clear and strong evidence for the *new racism* position in that not only were more color-blind persons not more likely to oppose race targeting, but in one case, *less* color-blindness was associated with opposition. Of the numerous other attitudinal measures included, every single one positively predicted opposition to at least one race targeted program. Taken together, these findings offer a substantial rebuff to the arguments of Sniderman and his colleagues in that there is no evidence that color-blindness animates opposition to, for example Affirmative Action. In other words, there is no evidence that whites oppose Affirmative Action because of an individualist rejection of group-based thinking. On the contrary, there is substantial and consistent evidence that whites are likely to draw significantly on group-based evaluations like *traditional prejudice, racial affect, racial resentment,* etc. in formulating such opposition.

Though not a primary aim, another important contribution of chapter three was the provision of a fairly comprehensive analysis of the influence of diverse racial attitudes on opposition to race targeted programs. The author knows of no other such study that includes so many different racial attitudes in analyses of race targeting programs. This is valuable if for no other reason that it is possible to give relative

weight to these different racial attitudes and to provide a framework for how they operate distinctly from one another.

There are at least two limitations to the research presented in chapter three. First, as with chapter one, the relationships tested here would benefit from analysis with multiple data points across time. Panel data analysis would allow an evaluation of whether the relationships observed were merely an artifact of the moment of observation or a robust attitude that as trans-contextual. The second limitation is that fairly little is known about the predictors of this color-blind attitude and what kinds of things might be associated with an endorsement of color-blindness. Subsequent research would benefit from a more substantive examination of the predictors of color-blindness. This would extend the present study by helping clarify how independently color-blindness operates from other racial attitudes.

5.5 Overall Limitations and Directions For Future Research

One always wishes for the "perfect" data in order to make *exactly* the kind of analysis one would like to do, though that is seldom the case. The primary limitation of each of these chapters is, in one way or another, associated with inadequacies of the survey data that were used. In general terms, survey data are most valuable when they can be used in conjunction with other sources of information- such as was the case in chapter two. Because persons are nested in multiple levels of social context and are often unaware or unable to articulate the effects of those contexts, self-reported closed-ended survey questions will always be limited in value- unless- that is, those data can be analyzed in conjunction with other diverse data sources.

One also seeks more specificity in the measures used as well. While the GSS offers a great number of well-tested and often very specific measures- in many cases constructed from existing theoretical and empirical work- one is limited to the questions posed by interviewers. Researchers are limited by the questions provided – questions that do not always directly speak to the core of the research question- and that was certainly the case in this project. The inclusion of the question about color-blindness, while critical to the analysis in chapter three, left ambiguity about whether the question was descriptive or prescriptive in nature. When attempting to adjudicate important disagreements in the literature, this ambiguity is not ideal.

Limitations of sample size were also important and though multiple imputation analysis was successfully conducted in chapters one and three, the number of questions that were not asked to every respondent made several desirable analyses difficult or impossible. The greatest challenge posed to the use of multi-level data is that there are very few multi-level analyses now possible with multiply imputed data- a factor that limited the findings in chapter two. Greater sample sizes and the statistical power that comes from them would have been of particular interest to the analyses in that chapter, but would have benefitted all of the work done in this dissertation project.

Of course, most of the questions implicated in these chapters are also valuable insofar as they are related to the attitudes of people of color. Future researchers might fruitfully examine, for example, how insecurity moderates the effects of education on racial resentment for Asian Americans. Subsequent analyses could well examine how low-status contexts impact Latinos differently than NHWs in the formulation of their

attitudes about African Americans. And, of course, researchers might further extend the literature by including the voices of African Americans in research focused on the relationship between color-blindness and support for race-targeted programs. It is not assumed that the mechanisms driving white racial attitudes are the same for people of color. In fact, given the significant racial stratification that remains in our society, one would expect exactly the opposite. But only further research could verify or falsify such hypotheses.

It also bears mentioning that in many cases, the models employed here yielded relatively small (pseudo) R^2 values, suggesting that a substantial amount of variation in the sources of these racial attitudes was uncaptured in the analyses. This is a limitation consistent with much of the other research in this area- owing primarily to the use of secondary survey data. The careful crafting of well-tested instruments whose primary focus is on racial attitudes is likely to improve the robustness of the findings presented in the previous pages.

5.6 Summary

The research presented here is a snapshot of white racial attitudes in the US at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. This research is valuable, as mentioned elsewhere, in that it captures a point in time along a trajectory of changing attitudes on the one hand, but also a relatively detailed view of these racial attitudes at a fairly unique time in US history on the other. This research makes no claims about the future, or about the ways in which the relationships observed might be generalized to non-white populations. The author hopes that this work and its narrow claims can join

an important intellectual conversation and help to advance our collective understanding of white racial attitudes in the United States.

What is clear, again, is that in spite of normative aspirations to the contrary, race still plays a prominent role in the way that white people in the United States think about themselves, others, and the society they live in. This project provides further evidence of this gap between beliefs and conditions, and in this way provides a point of departure for a different set of questions.

Questions about how and why whites might so understate their own prejudice and underestimate the prejudice of other whites. Questions about what it means to live in a society that is putatively non-racial and color-blind, but also riven with racial inequality. Questions about what it means for white men, an ever-shrinking portion of our society to retain most of the power and resources in that society. Questions, however, for other researchers and other projects.

The author hopes that the research presented here may extend the various implicated literatures, but also to contribute to a better understanding of the causes and consequences of racial attitudes outside of the academy. While, after all, the project of expanding our knowledge is noble and valuable in its own right, the subject of these analyses is not without enormous import for the everyday lives of members of our society. To the extent that these racial attitudes are both the source and the product of existing racial inequality, a better understanding of them is most useful insofar as that knowledge can be leveraged to further the cause of racial justice.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A Chapter One Scale Components and Factor Scores

Economic Insecurity Index (α = .671)

1. *"During the past 12 months, were you pressured to pay bills by stores, creditors, or bill collectors?"* (0= No, 1= Yes) **<finan4>**
2. "*In the last twelve months, have you fallen behind in paying your rent or mortgage?"* (0= No, 1= Yes) **<hrdshp1>**
3. "*In the last twelve months, have you lacked health insurance coverage (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross, an HMO, etc.)?"* (0= No, 1= Yes) **<hrdshp6>**

Racial Resentment Index (α = .684)

1. "*Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors.*" (5= Strongly Agree, 1= Strongly Oppose) **< wrkwayup>**
2. "*On the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are because most just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty?*" (1= Yes, 0= No). **<racdif4>**
3. "*On the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?*" (0= Yes, 1= No). **<racdif1>**

Racial Policy Index (α = .594)

1. *"Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?" (1 = Strongly Favor, 4 = Strongly Oppose)* ***<affrmact>***
2. *"Some people think that African-Americans have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to African Americans. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (1= strongly support, 5= strongly oppose)* ***<helpblk>***
3. *"I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount on assistance to Blacks" (1= Too Little, 3= Too Much)* ***<natracey>***

Traditional Prejudice Index (α = .711)

1. "*Do most African Americans tend to be hardworking or lazy?*" (1=Very Hardworking, 7= Very Lazy) **<workblks>**
2. "*Do African Americans tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent?*" (1= Very Intelligent, 7= Very Unintelligent) **<intlblks>**

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Appendix B Chapter Two Variable Information

	Variable	**Range**	***Text of Prompt***
Racial Attitude Variables	Blacks Unintelligent	1-7 (7=Very Intelligent) (Higher values represent respondent's assessment that whites are more intelligent than African Americans.)	Standardized Index Of Difference Between: *" Do African Americans Tend To Be Intelligent or Unintelligent?"* *AND* *" Do Whites Tend To Be Intelligent or Unintelligent?"*
	Blacks Lazy	1-7 (7=Very Hard-Working) (Higher values represent respondent's assessment that whites are more hard-working than African Americans.)	Standardized Index Of Difference Between: *" Do African Americans Tend To Be Lazy or Hard Working?"* *AND* *" Do Whites Tend To Be Lazy or Hard Working?"*
	Racial Resentment	1-5 (1= Strongly Disagree)	*"Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors."*
	Affirmative Action	1-5 (1= Strongly Oppose)	"*Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?"*
	Help Black	1-3 (1 = Strongly Disagree)	"Some people think that African-Americans have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to African-Americans."
Individual-Level Control Variables	Cohort	1927- 1988	*"In what year were you born?"*
	Male	0-1 (1= Male-identified)	*Recorded by interviewer.*
	Conservative	1-7 (7= Extremely Conservative)	*"Politically speaking, do you think of yourself as more of a conservative or more of a liberal?"*
	Some College	0-1 (1= Respondent reported having attended at least some college)	*"What is the highest level of education that you have completed?"*
	Income	1-12 (1= under $1000, 12 = $250,000+)	*"In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is?"*
	Unemployed	0-1 (1= unemployed)	*"At any time during the last twelve months, have you been unemployed and looking for work for as long as a month?"*

	Integrated Neighborhood	0-1 (1= Neighborhood is integrated)	*Are there any African-Americans living in this neighborhood now?*
	Financial Situation	1-3 (1= Better)	*"Compared with the last couple of years, how would you describe your current financial situation?"*
Context-Level Variables	County Percent Non-Hispanic White	.12 - .98 (variable by year)	*Percentage of persons living in the county who identified as White and Non-Hispanic. (via Census)*
	County Average Unemployment Level	2.3 – 12.9 (variable by year)	*Percentage of all persons eligible to work who are currently unemployed and looking for work. (via BLS)*
	Region of Residence	0-1 (1=US South)	*Based on the regional designations established by the US census.*
	Race of Interviewer	0 -1 (1= Black Interviewer)	Race of interviewer recorded by interviewer self-identification.

Appendix C Chapter Three Variable Information

	Variable	Range	Text of Prompt
Key Racial Attitudes	Color-blind	1-4 (4= Strongly Agree)	*"For the most part, I'm color-blind; that is, I don't care about what race people are."*
	Traditional Prejudice	1-7 (7=Very Intelligent) (Higher values represent respondent's assessment that whites are more intelligent than African Americans.)	Standardized Index Of Difference Between: *" Do African Americans Tend To Be Intelligent or Unintelligent?"* *AND* *" Do Whites Tend To Be Intelligent or Unintelligent?"*
Control Variables	Conservative	1-7 (7= Extremely Conservative)	*"Politically speaking, do you think of yourself as more of a conservative or more of a liberal?"*
	South	0-1 (1= Living in US South)	*Recorded by interviewer. (Dichotomized from Census Designated Regions)*
	Male	0-1 (1= Male-identified)	*Recorded by interviewer.*
	Cohort	1927- 1988	*"In what year were you born?"*
	Rural	0-1 (1= Residents of Rural Areas)	*Size of place reported by respondent was inhabited by less than 60,0000 persons.*
	Some College	0-1 (1= Respondent reported having attended at least some college)	*"What is the highest level of education that you have completed?"*
	Income	1-12 (1= under $1000, 12 = $250,000+)	*"In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is?"*
	Unemployed	0-1 (1= unemployed)	*"At any time during the last twelve months, have you been unemployed and looking for work for as long as a month?"*
	Work Integrated	1-5 (5= all Black, 1= all White)	*"Are the people who work where you work all white, mostly white, about half and half, mostly black, or all black?"*
	Neighborhood Integrated	0-1 (1= African Americans in Neighborhood)	*"As far as you know, are there any African American residents of this neighborhood?"*
	Upward Mobility	1-5 (1=Far Below, 5= Far Above) (Higher values represent upward mobility)	Standardized Index Of Difference Between: *"Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?"* *AND* *"At age 16, when compared with American families in general, would you say your family income was far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?"*
Racial Affect Measures	Not Live with Blacks	1-5 (1=Strongly Favor, 5= Strongly Oppose)	Standardized Index Of Difference Between:

		(Higher values represent preference for living among white persons)	*"How do you feel about Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were black?"* *"How do you feel about Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were white?"*
	Not Marry Blacks	1-5 (1=Strongly Favor, 5= Strongly Oppose) (Higher values represent preference for marriage to white persons)	Standardized Index Of Difference Between*:* *"What about having a close relative marry a black person? Would you be in very favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?"* *AND* *"What about having a close relative marry a white person? Would you be in very favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?"*
	Not Close to Blacks	1-9 (1= Not at all close, 9= Very close) (Higher values represent relatively high social distance from African Americans)	Standardized Index Of Difference Between*:* "In general, how close do you feel to blacks?" AND "In general, how close do you feel to whites?"
Stratification Beliefs	No Housing Discrimination	1-4 (1= A lot, 4= None at all)	*"How much discrimination is there that makes it hard for African Americans to buy or rent housing wherever they want?"*
	No Job Discrimination	1-4 (1= A lot, 4= None at all)	*"How much discrimination is there that hurts the chances of African Americans to get good paying jobs?"*
	No Discrimination	0-1 (1= No Discrimination)	*"On the average African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?"*
	Not Lack of Educational Opportunities	0-1 (1= No Lack of Educational Opportunities)	*"On the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are because most African-Americans don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty?"*
	Inborn Disability	0-1 (1= In-born disability)	*"On the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are because most African-Americans have less in-born ability to learn?"*
	Lack of Will	0-1 (1= Lack of Will)	*"On the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are because most African-Americans just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty?"*

	Poor Socialization	0-1 (1= No Poor Socialization)	*"On the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are because most African-Americans had a poor upbringing?"*
Racial Apathy	Don't Care About Race	1-4 (1=Not concerned at all)	*"How concerned are you personally about race relations?"*
	Racism is Not My Business	1-4 (1=Strongly Disagree)	*"Maybe some racial minority groups do experience unfair treatment, but that's no business of mine."*
Racial Resentment	Racism Used As An Excuse	1-4 (1=Strongly Disagree)	*"For African Americans to succeed, they need to stop using racism and slavery as excuses."*
	Racism Is In The Past	1-4 (1=Strongly Disagree)	*"African Americans do not need any special consideration because racism is a thing of the past."*
	Tired of Hearing About Race	1-4 (1=Strongly Disagree)	*"I'm tired of hearing people talk about racial problems in the U.S. today."*
	Whites Hurt By Affirmative Action	1-3 (1=Not Very Likely)	*"What do you think the chances are these days that a white person won't get a job or promotion while an equally or less qualified black person gets one instead?*
	Whites are Disadvantaged Relative to Blacks	1-4 (1=Strongly Agree)	*"Whites are generally treated better than other groups in American society today."*
	Blacks Should Work Their Way Up	1-5 (1= Strongly Disagree)	*"Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors."*
	Special Considerations Are Unfair	1-4 (1= Strongly Disagree)	*"I resent any special considerations that Africans Americans receive because it's unfair to other Americans."*

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VITA

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Education

Purdue University

Ph.D., Sociology 2014
*Dissertation: "*White Racial Attitudes in the Age of Obama"
Dissertation Chair: Dr. Kevin Stainback

M.S., Sociology 2006

Indiana University *2004*

B.S., Secondary Education 2004
Areas of Certification:
Sociology, U.S. History, World History,
Geography, and Government

Research Interests

Racial Attitudes; Whiteness Studies; Social Construction of Race; Inequality and Social Stratification Beliefs; Social Movements; Inter-Ethnic Violence; Media Framing

Teaching Interests

Race, Inequality & Stratification, Social Theory, Political Sociology, Social Movements, Media & Society.

Refereed Journal Articles

LeCount, Ryan Jerome and Philo Wasburn. 2009. "Fear Factor(s): Terrorist Threat Warnings and Television Network News Coverage of the President." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology.* Volume 37(1): 27-46.

Teaching Positions (teaching portfolio available upon request)

Assistant Professor of Sociology

Department of Sociology, Hamline University 2012–Present

Courses taught: Racial and Cultural Minorities, Political Sociology, Introduction to Sociology, Senior Seminar, First-Year Seminar, Social Movements, and The Sociology of Tourism

Graduate Instructor (sole responsibility for course design and instruction)

Department of Sociology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

Courses taught: Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations; Social Problems, Sociology of Religion, Introduction to Sociology, Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relation (online course), Social Problems (Online course)

Adjunct Professor (sole responsibility for course design and instruction) 2010–2011

Department of Social Sciences, IVY Tech State College, Lafayette, Indiana

Courses taught: Introduction to Sociology

Graduate Instructor 2005–2006

Department of Communications, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
Courses taught: Presentational Speaking

Graduate Teaching Assistant 2006, 2010

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
Courses: Social Theory, Introduction to Sociology; Sociology of Religion, American Society; Social Movements

Student Teacher 2004

Bloomington High School South, Bloomington, Indiana
Courses taught*: Sociology; Geography*

Conference Presentations

2014 (With Kathy Abrahamson) "Does Health Status Influence Attitudes Regarding Government Healthcare Spending? Applying Terror Management Theory to the Healthcare Spending Debate.
Society for the Study of Social Problems National Conference, San Francisco, CA

2013 "But I Don't See Race: Colorblindness and Opposition to Race-Targeted Programs"
Sociologists of Minnesota, St. Paul MN

2010 "Inter-ethnic Violence as Production And Maintenance of Racial Boundaries."
African American Studies and Research Center Symposium, West Lafayette, IN

"Shifting Identities, Shifting Fortunes: Appeals to Whiteness and the Wilmington Massacre and Coup of 1898." North Central Sociological Association, Chicago, IL

2009 "Fear Factor(s): Terrorist Threat Warnings, Television Network News Coverage, and Approval of the President." North Central Sociological Association, Dearborn, MI

(With R.C. Morris) "Class, Academic Culture, and Efficacy Attitudes: The Effect of SES on Student Attitudes about Self-Efficacy in University and Junior College Settings" North Central Sociological Association, Dearborn, MI

"Education as a Panacea? Explaining Racial Anxiety among Working Class Whites." North Central Sociological Association, Dearborn, MI

"Race, Class, and Interest: Constructed Identities and the Politics of Collective Violence." Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL

2008 Discussant, *How Class Works Conference,* SUNY Stony Brook

Invited Presentations

2014 *Race and the War on Poverty: The Racialization of Anti-Poverty Programs in the United States.* Hamline University School of Law.

2013 *Race, Culture and Education: Who Thrives and Why?* Eastview Dialogues. Apple Valley, MN

Works under Review

LeCount, Ryan Jerome. "*But I Don't See Race": Color-blindness and Opposition to Race-Targeted Policy*" **Under Review at The American Sociological Review**

LeCount, Ryan Jerome and R.C. Morris. "*Class, Academic Culture, and Efficacy Attitudes: The Effect of SES on Student Attitudes about Self-Efficacy in University and Junior College Settings*"- **Under Review at Sociological Forum**

LeCount, Ryan Jerome and Kathleen Abrahamson. "*Does Health Status Influence Attitudes Regarding Government Healthcare Spending? Applying Terror Management Theory to the Healthcare Spending Debate.*" **Under Review at the Sociological Quarterly**

Work in Progress

LeCount, Ryan Jerome. "*Respondent Education and Race-Of-Interviewer Effects: A Panel Analysis"*

LeCount, Ryan Jerome. "*The Whiting Out of Progress: Race, Class and the Fall Of The Fusion Movement in North Carolina*"

LeCount, Ryan Jerome and Nick Vargas. "*Moving Toward Whiteness: Structural Anxiety and Racial Self-Identification*"

LeCount, Ryan Jerome and Nick Vargas. "*The Persistence of Belief in Innate Racial Difference in a 'Colorblind' Society: Some Structural Determinants*."

LeCount, Ryan Jerome and Hubert Izienicki. "*Constructing the Future by Erasing The Past: The Cultural Production of 'Polishness' in 21st Century Poland*."

LeCount, Ryan Jerome and K. Harry Morgan. "*Shifting Identities, Shifting Interests, and Shifting Fortunes: Persian and Arab Shiites in the Iran/Iraq Border Region*"

Professional Service

Co-Facilitator, Hamline White Privilege Circle *2013–Present*

Member, Sexual Violence Prevention Taskforce *2013–Present*

Faculty Advisor and Participant NCUR *2014– Present*

Member Hamline University NCORE Team *2014–2015*

Member, Diversity Initiatives Steering Committee *2014–Present*

Member, Sociology Search Committee *2014*

Member, CHS Director Search Committee *2014*

Professional Membership and Leadership

President, Purdue University Sociology Graduate Organization *2008–2011*

Vice President, Purdue University Sociology and Anthropology Graduate Student Association *2007–2008*

Charter Member and Executive Officer, Purdue University Sociology and Anthropology Graduate Student Association *2006–2007*

Member, Graduate Committee, Department of Sociology *2006–2009*

Member, American Sociological Association Section on Racial and Ethnic Minorities

Member, Society for the Study of Social Problems

Member, Midwest Sociological Society

Member, North Central Sociological Association

Awards and Certification

Recipient, Outstanding Faculty Member, Hedgeman Center, Hamline University *2014*

Finalist, Outstanding Graduate Teaching Award *2007–2010*

Recipient, Graduate Certificate in Survey Research *2008*